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 Distracted driving, a hazard that is increasingly common in the United States 
(U.S.), creates a risk for occupational injury and death for truck drivers. The overall goal 
of this dissertation was to understand the burden of distraction-involved truck fatalities in 
the U.S. and gain insight into workplace and personal factors that would affect distracted 
driving in this occupational population. First, after describing the rates of truck crashes 
by state, I used a longitudinal analysis of fatality rates in crashes involving distracted 
truck drivers and whether or not state and federal distracted driving bans affected these 
rates. Second, I undertook a mixed methods study using surveys of drivers and interviews 
with experts on distracted driving and truck driving safety. 
Research findings are presented in three manuscripts: Effects of State on Fatalities 
Involving Distracted Truck Drivers; The Effects of Safety Climate on Distracted Driving 
in Commercial Truck Drivers; and Understanding Commercial Truck Drivers’ Decision-
Making Process Concerning Distracted Driving. First, I examined the rates of distraction-
involved truck fatalities in the U.S. over an 11-year period and found that while state 
texting and handheld cell phone use bans were not associated with decreases in fatality 
rates, fatality rates to truck drivers and all vehicle occupants had been decreasing since 
2007. The second manuscript explored the relationship of organizational safety climate, 
using an established questionnaire and key informant interviews, and found that 
management commitment to safety and communications and procedures were important 
for keeping drivers safe from the hazard of distracted driving. The third manuscript 
explored how the constructs of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) affected truck 
iii 
drivers’ decision-making concerning communication on the job. Key informants 
described how the different aspects of the TPB could influence drivers’ decision making; 
in regression analysis for both texting and dispatch device use, the TPB constructs of 
intentions, norms, and perceived behavioral control were correlated with distraction-
involved near-crashes on the job.  
Results from this dissertation revealed that while distraction-involved truck crash 
rates are decreasing, there is wide variation between states. Furthermore, truck drivers’ 
supervisors play an important role in creating an organizational climate where drivers do 
not feel pressured to undertaking distracting tasks while driving. These results should 
impact organizational policies and enforcement of these policies to prevent distracted 
driving. States, worker representatives, industry groups, and academic researchers will 
influence future enactment of governmental and organizational policies concerning 
distracted driving in truck drivers. 
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 Although distractions have always existed for drivers, the recent availability of 
mass-marketed electronic communication devices has brought this hazard to the forefront 
of motor vehicle safety. For the worker who drives on the job, electronic communication 
while driving has become the norm due to both social and occupational pressures. 
Commercial truck drivers in the United States (U.S.) face numerous distractions of 
varying degrees of danger while trying to safely operate multi-ton vehicles. This thesis 
seeks to understand the scope of the problem that distracted driving creates for truck 
drivers, how distraction affects driver behavior, how company safety climate affects 
distracted driving, and how policies can positively or negatively affect this problem. 
 
 This introductory section will first describe distracted driving from its origins to 
modern hazards. Second, I will delve into distractions that are unique to commercial 
truck drivers. Third, I will describe how workplace safety climate affects safe worker and 
driver behavior. Fourth, I will also describe how drivers make decisions on safe driving 
behaviors and how this will apply to commercial truck drivers. Finally, I will discuss 
what steps have been taken to reduce distracted driving and what effects, if any, these 




 Defining distracted driving first requires a description of all tasks that drivers can 
undertake while driving. Ablassmeier and colleagues break down these tasks into three 
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categories: primary tasks that only control vehicle speed and direction; secondary tasks 
that support the primary tasks, such as turning on headlights or checking mirrors; and 
tertiary tasks that are any activities the driver undertakes that are unrelated to driving [1]. 
It is these secondary and tertiary tasks that distract from primary driving. Distraction 
from primary driving comes in four forms: 1) visual distractions that take the driver’s 
eyes off the forward roadway; 2) auditory distractions that take the driver’s aural 
perception from relative driving cues; 3) cognitive distractions take the driver’s mind off 
the driving task; and 4) manual distractions take the driver’s hands off the wheel [2]. The 
first two forms of distraction delay the driver from receiving necessary information for 
the driving task, the third affects the processing of this incoming information, and the 
fourth delays the driver from taking corrective action necessitated by the situation [3]. 
Thus, based on this classification the definition of distracted driving that I will use for 
this thesis is, “any secondary or tertiary task that takes the driver’s eyes, hands, or 
attention away from the primary task of driving.” 
 
 Studies of driver behavior using in-vehicle cameras have found over two dozen 
secondary and tertiary tasks as sources of distraction [4-7]. Distractions cover a range of 
behaviors, from common activities, such as reading a map or GPS and talking with a 
passenger, to less frequently observed activities, like reading the newspaper or shaving. 
An emergent threat is activities involving cellular phone use [8]. The term cell phone use 
while driving (CPWD) encompasses any task involving a cell phone, including dialing a 
phone, talking on the phone, and reading or writing messages [9]. CPWD has been 
increasing in recent years due to the proliferation of cellular phones in the United States 
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and elsewhere [10, 11]. Two of the most dangerous CPWD tasks are dialing the phone 
and sending, reading, and writing short message service text messages (a.k.a. texting) [6]. 
Dialing and texting both involve manual, visual, and cognitive distractions [2]. Both in 
the laboratory setting [12, 13] and during actual driving [6], texting has been shown to be 
the greatest hazard for crash or near crash. This hazard is magnified by the exponential 
growth of text messages sent in the U.S. since 2006: the number of text messages sent in 
to U.S. doubled from 2006 to 2007, then doubled again from 2007 to 2008 [14].  
 
 Not all drivers are equally likely to drive distracted, nor are they affected equally 
by distractions. While teens and drivers in their twenties [15, 16] are more likely to 
undertake phone-related distraction while driving, drivers over 65 might take longer to 
cognitively process such distractions [17]. A review of risk factors associated with 
distracted driving found no evidence that males or females were more affected by cell 
phone distraction than the other gender [18]. Drivers who choose to drive distracted are 
less likely to see it as a dangerous activity [19], are more likely to undertake aggressive 
driving behaviors like speeding and drink driving [20], and cannot accurately gauge their 
own level of distraction [21].  
 
 Prior studies have examined the effects of distracted driving on the crash risk, yet 
the results have varied depending on the definition of distraction under study as well as 
what study method was used in a given investigation. As CPWD is the most studied 
distraction, I will use it as an example. The first study of CPWD and crash risk by 
Redelmeier and Tibshiriani in 1997 used a case-crossover study design and found that 
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“telephone calls” increased the relative risk of injury crash 4.3 times [22]. One year later, 
Violanti used a case-control study of fatal crashes to find that “phone use” increased the 
odd ratio (OR) for crashing 9.3 times [23]. Into the 2000s, case-control [15] and case-
crossover [24] studies still produced crash ORs of 2.5 and 4.1, respectively. 
Technological advances have allowed for naturalistic driving studies, where researchers 
can view drivers in their natural state and more accurately estimate the risks of specific 
aspects of CPWD. The trade-off for precision in these studies is a lower number of 
drivers that can be analyzed and, consequently, the infrequent crashes and near crash 
situations. Klauer and colleagues conducted a study for the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and found that dialing a phone increased crash risk 2.8 
times yet talking on a device did not increase crash risk [5].  
 
It is important to note that the above studies generally surveyed the same activity 
(“talking on a cell phone”) yet their methods and definitions of the observed behaviors 
produced different results. Few studies have the statistical power to accurately measure 
crash risk for all subtasks involved in a cell phone conversation [6], such as dialing the 
phone, answering the phone, or holding the phone during a conversation. Critical analysis 
of distraction definitions and comparing these crash risks between studies should inform 
researchers when they are considering which aspects of a given distraction are most 
dangerous. 
 
The largest naturalistic driving study to examine distracted driving in commercial 
truck drivers and was conducted by the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) 
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[6]. The VTTI Study, as it is referred to, compared 4,452 safety critical events (defined 
by the authors as crashes, near crashes, crash-relevant conflicts and unintentional lane 
deviations) to 19,888 control periods and calculated the OR of safety critical events for 
35 different secondary and tertiary tasks. Table 1 lists the ORs for all CPWD tasks in the 
VTTI Study. Of note, texting-while-driving produces an OR for safety critical events of 
23.2. 
 
Table 1. Odds ratios (ORs) for safety critical events in commercial truck drivers for cell 






Text messaging 23.24 9.69 – 55.73 
Dialing cell phone 5.93 4.57 – 10.69 
Talk or listen to handheld phone (excluding 
dialing)  1.04 0.89 – 1.22 
Talk or listen to hands-free phone (excluding 





 Commercial trucks, under the jurisdiction of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) in the U.S., are those vehicles that either 1) have a gross 
vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds; 2) have a gross combination weight 
rating of 26,001 or more pounds; or 3) are of any size and transports hazardous materials 
[25]. (The term “commercial” does not necessarily mean that the driver works for a for-
profit organization; it is simply the wording used by the FMCSA.) Generally speaking, 
this definition includes semi-cabs and trailers and non-pivoting, unibody trucks. 
Commercial truck drivers, as they will be referred to from here on, are distracted by 
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CPWD, texting, adjusting the radio, eating and all the other hazards faced by non-
commercial drivers [4]. There are additional occupational distractions that commercial 
truck drivers face not found in personal vehicle operation, such as interacting with a 
dispatch computer and using a CB radio [6]. Appendix 1 is from the aforementioned 
VTTI Study and lists the OR and 95% confidence intervals for safety critical event for 35 
secondary and tertiary tasks that commercial truck drivers were observed undertaking 
while driving. 
 
 Even without the modern hazard of distracted driving, commercial truck drivers 
are a population that is already under occupational stress. Trucking and courier services 
(as grouped by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) have the highest costs for nonfatal 
occupational injuries and illnesses in the U.S. [26]. As has been described by other 
authors [27-29], truck driver health and well-being is affected by issues such as 
sleepiness and fatigue, poor physical fitness, and the work being shift work-based.  
 
Motor vehicle crashes are the main cause of occupational fatality in the U.S. and 
not surprisingly this is the case for commercial truck drivers [30, 31]. The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted a descriptive analysis of workplace 
transportation fatalities and found that increased occupational MVC fatality was 
associated with workers characteristics such as being over 55 years of age, of male 
gender, or of Native American and Alaska Native race [30]. The CDC also found that the 
highway transportation fatality rate for truck drivers (19.6 per 100,000 workers) is 22 
times higher than the national average [30]. In 2010, 304 of the 415 fatalities (73%) of 
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occupational fatalities to workers classified under Truck Transportation by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) were from motor vehicle incidents [31].  
 
Although it would make sense that workers exposed to frequent occupational 
driving would have high incidence of motor vehicle fatalities, the fatality rate for truck 
occupants was lower than passenger vehicle occupants, 3.7 per billion vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) and 19.3 per billion VMT in 1999, respectively [32]. There are a few 
possible explanations for the lower fatality rate in truck passengers versus passenger 
vehicle occupants. Truck drivers, in obtaining their commercial driver’s license, are 
required to have more training than operators of privately owned vehicles. Using 
Maryland as an example, applicants for a commercial driver’s license must have already 
obtained a regular Class C license in addition to other requirements, such as being 21-
years-old for Interstate licensure and proof of a physical exam [33]. Also, the large mass 
of commercial trucks offers relative protection to its occupants compared to occupants of 
smaller vehicle [34]. Thus when a commercial truck driver is involved in a crash with 
other vehicles, occupants in the other vehicles are at greater risk for fatality than the truck 
driver him- or herself. 
 
 For commercial truck drivers the vehicle cab is their workplace, so distraction on 
the job becomes and occupational hazard. Aside from work on commercial truck drivers 
done by VTTI, other researchers have examined distracted driving in the occupational 
setting. A study by Walsh and colleagues examined attitudes toward CPWD among 
Australian drivers and found that those who claimed to drive mainly for business 
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purposes were more like to have positive attitudes towards CPWD and intended to 
undertake CPWD in the future versus those who drove mainly for non-business purposes 
[35]. Walsh  recognize that cell phones have become a business tool and the ability 
to both drive and conduct business simultaneously is a draw for business drivers. While 
some drivers may want to undertake CPWD activities to improve work efficiency, some 
drivers are forced to do so against their will. When drivers are under time pressures, they 
lose what Caird and Kline [36] refer to as “adaptive degrees of freedom,” or the ability to 
avoid unsafe behaviors in adverse driving situations. If an employer requires drivers to 
multitask while driving, it becomes an issue of workplace safety climate.  
 
				
Drivers believe that they can be more efficient by taking phone calls while driving 
[35]. This would seemingly be a time saver employers and worker, yet it is well 
established that DD raises crash risk. If a company was to consider creating a policy on 
CPWD or other DD, a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to weigh these supposed 
time saving versus the potential of a property damage-, injury-, or fatality-involved crash, 
any potential ensuing liability claims [37], or costs associated with workers compensation 
[38]. Although such an economic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, similar 
analysis has been done for company seat belt policies (for an example, see Boyce and 
Geller [39]). 
 Not all occupational drivers face similar pressures concerning whether or not they 
should undertake distractions while driving. Employers could send implicit or explicit 
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signals to their drivers concerning driving distracted on the job. On one end of the 
spectrum, an organization’s drivers could be explicitly told that it is against company 
policy to undertake distractions while driving, and communications equipment in the cab 
would only work when the vehicle was at rest. At the opposite end of the spectrum, an 
organization could require drivers to take calls or answer messages while driving to 
“improve” efficiency. Between the two extremes there are numerous other options: an 
organization could ban personal communication for its drivers while still requiring them 
to be available to communicate with management; an organization could have no policy 
on distracted driving at all; or, an organization could explicitly say that drivers were not 
to undertake distractions, yet still contact drivers when management knows that those 
drivers are on the road. Measuring workplace communications, time pressures, and safety 
procedures are some of the elements that fall under the broader study of workplace safety 
climate [40, 41]. 
 
 The concept of safety climate was developed by Dov Zohar, and he defines it as 
shared perceptions among employees of an organization concerning the procedures, 
practices, and reinforced behaviors surrounding the performance of high-risk operations 
[41]. Most commonly measured using the Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCQ) [42], this 
workplace assessment asks workers to describe how highly they feel management values 
communication, work pressures, training, and management’s commitment to safety [41-
44]. Two meta-analyses found that the perception of management’s commitment to safety 
is the most commonly assessed aspect of safety climate [42, 43]. Taken 	 as advised 
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by Zohar [41], safety climate can describe the complex signals sent by management to 
workers in regards to the value of worker safety.  
 
 The SCQ is an instrument that has workers answers questions on a Likert scale, 
the score of which are compared to occupational outcomes, such as injuries or safe 
behavior for a given workplace [43, 45]. Originally consisting of 40 questions across 
different aspects of employee perception [40], the questionnaire has been modified and 
validated across many occupations [42]. Wills and colleagues conducted a pair of studies 
where they developed and validated a version of the SCQ for occupational drivers [46, 
47]. Their first study used a factor analysis to examine the components of SCQ- Modified 
for Drivers (SCQ-MD) [46]. Their second study used the SCQ-MD in conjunction with 
other established measures of driver behavior and compared these various instruments to 
workplace traffic offenses and crashes [47]. Because distracted driving is a workplace 
safety issue for commercial truck drivers, based on a review of the literature I 







 When making decisions on whether or not to undertake distracted driving while 
on the job, commercial truck drivers must weigh personal, social, and occupational costs 
and benefits for the distractions. The occupational safety approach of behavior-based 
safety is one method for understanding injuries in the workplace; however, it is more 
focused on safely changing behavior than describing it [48]. The Theory of Planned 
11
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Behavior (TPB) has been used to describe decision-making surrounding safe driving 
behaviors [49] and driving in the occupational setting [35, 50]. Using the dimensions of 
the TPB described below, I will explore how commercial truck drivers weigh social and 
occupational considerations when undertaking driving distractions.  
 
 In the 1970s, Fishbein and Azjen developed the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) hypothesizing that attitudes and subjective norms surrounding a behavior 
influenced intentions to undertake that behavior and that those intentions led the 
individual to do or not do the behavior [51]. A limitation of the TRA is that it could not 
account for an individual’s ability to make decisions in situations of reduced volitional 
control [52]. Ajzen modified the TRA to include the construct of perceived behavioral 
control (PBC) [53]. PBC is “the subjective probability that one is capable of executing a 
certain course of action” (p 93) [53], a concept that is very similar to self-efficacy in 
Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory [54]. However, Bandura’s model of self-efficacy 
involves the individual weighing the outcomes [55], whereas in the TPB the individual 
considers the outcomes in Intention and Attitude aspects of the model. Figure 1 is a 








The first step in measuring TPB constructs is conducting elicitation interviews to 
specify the questions for the target population of interest. Montaño and Kasprzyk [52] 
outline the execution of the elicitation interviews: first, the subjects are asked to describe 
any positive or negative attributes associated with performing the action (i.e. a 
description of attitudes); second, they describe social referents (individuals or groups) 
that could affect their decision, either positively or negatively; finally, PBC is assessed by 
eliciting any facilitators or barriers towards performance of a behavior. In the current 
study, I used elicitation interviews to identify distractions that commercial drivers 
commonly face, which social referents would affect their decisions to undertake these 
distractions, what benefits or costs could result from the distractions, and whether or not 
drivers had decisive control over undertaking or not these distractions while driving. The 
elicitation interviews used to generate the TPB constructs in this study will be explained 







 Part of this study will examine truck drivers who are members of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). The IBT represents over 1.4 million workers, mainly in 
truck transportation such as long-haul freight trucks, tanker trucks, and package delivery 
[57, 58]. Historically, the IBT has been a strong union [59, 60]. An example of their 
political power applied to occupational health is their role in influencing President Nixon 
to compromise in the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act [61]. Although 
they currently represent one tenth of all union workers in the U.S. [57], a review of the 
literature only found a single study of IBT members and occupational health [62]. There 
is no existing literature on IBT members and crash risk. 
 
 There is existing literature that compares union workers in many industries to 
their non-union counterparts. Compared to non-union work sites, unionization promotes 
workplace safety initiatives, such as proper labeling of chemical hazards and ergonomic 
protections [63, 64]. Union construction workers report more management support for 
safe work practices than non-union construction workers [65]. This has resulted in union 
workers having lower occupational injury and fatality rates than non-union workers in the 
U.S. [66-68]. Thus, when interpreting the results of the second and third manuscripts, I 
must be aware that the union drivers whom I am surveying are likely in safer 










 As has been done for other behaviors that increase motor vehicle injuries and 
fatalities (e.g., speeding, drunk driving), states and municipalities have passed laws 
prohibiting distracted driving, specifically CPWD. Ibrahim and colleagues summarize the 
history of state distracted driving laws in the U.S. [69]. As of July 2013, 41 states ban 
texting-while-driving and 11 states ban all handheld cell phone use (Washington, DC 
bans both) [70]. Although research has shown that there is no difference in crash risk 
comparing talking on a handheld versus hands-free phones, no state bans hands-free 
CPWD [22, 24]. Some states that don’t ban either or both activities have partial bans for 
novice drivers or bus drivers; no state has a ban specific to commercial truck drivers [70]. 
Aside from laws pertaining to CPWD bans, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma and the District of Columbia have laws banning general distracted driving 
[71]. To use Connecticut’s general distracted driving statute as an example, drivers are 
prohibited from engaging “in any activity not related to the actual operation of a motor 
vehicle in a manner that interferes with the safe operation of such vehicle on any 
highway” [72]. 
 
 Due to the federalized system of government in the U.S., the federal government 
in Washington, DC has little control over state driving laws. In the past, the federal 
government has necessitated that states have such regulations by making their enactment 
a stipulation for receiving federal highway funds dispensed by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) [73]. As of yet, no legislative action (necessary for funding 
appropriations) has been taken by the federal government on distracted driving for all 
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drivers. However, the Executive Branch of the government does have jurisdiction over 
some aspects of transportation. Under the guidance of DOT Secretary LaHood and with 
the support of President Obama, the Executive Branch has taken action on distracted 
driving [74]. Because the FMCSA has jurisdiction over commercial trucks, on September 
30, 2009, Secretary LaHood issued a rule stating that commercial truck and bus drivers 
would be banned from texting-while-driving through the entire U.S. [75]. The Final Rule 
went into effect October 2010. 
 
 Because texting and handheld cell phone bans are fairly recent developments, 
there are few thorough analyses of their effectiveness. The Governors’ Highway Safety 
Association summarized the literature in 2011 and found that CPWD laws had temporary 
effects on CPWD activity and little, if any, effect on crash and fatality rates [2]. There are 
many reasons why these laws have not been effective in achieving their goals. Some 
states allow for primary enforcement of CPWD laws while others limit officers to 
secondary enforcement [69]. Primary enforcement of a regulation allows for law 
enforcement officers to initiate a traffic stop upon observing the violation. If a law 
enforcement officer observes a regulation prohibited under secondary enforcement, he or 
she cannot pull over the offending driver specifically for that offense, and can only issue 
a citation for the secondary offense if the driver was pulled over for a primary offense. A 
legal review of the Pennsylvania texting ban describes the hurdles both law enforcement 




A series of studies of teen drivers in North Carolina found that although 
knowledge of a CPWD ban for teen drivers in the state slowly increased after the law was 
passed, there was no decrease in handheld cell phone use in either the short- or long-term 
[77, 78]. If the threat of punishment does not exist, then enforcement as a means to 
reduce distracted driving is no longer effective. In fact, other researchers have 
hypothesized that lack of enforcement, or inconsistent enforcement, is a major reason that 
prior CPWD bans have failed to reduce CPWD crashes or prevalence [14, 69, 79].  
 
 If the laws alone do not increase awareness nor result in high levels of 
enforcement, more concerted efforts could be necessary to produce an effect. NHTSA 
conducted a demonstration project of high-visibility enforcement in conjunction with a 
public relations campaign in up-state New York and Connecticut for such a purpose [80]. 
This NHTSA project, simultaneously implemented at both locations, was designed using 
elements of previously successful driving safety campaigns, such as the seatbelt 
enforcement project call “Click It or Ticket” and various drunk driving enforcement 
efforts. Combining paid media, earned media, and high-visibility enforcement, this 
project significantly reduced texting and handheld CPWD at both study sites. The 
NHTSA report on the project even included best practices for law enforcement [80]. Yet 
because it was so localized in time and place, there is no indication that this program 
reduced CPWD-related crashes or injuries. Also, because the project was conducted in 
2010 and 2011, there has been no follow-up study of the long-term effects in the two 
communities. Due to the high cost of conducting such a coordinated program, it would be 
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difficult to scale-up such a program to the state or national level; however, this project is 
evidence that government intervention can reduce prevalence of distracted driving. 
 
 Employers recognize that distracted driving can be an occupational hazard, so 
some organizations that require frequent driving have created their own policies on 
distracted driving for employees. These policies are not exclusive to only transportation 
companies: President Obama issued an Executive Order in 2009 banning all Federal 
employees from texting while driving while on government business [81].  
 
Organizations understand that not only are their employees at risk for injury, but 
also that they could be liable for injuries to third parties caused by their employees who 
are driving distracted [37]. At a 2011 conference on distracted driving in the occupational 
setting, members of the Network of Employers for Traffic Safety (NETS) described some 
of the steps their companies had taken to deal with occupational distracted driving [82]. 
The NETS members, such as Johnson & Johnson and Exxon, described how their 
companies have taken steps not just to curtail CPWD for their drivers, but also change 
management practices to insure that drivers are not being contacted when on the road. A 
2010 VTTI study of company cell phone policies have been shown to be more effective 
than state laws at reducing CPWD prevalence [4]. The VTTI researchers hypothesized 
that on-board safety monitoring technology gave management the ability to observe 
CPWD and those drivers working under a fleet cell phone policy knew that they could be 
directly impacted (i.e. punished) for violating the policy. This hypothesis is supported by 
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the finding that state bans did not reduce CPWD for drivers because the police could not 
monitor cell phone use directly, as thus punishment was less likely [4]. 
 
 Aside from the aforementioned NHTSA demonstration project involving high-
visibility enforcement [80], prior studies of CPWD bans have shown no effect on 
prevalence or crashes, transportation safety experts have been forced to explore other 
possible methods to reduce distracted driving. Consistent with the previously described 
Theory of Planned Behavior described above, current efforts on curbing distracted 
driving are considering the roles of social norms in CPWD. On March 22, 2013, the 
CDC’s National Center for Injury Prevention and Control sent an image (Figure 2) out 
via social networking service Twitter with the text “Don’t let distracted driving become a 
social norm.”  Three studies of non-American drivers all found that subjective norms, 
what one’s peers think about a given behavior, have a major influence on younger 
drivers’ decision-making surrounding CPWD [35, 83, 84]. One of these studies, 
examining Kuwaiti drivers, found that injunctive norms, i.e., the perception of frequency 
and acceptability of a given activity, were found to highly correlate with CPWD [84]. 
Thus, to change social norms on distracted driving, safety advocates will have to address 











 This Methods chapter will first describe the methods used in manuscript 1, then 
the methods used jointly in manuscripts 2 and 3. Manuscript 1 is a statistical exploration 
of fatality data and is mainly descriptive in nature. Manuscript 2 examines the effects of 
workplace safety climate on driver distraction and manuscript 3 uses the Theory of 
Planned Behavior to describe the decision-making process for drivers concerning 
distracted driving on the job. Manuscripts 2 and 3 were developed in concert and were 
conducted simultaneously using mixed methods.  
 
Manuscript 1: Statistical Analysis of Distraction-Related Truck Crash Fatalities 
 
 As described in the Introduction, motor vehicle incidents are the leading cause of 
occupational fatality in the U.S. Truck drivers face many forms of distraction while 
driving on the job [6], yet this issue has emerged in the national consciousness with the 
increase in cell phone use while driving, especially texting while driving. Prior to the 
current study, little research has been conducted on the burden of distracted driving on 
the population of truck drivers in the U.S. The Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS, formerly known as the Fatal Accident Reporting System) maintained by NHTSA 
[86] has been often used by researchers to track occupational [87, 88] and non-
occupational motor vehicle fatalities in the U.S. [14, 89]. FARS data are reported 
annually and fatalities can be assessed by state or territory. Using these design 
characteristics as the basis of the analysis, the purpose of Manuscript 1 is two-fold: 1) 
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describe distraction-involved truck fatalities by state and across the study period; and 2) 
assess the impact of state and federal distracted driving regulations on fatality rates. 
 
	 
 The FARS data are publicly available and free to download. Cases in FARS are 
downloaded by year and each case is assigned a unique observation number. Any crash 
that involves a motor vehicle and result in the death of a motorist or non-motorist within 
30 days of the crash is required to be compiled by each state (by a state FARS Analyst); 
these state-level reports are then combined by NHTSA [90]. Sources that the states use to 
complete data entry include Police Accident Reports, death certificates, state vehicle 
registration files, coroner/medical examiner reports, state driver licensing files, hospital 
medical records, state highway department data, emergency medical service reports, and 
vital statistics data [90]. FARS has over 120 variables for each case (all of which are not 
always recorded or required) [90]. It has been shown that when the variables get more 
specific (e.g., vehicle make and model), the less likely they are to be consistently entered 
in FARS [91]. NHTSA states that each Analyst’s data entry is checked for consistency 
and completeness on a continuing basis; however, the manual describing the FARS data 
does not indicate how levels of completeness and accuracy are measured and what is 
considered acceptable [90]. 
 
The variables that I downloaded from FARS for each year were Seating Position, 
Injury Severity, Body Type, Gross Vehicle Weight Rating, Related Factors- Driver Level 
(up to four values of this variable were available for each subject), State, Case Number, 
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Vehicle Number, and Person Number. Data were downloaded from FARS as text files 
and uploaded into Stata v.12.1 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX). I downloaded every 
case for each individual year, and then used the following process to identify the cases of 
interest. 
 
 To collect the appropriate fatalities, I first needed to identify crashes involving 
trucks and then determine when the drivers of the trucks were distracted. To identify 
crashes involving trucks, two FARS variables were used: Body Type and Gross Vehicle 
Weight Rating (GVWR) for each year of data [92]. Because the GVWR variable was first 
included in the 2000 database, this year was established as the first year of the study 
period. Table 2 lists the Body Type categories designating commercial trucks. These 
Body Type values were validated using GVWR, as recommended by NHTSA in the 
FARS Coding Manual [92]. I checked to insure that each vehicle identified as having a 
Body Type found in Table 2 aligned with the FMCSA definition described in the 
Introduction [25] using the GVWR variable. For vehicles with values of 64 and 79 for 
Body Type, 204 vehicles were designated as not Commercial Motor Vehicles (CMVs) 
because their GVWR was below 10,000 lbs. threshold that FMCSA uses to define CMVs. 
 
After identifying crashes involving commercial trucks, I needed to identify those 
truck drivers who were driving distracted. Because of a change in the FARS database for 
2010, separate methods were necessary to identify those truck drivers who were 
distracted for the 2000 through 2009 data and in the 2010 data. For 2000 through 2009, I 
used the Related Factors- Driver Level variable. Table 3 displays the values, as described 
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by Wilson and Stimpson, indicating a distracted driver using Related Factors- Driver 
Level [14]. Because the Related Factors- Driver Level variable was deleted in 2010, the 
Driver Condition at Crash Time and Driver Distracted By variables were queried to 
determine distracted drivers. Table 3 displays the values from these variables that 
indicate a distracted driver. In a 2010 report, NHTSA indicated that most information on 
distraction-involved crashes comes from police reports [93]. The report concludes that 
distraction data are likely unreported due to many factors surrounding police report data 
entry, including whether or not distraction involvement is a field on the police report 
form and the rate at which new technologies make it difficult for police reports to 
accurately repot these data. 
Table 2. Codes for the Body Type variable from FARS used to select for crashes 




Description of vehicle 
60 Step van 
61 Single-unit straight truck (10,000 lbs.<GVWR19,500 lbs.) 
62 Single-unit straight truck (19,500 lbs.<GVWR26,000 lbs.) 
63 Single-unit straight truck (GVWR > 26,000 lbs.) 
64 Single-unit straight truck (GVWR unknown) 
66 Truck-tractor (Cab only, or with any number of trailing 
units; any weight) 
71 Unknown if single-unit or combination unit Medium Truck 
(10,000 lbs. < GVWR < 26,000 lbs.) 
72 Unknown if single-unit or combination unit Heavy Truck 
(GVWR > 26,000 lbs.) 
78 Unknown medium/heavy truck type 






In FARS, identifying a driver-related factor does not assign “blame” to that factor 
for having caused the crash. This analysis did not account for other vehicular or 
environmental factors, nor factors related to the other driver (in the case of multiple-
vehicle crashes) in our analysis. Thus I will refer to these crashes as distraction-involved 
or distraction-related crashes; not “caused by” distracted driving. After identifying the 
above crashes, fatalities to distracted truck drivers were identified using the Seating 
Position and Injury Severity variables. 
Table 3. Values of FARS variables indicating a distracted driver, 2000 through 2010. 
Year 
FARS variable 






3- Emotional; 6- Inattentive; 93- Cellular Telephone; 94- Fax 
Machine; 95-  Computer; 96- On-board navigation system; 97- 






3- Emotional; 6- Inattentive; 93- Cellular Telephone present in 
vehicle; 94- Cellular telephone in use in vehicle; 95- 
computer/fax machine/printers; 96- onboard navigation system; 






3- Emotional; 6- Operating the vehicle in a careless or 
inattentive manner; 93- Cellular Telephone present in vehicle; 
94- Cellular telephone in use in vehicle; 95- computer/fax 
machine/printers; 96- onboard navigation system; 97- two-way 




Crash Time 8- Emotional 
Driver 
Distracted By 
1- Looked but did not see; 3- By other occupant(s); 4- By 
moving object in vehicle; 5- While talking or listening to 
cellular phone; 6-While dialing cellular phone; 7- Adjusting 
audio and/or climate controls; 9- While using other 
device/controls integral to vehicle; 10- While using or reaching 
for device/object brought into vehicle; 12- Distracted by 
outside person, object or event; 13- Eating or drinking; 14- 
Smoking related; 15- Other cellular phone related; 92- 
Distraction/inattention, details unknown; 97- Inattentive or lost 





I also identified fatalities to occupants other vehicles in distraction-involved truck 
crashes. I identified crashes where a truck driver was distracted as described above and 
used the Case Number variable to identify all vehicles in that given crash. Using the 
Injury Severity variable, I identified all vehicle occupants who were killed in any vehicle 
involved in the distraction-related crash. This second list of all vehicle occupants includes 
all the truck drivers who were killed.  Using the State variable and the Year variable, I 
generated longitudinal fatality counts for each state and the District of Columbia (DC). 
Each year of data offers a cross-section of fatalities in a given state. When individual 





 Fatalities were analyzed by both counts and rates. The exposure for the rate 
calculation was billions of vehicle miles traveled (VMTs). VMT is a commonly used 
measure of driving exposure [95, 96]. VMTs provided a more precise estimate of driving 
exposure as opposed to calculating rates per number of individuals in a population. Since 
this study is examining crashes involving trucks, I used diesel VMTs to calculate rates, as 
was done by Neeley and Richardson [87], for a more precise measure of exposure data 
for truck traffic in a state. Data on annual state VMTs was obtained from the Department 
of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) [97]. I downloaded table 
VM4 from the annual “Highway Statistics” reports [98]. Fatality rates for truck drivers 




 Descriptive analysis was conducted on fatality counts and rates. Fatalities for the 
total period, by state, by year, and by state and by year (state*year) were described using 
mean, standard deviation, and inter-quartile range. Because there is high variation 
between states in motor vehicle crash rates and injuries [99], I conducted an analysis of 






 To analyze the impact of distracted driving laws on fatality rates, a multi-level 
longitudinal Poisson model was fit. The Poisson model, often used to describe the count 
distribution of motor vehicle crashes [101], assumes that the mean (E[Y]) and variance 
(Var[Y]) of an outcome given covariates (X1…Xn) are equal [102]. The offset for the 
Poisson model [94, 102] was diesel VMT in billions of miles. The analysis of state laws 
was informed by Neeley and Richardson’s analysis of the impact of state laws on truck 
driver safety [87]. These authors designed their analysis of truck-involved fatalities 
noting that crashes are correlated spatially (by state) and temporally [103, 104]. The 
regression will employ random intercepts for the individual states with fixed effects for 
the regression coefficients [103, 105, 106]. An exception was the cell phone saturation 
variable, which used random effects [107]. The random effects model for cell phone 
saturation had both a significant regression coefficient and reduced log likelihood versus 
the fixed effects model. 
 
 The purpose of this regression analysis was to examine the effects of state CPWD 
bans on distraction-involved truck crash fatality rates. Wilson and Stimpson conducted a 
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similar longitudinal analysis of texting-while-driving in the U.S. using FARS data and 
found that as of 2008 no state texting laws had an effect on reducing distraction-related 
fatalities [14]. As of July 2013, I could identify no analyses of state handheld CPWD 
bans. State bans on texting and handheld were identified using data from the Governors’ 
Highway Safety Association (GHSA) [70]. Binary variables were generated for each 
state*year for presence of a given ban. Because the state*year is the level of analysis, I 
could only describe which year a ban went into effect. Due to sample size limitations, I 
was unable to describe cases by the state*month, which would be a more accurate 
representation of when the bans went into effect. A binary variable for the FMCSA 
texting ban was generated with no ban in 2000 through 2009 and the ban in effect for all 
states in 2010. Although the FMCSA ban was announced in September, 2009 and the 
FMCSA solicited open comments on its rule-making procedure in January, 2010, the ban 
was not put into effect until October, 2010. Since the data were available from 2000 – 
2010, this analysis will not be able to assess the impact of the 2010 FMCSA ban on 
fatality rates 
 
 To study the impact of the CPWD bans, other state-level data known to affect 
crash rates, motor vehicle fatality rates, and distracted driving were added to the model. 
Table 4 lists these variables, their distributions, and sources. I will briefly describe each 
of them below. 
Cell phone saturation is the number of cell phone subscriptions per capita in a state in a 
given year and describes the growth in cell phones across the study period [14, 108]. Data 
on cell phones in a state came from annual reports by the FCC [109] and state population 
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data were downloaded from the Census Bureau. To analyze the effect of the economy on 
fatality rates [110], annual state unemployment rates were downloaded from the Census 
Bureau, as were median per capita incomes, standardized to 2011 U.S. dollars. 
Population density was calculated using annual population and total area, both data also 
came from the Census Bureau. Because I did not describe crashes as urban or rural, 
population density serves as an approximation of urbanicity within a state [87].  
Table 4. Distribution of and sources of each variable used in the model. 
Variable Distribution Source 
Fatalities Count FARS- NHTSA 
State texting laws Binary GHSA 
State handheld cell phone laws Binary GHSA 
Vehicle miles traveled Continuous DOT- Traffic Safety Facts 
Cell phone saturation Continuous FCC/Census Bureau 
State unemployment rate Continuous Census Bureau 
State ethanol consumption Continuous NIAAA [111] 
State 0.08 BAC law Binary DOT- Traffic Safety Facts 
Highway capital expenditures Continuous DOT- Traffic Safety Facts 
Per capita income Continuous Census Bureau 
Population density Continuous Census Bureau 
Primary seat belt law Binary DOT [112] 
Truck length restrictions Categorical Rand McNally Motor Carrier’s Road Atlas 
Rural truck speed limit Categorical Rand McNally Motor Carrier’s Road Atlas 
 
 
 Primary enforcement of driver seatbelt laws reduces fatality rates in all crashes 
[113]; thus this variable was included as a potential confounder. A report on primary and 
secondary enforcement of seatbelt laws from NHTSA provided information on the years 
that states enacted primary seatbelt enforcement [112]. I only examined primary 
enforcement for drivers, because data were not available on all state laws for primary and 
secondary enforcement of passenger seatbelt use. By the end of the study period, all 




Two variables were included to account for the effects of drunk driving on fatality 
rates. The first was a binary variable on whether or not a state used 0.08 mg/dl blood 
alcohol content (BAC) as the threshold for driving while intoxicated (DWI) or driving 
under the influence (DUI). These data came from the DOT’s annual Traffic Safety Facts 
reports. Second, per capita alcohol consumption, measured in gallons of ethanol, was 
obtained from a report from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
[111]. Capital expenditures represent the investment that a state makes in roadway 
infrastructure [87]. These data were also obtained from the Traffic Safety Facts reports 
and converted to 2010 U.S. dollars. Traffic Safety Facts data were only available through 
2010. 
 
 All the previous data are publically available online and free to download. Two 
other variables that impacted fatality rates in the study of truck drivers by Neeley and 
Richardson were maximum truck length and rural truck speed limit [87]. States are 
allowed to set both the maximum speed on highways and the maximum allowable length 
for trucks. The data were obtained from the annual editions of the Motor Carrier’s Road 
Atlas published by Rand McNally. Examining the data, they naturally broke down into 
categories. For maximum truck length, data were categorized as 1) under 53 feet; 2) 53 
feet or 53 feet, six inches; 3) 57 feet, four inches or 57 feet, six inches; and 4) 59 feet or 
longer. State speed limits were in 5 mile per hour (mph) intervals from 55 mph to 75 
mph. I specifically examined “rural truck speed limits” in the analysis: some states have 
higher speed limits for passenger vehicles versus large trucks and buses; furthermore, 




 Because the Rand McNally atlases were not intended to be used for surveillance, 
the 2007 through 2009 editions were missing data on rural truck speed limits. Internet 
searchers produced some missing data: for example, Virginia changed the speed limits by 
legislative action in from 65 mph in 2009 to 70 mph in 2010 [114]. I imputed the missing 
data using a method developed by Royston for missing categorical data [115, 116]. 
Although this method worked, data highly varied between categories year-to-year within 
a state, which did not reflect the infrequent changes seen in all other years of the study 
period. As a result, I opted to carry the 2006 observations forward to 2009, a technique 
for missing data that is commonly used in pharmaceutical studies [117], and noted the 






 As described previously, ANOVA was conducted to compare within- and 
between-state variation for fatality rates. The results of the F-tests were highly significant 
for truck driver fatality rates and all vehicle occupant fatality rates, F(50,510) = 14.51, 
p<0.0001 and F(50,510) = 11.47, p<0.0001, respectively. These results reinforced the need 
for a multi-level model in regression analysis. I used the variance inflation factor (VIF) to 
test for multicollinearity among the covariates [94]. Since none of the VIF values were 
above the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 no variables were eliminated from the model at this 
step [118]. Later in the analysis process, Stata dropped the per capita income variable due 




 Unadjusted regression on truck driver fatality rate and all vehicle occupant fatality 
rate was conducted for all covariates. For all variables aside from the 2010 FMCSA ban 
(which was a national ban) state-level fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) were 
tested [107]. In only the case of cell phone saturation was there a difference in effect 
between FE and RE analysis. Other than cell phone saturation, all analyses were 
conducted using FE. 
 
 Two multivariate regression models were fit for both truck driver fatality rates 
and all vehicle occupant fatality rates. The first model included only those variables that 
were significant in univariate regression at the   0.10 level. Entering covariates with p-
values less than 0.2 has been used in model selection in the past [94]; however, using 
0.10 as a cutoff is a trade-off between including relevant covariates and model 
performance [119]. The second model included the significant variables as well as in the 
state texting and handheld CPWD bans and the FMCSA ban. These two models were 
compared using likelihood ratio tests [94, 120].  
 
 To test for possible delayed-effects of state laws [121], lagged variables for state 
texting and handheld CPWD laws were generated. Lagging the effects of the law by one 
year produced no significant outcomes. Since 2010 was the last year of analysis, lag 
effects for the FMCSA ban could not be tested. 
32

Manuscripts 2 and 3: A Mixed Methods Examination of Distracted Driving in 
Commercial Truck Drivers 
 Manuscript 2 is an analysis of the effects of safety climate on distracted driving 
behaviors in commercial truck drivers. Manuscript 3 uses the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB) to analyze the influences on truck drivers’ decision-making surrounding 
distracted driving. Both papers were developed in concert and were conducted using key 
informant interviews followed by an online survey of commercial truck drivers. First, I 
will describe the methods for data collection, then I will describe the data analysis 
methods for each manuscript separately.  
 
 When conducting a mixed methods study, researchers must consider what they 
gain from combining two different paradigms and methods of research. To fully benefit 
from mixed qualitative and quantitative methods, a researcher has to undertake a 
pragmatic approach to understanding the strengths and limitations of each method [122, 
123]. The term “triangulation” is used as a catch-all to describe how the weaknesses of 
one method are buttressed by the second method, and vice versa [124]. The mixed 
methods should grow out of a paradigm, sometimes referred to as post-positivist or 
pragmatic [123, 124], that builds on both the positivist quantitative data and the 




 The TPB, as described in the Introduction chapter, requires key informant 
interviews to determine the appropriate behaviors, attitudes, social norms, and perceived 
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behavioral control for the population of interest [52]. Originally, I had intended to 
conduct focus group sessions with truck drivers instead of individual key informant 
interviews. Working with Mr. Byrd, we had agreed to hold up to five focus group 
sessions with drivers from IBT Local #639 located in Burtonsville, MD. After 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was granted through the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, we were unable to set up focus group sessions that 
were satisfactory for all parties. Therefore, the qualitative data collection approach was 
modified slights, and an amendment was submitted and approved by the IRB in 
November 2012 to conduct key informant interviews.  
 
The purpose of the interviews was four-fold: 1) Understand beliefs and attitudes 
of truck drivers surrounding distracted driving; 2) Understand correlations between 
workplace safety climate and distracted driving behaviors; 3) Understand non-crash 
outcomes that could result from distracted driving; and 4) Determine if commercial truck 
drivers perceive distracted driving as a threat. The interview script was developed with 
the input of my Thesis Advisory Committee. After the subject matter was resolved, the 
survey was pilot tested with a transportation safety researcher from the National 
Transportation Safety Board and a representative of the American Trucking Association. 
The recommendations of these experts were used in refining the final language of the 
interview script. The approved interview script is presented in Appendix 2.  
 
To identify potential respondents for the key informant interviews, I sought out 
experts in truck driver safety or distracted driving. The initial interview subjects were 
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purposively recruited from the list of attendees at the Symposium on Prevention of 
Occupationally-Related Distracted Driving sponsored by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health Occupational Safety and Health Education and Research Center 
on April 18, 2011 in Laurel, MD. From this conference, two appropriate subjects were 
identified. Upon completion of the interview, subjects were asked if they could 
recommend any of their peers who might contribute to data collection; nine subjects were 
identified by interview participants or attendees from the conference. This snowball 
sampling technique allowed us to reach interview subjects we might not otherwise have 
considered [125].  
 
Interviews were conducted via Skype (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA) and were 
recorded using MP3 Skype Recorder v3.1 (www.VOIPCallRecording.com). Audio files 
of the interviews were transcribed by uploading the .mp3 files to 
www.productiontranscripts.com (Production Transcripts, Glendale, CA). Data collection 
was ceased after 11 interviews when data saturation was reached. The recording software 
failed on one interview, so I ended up with 10 transcripts and notes on all 11 interviews. 
Data were collected in December, 2012 and January, 2013. The interview subjects 
remained anonymous throughout data collection; when reference is made to specific 
interview subjects in Manuscripts 2 and 3, their interview number will be used. Of the 11 
interview subjects, five were researchers at academic institutions, three were at private 





Notes and transcripts were stored as Microsoft Word documents, which were then 
used for qualitative coding. Data were open-coded line-by-line to label the themes found 
in subjects’ responses [126, 127].  Initial themes were developed by identifying labels 
that were found in commonly across the interviews. Focused coding, or level-2 coding, 
was employed to group themes into broader categories [126, 127]. For example, 
“personal control” and “work pressure” were two labels that often appeared close to one 
another as interview subjects described the balance the drivers would have to strike in 
their decision-making process. A codebook (Appendix 4) was developed during the 
focused coding process. A second coder was employed for a subset of three randomly-
selected interviews as a check on the reliability of the coding process. Both coders met to 
discuss the coding and how well the codebook described the categorizations of the data 
[128]. The two coders differed slightly in their choice of wording of themes, but no 
substantive differences emerged. Analysis will be further described for each of the two 




 The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) represents over one million 
workers in the U.S. and Canada [57]. I reached out to this group because they represent 
the largest number of commercial drivers in the U.S. Throughout the design of the study I 
was in contact with the head of Occupational Safety and Health for the IBT, Mr. Lamont 
Byrd. Mr. Byrd was able to help refine the language used in study materials and direct me 




 After the key informant interviews were completed, the driver survey could be 
finalized. Appendix 3 shows the finalized driver survey. Questions on pages 165 - 169  
are the SCQ as modified for drivers by Wills and colleagues [46, 129]. The first step in 
finalizing the survey was determining which behaviors were most hazardous and relevant 
and the drivers [52]. The “Behaviors” section in the interview (Appendix 2) asked 
respondents to give a rating of how distracting each of the behaviors is to truck drivers. 
This list of behaviors were selected from the table from the VTTI study shown in 
Appendix 1 [6]. Interview subjects were asked to respond using a Likert scale of 1 
through 5 where 1 was “not at all distracting” and 5 was “very distracting.” The ratings 
from all interview subjects were recorded by the interviewer, and a mean perceived 
hazard was calculated for each behavior. After this section was completed, the 
interviewer selected three or four of that the interviewee gave the highest distraction 
scores. The subjects were then asked to describe for each of the selected behaviors if the 
TPB constructs would affect driver behavior. 
 
 Key informants were unanimous in rating “Writing a text message or other 
message on a cell phone” as very distracting, i.e. 5 out of 5. Dialing a cell phone, reading 
a message, reading a map, interacting with a dispatch device, and writing notes or a log 
all had mean perceived distractions above 4.5/5. The TPB survey relies on analyzing 
behaviors that are relevant to the population. In this case, I choose both “writing a text 
message…” and “interacting with a dispatch device” as the relevant behaviors that I 
would use on the survey. After reviewing the literature and consulting with my Thesis 
Advisory Committee, I settled on the language of “texting” rather than “writing a text 
37

message…” for the wording in the online survey. From the interviews, key informants 
stated that texting could be either from management, if that is an organization’s 
communication method, or personal communications with friends and family.  
  
 I chose “interacting with a dispatch device” because this is a distraction that is 
unique to commercial truck drivers as an occupational hazard. Thus, any interactions that 
a truck driver has with the device originate solely from his or her occupational situation. 
One of the pilot testers and a key informant interview subject both recommended that 
questions about dispatch device use be divided into “looking at” the dispatch device and 
physically “interacting with” the device. Interview subjects rated “interacting with” as 
more distracting, on average, than “looking at” the devices, mean perceived distraction 
4.5/5 and 4.3/5, respectively. Only those drivers who used dispatch devices as part of 
their work answered those questions. Two different types of dispatch devices are shown 
for those survey participants who might be unclear as to what type of equipment the 
survey referred.  
 
 To measure social norms for the TPB, appropriate social referents must be 
identified [52, 53]. In the interviews, key informants were asked who would positively or 
negatively influence a driver’s decision to undertake any of three or four distractions on 
which each interview subjects was further probed. The text of all responses on social 
referents for each behavior were entered into a spreadsheet and color coded indicating 
whether the interview subject thought that a given referent would have a positive, 
negative, or neutral/not further specified influence on undertaking such a behavior. In the 
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10 transcribed interviews, key informants were asked about a total of 32 distracting 
activities (with much overlap between interview subjects) and only four times did 
interview subjects report that management had no influence over a given behavior. 
Interview subjects were specifically asked if family members would influence 
performance of these behaviors, and in 13 of these same 32 instances, key informants 
said that family would have no influence. Coworkers and friends had even less influence 
on behavior performance, according to the key informants. Thus, questions on pages 160, 
163 and 164 in Appendix 3 ask about the opinions of supervisors, as they are the most 
relevant social referents to commercial truck drivers. 
 
The final page of the survey (Appendix page 170) describes various safety critical 
events that commercial truck drivers might face. These outcomes were informed by the 
literature, especially the work of the VTTI researchers [4, 6], and were confirmed as 
likely scenarios by the key informants. From the Olson study [6] we know that distracted 
driving crash is least likely, with near crashes being more common outcomes [130]. 
These four questions will be used as outcomes to analyze against safety climate scores 
and the components of the TPB. To determine if the language in the survey was 
appropriate, I went over survey with a Business Representative from an IBT Local with 
whom Mr. Byrd had put me in contact. After adjusting question order and some wording 





 Mr. Byrd and other members of the IBT helped inform the selection of the target 
population for the survey. Although Teamsters members are generally thought of as truck 
drivers, the IBT represents a wide variety of drivers, and some non-drivers, whose job 
duties are highly diverse [58]. From the online list of the various industries that IBT 
workers work in [58], I narrowed down the target population with the assistance of Mr. 
Byrd and other IBT representatives. The final sample of eligible drivers included those in 
the carhaul, express, freight, package, and tankhaul industries. The question on page 157 
in Appendix 3 is meant to screen for drivers in these industries. Representative images of 
the various vehicles are in Appendix 3 on pages 157 and 158. Those drivers who select 
the option “I don’t drive any of these type [sic] the majority of the time” are screened out 
and redirected to a disqualification page in the survey thanking them for their time, but 
informing them that they are not appropriate candidates for the research. I estimate that 
up to 20% of subjects who initiated the survey would be screened out.  
 
 On page 174 of Appendix 5, I describe the types of vehicles driven by 
respondents as they answered on the screening question. The categories in Table 2 of 
Appendix 5 correspond to the images of the different vehicles on page 157 of Appendix 
3. Using a Pearson’s ², the distribution of vehicle types is the same for all subjects who 
passed the screening questions, those included in Manuscript 2, and those in both 
populations of Manuscript 3. There is no publically available data from the Teamsters 
that describes the distribution of its members by industry. The U.S. Census Bureau 
generated a census of all commercial vehicles in the U.S. in 2002 [131]. The Census 
report found that 62.9% of trucks in the U.S. are “heavy trucks,” which in the current 
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study includes semi-trucks, carhaul, tankhaul, and dump trucks; 22.5% were “medium 
trucks,” which includes the package vans in the current study; and the remaining 14.6% 
of trucks were small trucks excluded from the current analysis. Although I did not seek 
specific percentages of each vehicle type in the study, the percent of large trucks and 
medium trucks in Manuscripts 2 and 3 are not widely different from the Census Bureau 
report. A caveat is that the Census data were collected 11 years before my data, so the 
American trucking fleet might have undergone changes in that time. 
 
 With Mr. Byrd’s assistance, a link to the survey was posted to the Teamster’s 
website on April 2, 2013. The survey was created using SurveyMonkey, an online survey 
tool (SurveyMonkey LLC, Palo Alto, CA). Figure 3 is a screenshot of the survey 
announcement taken on April 4, 2013. Due to funding constraints, I could not afford to 
pay each survey participants reimbursement for the time used taking the survey. Thus, as 
seen in Figure 3, I used the raffle of an iPad 3 as enticement to take the survey. To insure 
the privacy of any study subjects, a separate survey was created solely for subjects to 
enter their email addresses if they wished to enter the raffle. As a further blinding 
procedure, my advisor, Dr. Pollack, randomly selected a winner from email addresses 
entered in the second survey. The survey was closed on May 19, 2013. 
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Figure 3. Screenshot of the survey announcement on the Teamster’s website 




Separate sample size requirements were calculated for the safety climate data and 
the TPB data. The safety climate questions are analyzed using a factor analysis. A rule of 
thumb for sample size and factor analysis is a ratio of 10 subjects per survey question 
[118], yet this is not a hard and fast rule [132]. A ratio of 5:1 or 6:1 has also been 
frequently used, and after 300 subjects the ratio of subjects to questions can does not need 
to be as high as 10:1 [132, 133]. For the 35-item SCQ modified for drivers [47], a sample 
of at least 350 subjects would be very strong, whereas 175 subjects would produce the 
minimal 5:1 ratio.  
 
There are many ways to conduct a sample size calculation for multivariate 
regression analyses of survey data [134-136], yet many TPB studies lack a sample size or 
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power calculations [134]. Reviews of sample size find that the gold standard method is to 
use variance inflation factor (VIF) from multivariate regression [134, 136]. Two studies 
examining TPB and driver behavior were identified for sample size calculations: Elliott 
and colleagues [49] used the TPB to describe 943 English drivers’ speeding behaviors 
and Wills and colleagues [129] compared the TPB constructs to negative workplace 
outcomes, such as crashes and traffic violations, for 317 Australian truck drivers. Neither 
of these studies allowed for sample size calculation using the VIF method.  
 
The Elliott  study regressed TPB components and demographic data, as I 
plan to do, on speeding behaviors. The resulting model had an R2 of 0.63 and an F 
statistic significant at p < 0.001 [49]. Using a sample size calculation from Fisher’s and 
Van Belle’s text book [137] I calculated that the 943 subjects in the Elliott study 
resulted in a power of 0.988. The data presented in the Wills  study did not allow for 
a similar calculation. Extrapolating from the Elliott results, I estimated that a sample of 
500 drivers would result in a study with power of greater than 0.80 and an alpha-level of 
0.05.   
 
Because the current study applies the TPB to a behavior (distracted driving) and a 
population (truck drivers in the U.S.) that have never before been examined, there is no 
one study that I can point to as a gold-standard when estimating outcome frequency. The 
VTTI study by Olson and colleagues found only 21 crashes, 197 near crashes, and 1,215 
lane deviations in 735,000 miles of recorded data [6]. Crashes and near-crashes are 
seemingly rare events; however, the driver population in the study by Elliott and 
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colleagues also reports very infrequent speeding behavior and their TPB analysis was 
able to produce significant results [49]. As a result of the power calculation using the 
Elliott  the IRB approved sampling of 500 subjects.  
 
Manuscript 2- Safety Climate- Data Analysis 
 The mixed methods data were collected separately from different populations. 
Although qualitative data were collected first, in this manuscript the order of data 
collection was not important to its interpretation. In mixed methods study notation, this 
manuscript follows a QUAN+qual design for the purposes of complementarity 
evaluation, that is, elaborating and illustrating quantitative results with the qualitative 
data [138, 139]. By using qualitative data from a population outside that of the drivers 
who are surveyed quantitatively, this “between-method” should enhance the data’s 
external validity [124].  
 
 Of the 440 subjects who entered the survey, 79 (18%) were screened out when 
they identified as not driving in one of the vehicles of interest. Over the course of the 
survey, 122 of the remaining 361 (34%) left the survey before completion. The final 
population consisted of 239 members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
Appendix 5 more thoroughly describes how this final sample size was reached. The 
online survey consisted of the 35 item SCQ modified for drivers by Wills and colleagues 
[46, 129]; questions on the subject’s gender, age, and years driving experience; and four 
questions on crashes and near crashes involving distraction. Drivers were asked how 
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much they agreed with a given SCQ question using a Likert scale where 1 represented 
“Strongly agree,” 4 represented “Neutral,” and 7 represented “Strongly disagree.” 
 
Qualitative data were collected from 11 key informant interviews with experts in 
truck driving safety, distracted driving, and transportation labor or management groups; 
10 of the 11 interviews were successfully transcribed. Transcribed interviews and the 
interviewer’s notes were saved as Word documents (Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA).  
  
 A factor analysis was conducted to determine if the six factors of the SCQ as 
determined by Wills . were appropriate for this population. From principal 
component analysis, the eigenvalues and percent variance explained indicated that there 
were between three and seven factors [140]. The scree plot with parallel analysis [141] 
(see Manuscript 2 Results) indicates that the data are best described by three factors. 
Using Wills . as a starting point, a 6-fator model was estimated using maximum 
likelihood; promax factor rotation was used due to correlation between factors [140]. 
Items with high uniqueness values (i.e., greater than 0.5) were dropped and the model 
was reassessed. Continued data reduction produced three factors (the first three factors 
from Wills .) strongly loaded on SCQ items 1 through 12, 14 through 20, and 21 





Table 5. Pattern matrix for three factors for the SCQ. Chronbach’s alpha for reliability of 
each factor is listed. 
Items and Labels 1 2 3 
Factor 1- Communications and Pressure ( = 0.94)   
1. Changes in working procedures and their effects on safety are 
effectively communicated to workers 0.74   
2. Employees are consulted when changes to driver safety practices 
are suggested 0.79   
3. Employees are told when changes are made to the working 
environment such as the vehicle, maintenance or garaging procedures 0.74   
4. Safety policies relating to the use of motor vehicles are effectively 
communicated to the workers 0.87   
5. Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles are 
complete and comprehensive 0.84   
6. An effective documentation management system ensures the 
availability of safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles 0.82   
7. Safety problems are openly discussed between employees and 
management/supervisors 0.66   
8. Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles match the 
way tasks are done in practice 0.66   
9. Employees can discuss important driver safety policy issues 0.51   
10. Employees are consulted for suggested vehicle/driver safety 
improvements 0.72   
11. Employees can identify relevant procedures for each job 0.62   
12. Employees can express views about safety problems 0.50     
Factor 2- Work Pressure ( = 0.93)   
14. Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic 0.85   
15. There is sufficient 'thinking time' to enable employees to plan and 
carry out their work to an adequate standard 0.88   
16. Workload is reasonably balanced 0.87   
17. There are enough employees/drivers to carry out the required 
work 0.76   
18. Changes in workload, which have been made on short notice, can 
be dealt with in a way that does not affect driver safety 0.80   
19. When driving employees have enough time to carry out their 
tasks 0.82   
20. Problems that arise outside of employees' control can be dealt 
with in a way that does not affect driver safety   0.61   
Factor 3- Management Commitment ( = 0.95)   
21. Management are committed to driver safety 0.86 
22. Management are committed to motor vehicle safety 0.85 
23. Driver safety is central to managements' values and philosophies 0.82 
24.Driver safety is seen as an important part of fleet management in 





The scores from the questions in a given factor were averaged to create a factor 
score for each subject. The mean factor scores and demographic data were entered into a 
multivariate regression for each of the four outcomes of interest [129]: 1) I have ever had 
a crash while driving on the job; 2) I have ever had a crash while driving distracted on the 
job; 3) I have ever had to break hard while I was distracted on the job; 4) I have ever had 
to swerve or jerk the wheel to get back into my lane while distracted on the job. All 
quantitative analysis was conducted with Stata v.12.1 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX).  
 
The results of the quantitative data and qualitative data are presented together. 
Using qualitative data in this way to elucidate on the statistical results allows for 
clarification of the effects of safety climate on drivers and employers [138].  
 
Manuscript 3- Theory of Planned Behavior- Data Analysis 
 The data collection and analysis in this manuscript follow what has been termed a 
“concurrent design” [142, 143]. The qualitative and quantitative data are collected and 
analyzed separately, the results of each method are first presented separately, then 
integrated for interpretation [144, 145]. The term “concurrent” in this usage does not 
necessarily designate temporal concurrence, it only means that the qualitative and 
quantitative data are developed and analyzed separately before integration [145]. Figure 4 




Figure 4. Diagram of the analysis of key informant interviews (Qual) and analysis of 
surveys (Quan) in Manuscript 3. This visualization is based off Plano-Clark’s and 




As described above, key informant interviews were used to elucidate the 
components of the TPB relevant to distracted driving in an occupational population. This 
is depicted in Figure 4 as the line from “Qual data collection” to “Quan data collection.” 
Transcribed interviews were saved as Word documents for qualitative analysis. Interview 
transcripts were analyzed for themes surrounding performance of distracting activities. 
Specifically, data on social norms and perceived behavioral control were closely assessed 
using qualitative methods. Online survey data of IBT members were downloaded from 
SurveyMonkey into Stata statistical software. Of the 440 subjects who entered the survey, 
79 (18%) were screened out because they did not drive the appropriate vehicle. All 
subjects (n=277) answered TPB questions on “texting while driving” and those drivers 
who indicated that they used a dispatch device in their work (n=153) answered questions 
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on the TPB concerning “interacting with a dispatch device.” See Appendix 5 for a more 
detailed description of how these sample sizes were produced. 
 
The TPB constructs were the independent variables and were scored as described 
by Montaño and Kasprzyk [52]. Attitude was assessed using the average of three 
semantic differential 7-point bipolar scales ranging from 1 to 7 with endpoints including 
“very harmful – very beneficial,” “very unpleasant – very pleasant,” and “very bad – very 
good;” intention was measured using a single 7-point bipolar scale (1 through 7) with 
endpoints “Definitely will – Definitely will not,” that is, an increased intention score 
indicates that a driver had less intention to undertake a given behavior; perceived 
behavioral control was assessed using a multi-item indirect assessment by multiplying 
control beliefs (scored on a bipolar 7-point scale) with times perceived power (scored -3 
to +3 on a bipolar scale); social norm was assessed with a multi-item indirect assessment 
multiplying the normative belief (scored -3 to +3) times the motivation to comply (score 
1 to 7). The Cronbach’s alpha for reliability of the texting and dispatch device use scales 
were 0.71 and 0.84, respectively.  
 
 Exploratory data analysis was conducted on the TPB constructs separately for 
both the texting and dispatch device populations [147]. Means and standard deviations 
were generated for each TPB construct and because the range of scores was small, 
frequency tables and histograms were also generated for visual assessment of the data. 
Although previous studies on driver behavior and the TPB have used mean scores to 
analyze each TPB construct [35, 56], our data were not normally distributed and clustered 
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around certain responses. Thus, we categorized the four TPB constructs for the texting 
and dispatch device use data. Development of the individual categories is described in the 
Results section of Manuscript 3. 
 
Subjects also self-reported if they ever had experience a series of safety critical 
events while on the job [148]. Subjects first reported whether or not they ever had a crash 
while on the job. After being reminded that distracted driving encompasses any activities 
that that take the driver’s eyes, hand, or concentration away from the primary driving 
task, subjects reported whether or not they had ever had a crash while distracted, had to 
brake hard to avoid a crash while distracted, and swerve to avoid a crash while distracted. 
These four outcomes served as the dependent variables in four separate regression 
analyses, described below, in both the texting and dispatch device populations. The Olson 
. study found that truck drivers would undertake distracting activities in the non-
crash control periods as well as during crashes or near crashes [6]. Rather than asking 
drivers if they had ever driven distracted, which can occur without negative 
consequences, we asked for situations when the distraction was so great that it became a 
hazard for crash or near crash. 
 
 Means and standard deviations (SDs) were calculated for age, years driving 
experience and weekly driving hours. Descriptive analysis of the categorical TPB 
variables was conducted. To validate the model in Figure 1 (page 4), we examined 
whether or not Intentions mediated the effects of the other TPB variables on the four 
outcomes [94]. To test this model required a multi-step process. First, we correlated 
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Norms, PBC, and Attitudes to Behavioral Intentions using logistic regression for both 
texting and dispatch device use [35, 56]. Second, univariate logistic regression was used 
to analyze the association of each of the four TPB constructs for texting and distracted 
driving with the four crash and near crash outcomes. Univariate logistic regression was 
also conducted for demographic data that the drivers reported: gender, age, driving 
experience, and weekly driving hours. Third, multivariate regressions were first 
conducted without Intentions, then including Intentions to see if it attenuated the effects 
of the other three TPB constructs, that is, did the ORs for Norms, PBC, and Attitudes 
decrease and what, if any, effect was there on the significance of the ORs. A change in 
the ORs towards 1.0 and/or decreasing significance of the p-values of the ORs was 
considered to be a mediation effect. Control variables in the multivariate models included 
on those variables that had p-values  0.10. Entering covariates with p-values less than 
0.2 has been used in model selection in the past [94]; however, using 0.10 as a cutoff is a 
trade-off between including relevant covariates and model performance [119]. 
 
 Qualitative and quantitative results are presented separately. Results from both 
methods are then brought together for meta-inference, defined by Tashakkori and Teddlie 
as “integration of the inferences that are obtained on the basis of QUAL and QUAN 
strands of a mixed methods study” (p. 710) [149]. The quantitative and qualitative data 








 In order to prevent distracted driving-related crashes, states have banned texting 
and handheld cell phone use for drivers. The present study analyzes the impact of these 
regulations on state-level fatalities rates for both truck drivers and all vehicle occupants 
in distraction-involved truck crashes. First, we described each fatality count by-state and 
by-year using data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System from 2000 through 2010. 
A multi-level longitudinal Poisson model was fit to assess the impact of state bans for 
texting or handheld cell phone use on distraction-related truck crash fatality rates. These 
results revealed that fatality rates have been decreasing since 2007. We found that there 
was no effect of state bans on distraction-involved truck crash fatality rates. A nationwide 
ban on texting for commercial truck drivers implemented in 2010 was associated with a 
continued decrease in fatality rates, yet further analysis will be necessary to assess the 
impact of this regulation on distraction-involved truck fatality rates. 
Introduction 
Although motor vehicle fatality rates have been decreasing for the past few 
decades [150], the rates and counts of fatalities involving distracted driving (DD) have 
been increasing since the early 2000s [93]. An emerging contributor to DD crashes and 
fatalities is cell phone use while driving (CPWD) [151], specifically, reading, writing, 
and sending SMS messages with a cellular phone (a.k.a., text messaging, or texting) [14]. 
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In addition to these general electronic communication distractions, commercial truck 
drivers may face occupational distractions, including keeping logs and monitoring a 
dispatch device [6]. Both states and the federal government have implemented 
regulations to decrease DD for all drivers and commercial drivers. This study will 
quantify fatalities in the United States (U.S.) and examine the effects, if any, of state and 




 Driving involves primary, secondary, and tertiary tasks [1]. Primary tasks are 
those that only involve vehicle direction and speed, such as steering and breaking. 
Secondary tasks support operation of the vehicle depending on the situation, such as 
using turn signals, checking the speedometer, and turning on the lights. Anything not 
included as primary or secondary task for vehicle operation is considered a tertiary task. 
Tertiary tasks include a wide range of activities, such as interacting with passengers, 
smoking, eating, and cell phone use [6, 7, 152]. Distracted driving (DD) is then defined 
as any activity that takes the drivers eyes, hands, or concentration away from the primary 
task of driving [153]. 
 
 Although DD is not a novel risk to drivers [154], the recent increase in cell phone 
use while driving (CPWD) has lead to a rise in DD-related motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) 
[11, 14]. Estimates are that drivers use handheld cell phones approximately 6% of driving 
time [8, 10]. Two of the most dangerous distractions that drivers can undertake with a 
phone are texting while driving and dialing the phone [12, 13]. These tasks involve 
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manual, visual, and cognitive distractions, and have been shown to produce the most 





 The leading cause of death for all American workers is MVC [156]. The MVC 
fatality rate is 3.7 deaths per every billion vehicle miles traveled (VMT) [32] for truck 
drivers. In the U.S., commercial motor vehicles are those vehicles that a) have a gross 
vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds; b) have a gross combination weight 
rating of 26,001 pounds or more; c) are designed to transport 16 or more passengers; or 
d) are of any size and transports hazardous materials [25]. Aside from distractions faced 
by non-commercial drivers, commercial truck drivers face additional work- and vehicle-
specific distractions that raise their crash risk. A series of studies by the Virginia Tech 
Transportation Institute has enumerated the unique occupational distractions faced by 
commercial drivers, such as using a CB radio, and interacting with a dispatch computer 
[4, 6]. These studies generated a thorough catalog of odds ratios for crashes and near 
crashes for each distracting activity. 
 
 In the occupational setting, it is possible that truck drivers have less freedom over 
the decision to undertake distracting activities while driving [36]. A study of occupational 
drivers found that increased work pressures were correlated with driver distractions [47]. 
It is possible that professional drivers are being required, either explicitly or implicitly, to 
undertake tertiary activities while driving to increase work efficiency. Whether or not 
they have control over it, drivers who mainly drive for work purposes are more likely to 
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report CPWD than drivers who mainly drive for non-occupational reasons [35]. An 
increased number of potential distractions and workplace pressures to attempt distractions 
while driving make DD an important risk factor for occupational injury and fatality. It is 
unknown what the burden of DD-involved truck crashes is in the U.S. or globally. 
 
 Due to their size and mass, crashes involving large trucks pose a greater threat to 
other vehicle occupants and pedestrians. For example, in 2009,  among fatal crashes 
involving a large truck and a passenger vehicle, there were only 18 fatalities to truck 
occupants compared to 1,022 fatalities to occupants of the passenger vehicles [157]. In 
multi-vehicle crashes, the mass of the truck poses an additional danger to occupants of 
other vehicles and somewhat protects the truck driver from injury [158]. In fact, the ratio 
of mass of two vehicle involved in a crash is predictive of fatality risk for occupants in 
the two vehicles [34, 158]. Therefore, to fully understand the burden of DD-related truck 
crashes, it is important to examine fatalities to both truck drivers and other vehicle 





 In an attempt to address DD, states have passed laws restricting texting while 
driving and handheld CPWD. New York was the first state to pass a texting ban for all 
drivers in 2001, and as of April 1, 2013, 39 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.) 
have passed texting bans [70]. Handheld CPWD is banned in 10 states and D.C. 
Although research has shown that there is no difference in crash risk comparing talking 
on a handheld versus hands-free phones [22, 24], no state currently bans all CPWD [70]. 
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The texting bans in 36 of the 40 jurisdictions have primary enforcement; 9 of 11 
jurisdictions have primary enforcement for the handheld CPWD ban [70]. Some states 
without comprehensive texting or handheld CPWD bans have partial bans for given 
populations, such as novice drivers and bus drivers; no state has a ban specific to 
commercial truck drivers [70].  
 
 Texting and handheld cell phone bans are recent legal solutions to the growing 
hazards of CPWD. McCartt and colleagues studied the effect of handheld cell phone bans 
in New York, Washington, D.C, and Connecticut and found immediate reductions in 
usage rates, but had mixed success in the long-term [159]. The Governor’s Highway 
Safety Association summarized the existing literature and found that there is no evidence 
to suggest that texting or handheld CPWD bans have reduced crashes [2]. A recent study 
by Lim and Chi found that handheld CPWD laws were associated with a reduction in 
total crash fatality rates for drivers in age 18 – 35 cohorts, but had no effect for older 
drivers [160].  
 
 In September 2009, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of 
the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a regulation entitled “Limiting the Use of 
Wireless Communication Devices,” which banned commercial truck and bus drivers 
from text messaging-while-driving [161]. In the final rule issued by the FMCSA, which 
went into effect in October 2010, drivers who are found to be texting-while-driving face 
up to a $2,750 fine and their employers are liable for a fine up to $11,000 [75]. Unlike the 
patch-work state DD laws, this regulation went into effect for the U.S. at one set time and 
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covered every state equally. However, in the text of the Final Rule, states were given up 
to three years to implement sufficient enforcement of the regulation. A review of the 
existing literature did not yield any prior studies on the implementation of this regulation 
state-by-state. 
 
Materials and Methods 
	
 The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) is an annual database published by 
the National Highway Transportation Administration (NHTSA) that includes all MVCs 
that resulted a fatality in a given year [162]. Data were collected from 2000, when the 
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) variable was first available, through 2010. Data 
were downloaded from the FARS Encyclopedia (http://www-
fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx) into Stata v. 12.1 (Stat Corp., College Station, TX). 
 
Using FARS, fatal crashes involving medium (GVWR from 10,000 to 26,000 
pounds) and heavy (GVWR greater than 26,000 pounds) commercial trucks were 
identified [87]. The Seating Position variable was used to identify the truck drivers. 
Because of a change in the FARS database for 2010, separate methods were necessary to 
identify those truck drivers who were distracted for the 2000 through 2009 data and in the 
2010 data. For the period from 2000 through 2009, the Related Factors- Driver Level 
variable was used. Table 3 displays the values, drawing on a method described by Wilson 
and Stimpson, to indicate a distracted driver [14]. The Related Factors- Driver Level was 
deleted from FARS in 2010, so the Driver Condition at Crash Time and Driver Distracted 
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By variables were queried to determine distracted drivers. Table 6 also includes the 
values from these variables that indicate a distracted driver. FARS does not identify a 
driver-related factor does not to suggest “blame” to that factor for having caused the 
crash. Thus, this analysis was unable to account for other vehicular, environmental, or 
driver-related factors that may have been the root cause of the crash. As a result, this 
study explores crashes involving distracted truck drivers and not crashes caused by 
distracted truck drivers. The Injury Severity variable was then used to identify truck 
drivers and other vehicle occupants killed in the crash. Both of these counts were 
compiled by year for each state and the District of Columbia. 
Table 6. Values of FARS variables indicating a distracted driver, 2000 through 2010. 
Year 
FARS variable 






3- Emotional; 6- Inattentive; 93- Cellular Telephone; 94- Fax 
Machine; 95-  Computer; 96- On-board navigation system; 97- 






3- Emotional; 6- Inattentive; 93- Cellular Telephone present in 
vehicle; 94- Cellular telephone in use in vehicle; 95- computer/fax 
machine/printers; 96- onboard navigation system; 97- two-way 






3- Emotional; 6- Operating the vehicle in a careless or inattentive 
manner; 93- Cellular Telephone present in vehicle; 94- Cellular 
telephone in use in vehicle; 95- computer/fax machine/printers; 





Crash Time 8- Emotional 
Driver 
Distracted By 
1- Looked but did not see; 3- By other occupant(s); 4- By moving 
object in vehicle; 5- While talking or listening to cellular phone; 
6-While dialing cellular phone; 7- Adjusting audio and/or climate 
controls; 9- While using other device/controls integral to vehicle; 
10- While using or reaching for device/object brought into 
vehicle; 12- Distracted by outside person, object or event; 13- 
Eating or drinking; 14- Smoking related; 15- Other cellular phone 
related; 92- Distraction/inattention, details unknown; 97- 








Descriptive analysis was conducted on fatalities involving truck driver and all 
vehicle occupants in distraction-involved truck crashes. Data were analyzed by raw 
counts and per billion VMT, an exposure commonly used to calculate motor vehicle 
crash rates [95, 96]. Since this study specifically examines crashes involving trucks, rate 
calculations were conducted using diesel VMTs, consistent with prior research, to 
provide a more precise estimate of exposure [87]. Data on annual state VMTs was 
obtained from the Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) [97]. State fatality rate data were described across states and across years. To 
compare within- versus between-state variation an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
used [100]. 
 
 To analyze the impact of distracted driving laws on fatality rates, a multi-level 
longitudinal Poisson model was fit, where the state was the first level and the U.S. was 
the second level. The offset for the Poisson model [94, 102] was the log of diesel VMT in 
billions of miles. Aside from state texting-while-driving bans, state handheld cell phone 
bans, and the federal regulation banning texting for all commercial truck drivers, we 
collected other variables that have been shown to influence DD crashes, or motor vehicle 
fatality rates. Table 7 lists these variables, their distributions, and sources. I will briefly 




Table 7. Distribution of and sources of each variable used in the model. 
Variable Distribution Source 
Fatalities Count FARS- NHTSA 
State texting laws Binary GHSA 
State handheld cell phone laws Binary GHSA 
Vehicle miles traveled Continuous DOT- Traffic Safety Facts 
Cell phone saturation Continuous FCC/Census Bureau 
State unemployment rate Continuous Census Bureau 
State ethanol consumption Continuous NIAAA [111] 
State 0.08 BAC law Binary DOT- Traffic Safety Facts 
Highway capital expenditures Continuous DOT- Traffic Safety Facts 
Per capita income Continuous Census Bureau 
Population density Continuous Census Bureau 
Primary seat belt law Binary DOT [112] 
Truck length restrictions Categorical Rand McNally Motor Carrier’s Road Atlas 
Rural truck speed limit Categorical Rand McNally Motor Carrier’s Road Atlas 
 
 Cell phone saturation is the number of cell phone subscriptions per capita in a 
state in a given year and describes the growth in cell phones across the study period [14, 
108]. Data on cell phones in a state came from annual reports by the FCC [109] and state 
population data were downloaded from the Census Bureau. To analyze the effect of the 
economy on fatality rates [110], annual state unemployment rates were downloaded from 
the Census Bureau, as were median per capita incomes, standardized to 2011 U.S. 
dollars. Population density was calculated using annual population and total area, both 
data also came from the Census Bureau. Because I did not describe crashes as urban or 
rural, population density serves as an approximation of urbanicity within a state [87].  
 
 Primary enforcement of driver seatbelt laws reduces fatality rates in all crashes 
[113]; thus this variable was included as a potential confounder. A report on primary and 
secondary enforcement of seatbelt laws from NHTSA provided information on the years 
that states enacted primary seatbelt enforcement [112]. I only examined primary 
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enforcement for drivers, because data were not available on all state laws for primary and 
secondary enforcement of passenger seatbelt use. By the end of the study period, all 
states had primary seat belt laws.  
 
Two variables were included to account for the effects of drunk driving on fatality 
rates. The first was a binary variable on whether or not a state used 0.08 mg/dl blood 
alcohol content (BAC) as the threshold for driving while intoxicated (DWI) or driving 
under the influence (DUI). These data came from the DOT’s annual Traffic Safety Facts 
reports. Second, per capita alcohol consumption, measured in gallons of ethanol, was 
obtained from a report from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
[111]. Capital expenditures represent the investment that a state makes in roadway 
infrastructure [87]. These data were also obtained from the Traffic Safety Facts reports 
and converted to 2010 U.S. dollars. Traffic Safety Facts data were only available through 
2010. 
 
 All the previous data are publically available online and free to download. Two 
other variables that impacted fatality rates in the study of truck drivers by Neeley and 
Richardson were maximum truck length and rural truck speed limit [87]. States are 
allowed to set both the maximum speed on highways and the maximum allowable length 
for trucks. The data were obtained from the annual editions of the Motor Carrier’s Road 
Atlas published by Rand McNally. Examining the data, they naturally broke down into 
categories. For maximum truck length, data were categorized as 1) under 53 feet; 2) 53 
feet or 53 feet, six inches; 3) 57 feet, four inches or 57 feet, six inches; and 4) 59 feet or 
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longer. State speed limits were in 5 mile per hour (mph) intervals from 55 mph to 75 
mph. I specifically examined “rural truck speed limits” in the analysis: some states have 
higher speed limits for passenger vehicles versus large trucks and buses; furthermore, 
some states have higher speed limits in rural areas versus urban areas [87].  
 
 Because the Rand McNally atlases were not intended to be used for surveillance, 
the 2007 through 2009 editions were missing data on rural truck speed limits. Internet 
searchers produced some missing data: for example, Virginia changed the speed limits by 
legislative action in from 65 mph in 2009 to 70 mph in 2010 [114]. I imputed the missing 
data using a method developed by Royston for missing categorical data [115, 116]. 
Although this method worked, data highly varied between categories year-to-year within 
a state, which did not reflect the infrequent changes seen in all other years of the study 
period. As a result, I opted to carry the 2006 observations forward to 2009, a technique 
for missing data that is commonly used in pharmaceutical studies [117], and noted the 
limitations of doing so in the manuscript. 
 
Data were compiled by state and by year into a longitudinal database [94]. 
Univariate analyses were conducted for the bans as well as covariates that have 
previously been shown to affect crash fatality rates. Multivariate regression models were 
fit for both truck driver fatality rates and fatality rates for all vehicle occupants. Two 
nested models were fit for each outcome: Model 1was only those variables that were 
statistically significant (p  0.10) in univariate regression; Model 2 consisted of the 
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variables in Model 1 plus the texting and handheld cell phone bans. The nested models 
were compared with a likelihood ratio test [94, 120].  
 
In univariate and multivariate analyses all covariates were examined using fixed 
effects, other than cell phone saturation, which used random effects [107]. The random 
effects model for cell phone saturation had both a significant regression coefficient and 
reduced log likelihood versus the fixed effects model. Analysis was conducted using 







 From 2000 through 2010, there were 1,007 fatalities to truck drivers who were 
distracted at the time of the crash. The fatality rate for this period was 0.321 per billion 
diesel VMT. For all vehicle occupants in crashes involving distracted truck drivers, there 
were 3,942 fatalities for a rate of 1.101 per billion VMT. Table 8 has descriptive data on 
fatality counts and rates by state and by year. ANOVA for both truck driver fatality rates 
and fatality rates to all vehicle occupants found much more variation between than within 
states (F(50,510) = 14.51, p<0.001 and F(50,510) = 11.47, p<0.001, respectively). Table 9 is an 
example of the variation between states, displaying the highest and lowest state fatality 
counts and rates over the study period. Figures 5 and 6 show fatality rates by year for 
truck drivers and all vehicle occupants, respectively.  
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Table 8. Descriptive Data on Fatality Counts and Rates (per Billion VMT) for Truck 
Drivers and All Vehicle Occupants in Distraction-Related Truck Crashes (Min-Max= 
Minimum – Maximum; SD = Standard Deviation; IQR = Interquartile Range) 
 Truck driver fatalities All vehicle occupant fatalities 
Mean (SD) Min-Max IQR Mean (SD) Min-Max IQR 
Count per 
state  19.7 (25.8) 0 – 134 20 
77.3 
(106.8) 0 – 406 63 
Rate per state  0.321 (0.33) 0 – 1.579 0.41 1.101 (0.95) 0 – 5.475 0.97 
Count per 
year 91.6 (21.6) 53 – 129 35 
358.4 
(82.9) 202 – 498 143 





Table 9. Lowest and Highest State Fatality Counts and Rates (per Billion VMT) for All 
Vehicle Occupants in Crashes Involving Distracted Truck Drivers, 2000 – 2010.  
Lowest Highest 
State Count State Rate State Count State Rate 
DC  0 DC  0.00 TX  406  OK  5.48  
HI  2 UT  0.04  OK  405  PA  2.70  
NH  2 GA  0.10  PA  399  MT  2.66  
RI  2 MI  0.15  CA  383  MO  2.59  
UT  2 OR  0.15  MO  257  NM  2.34  
ND  4 AL  0.18 FL  160  KY  2.30  
SD  4 NH  0.19 KY  156  KS  2.14  
VT  4 OH  0.25  NM  119  MD  2.02  
AR  5 ND  0.29 NC  103  ME  1.78  




Figure 5. Yearly fatality rates for commercial truck drivers in DD-related truck crashes. 
Dashed-line is mean rate across the study period (0.321 per BVMT). 
Figure 6. Yearly fatality rates for all vehicle occupants in DD-related truck crashes. 










 Table 10 displays results of univariate regression on truck driver fatality 
rates and fatality rates for all vehicle occupants. For truck driver fatality rates, only 
maximum rural truck speed limit and maximum truck length were significant predictors 
in univariate regression. For all vehicle occupants in distracted driving-involved truck 
crashes, rural truck speed limit, maximum truck length, percent cell phone saturation, 
unemployment rate, and the federal ban on texting for truck drivers were all significant 
univariate predictors.  
 
Table 11 displays the results of multivariate regression on truck driver fatality 
rates. Although states allowing the longest trucks and the highest rural speeds have near 
significant increases in fatality rates, no significant differences in adjusted IRRs were 
found. State and federal distraction laws were not significant predictors of fatalities, 
although the FMCSA ban approaches significance in Model 2. The likelihood ratio test 
found that there was no significant difference between Model 1 and Model 2. Table 12 
displays the results of multivariate regression on fatality rates for all vehicle occupants in 
distraction-involved crashes. Speed limit, truck length, unemployment rate, and cell 
phone saturation were all not significant; however, the 2010 federal ban on texting-while 
driving for commercial truck drivers was associated with a decrease in the fatality 
incident rate by 41%. When we add state texting and handheld cell phone bans in Model 
2, the 2010 ban was associated with a 49% decreased incident rate. A likelihood ratio test 
found that Model 2, with the added state texting and handheld CPWD bans, resulted in 
statistically improved model fit (likelihood ratio ²=6.36, p < 0.05).  
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Table 10. Results of Univariate Multi-level Poisson Regression on Fatality Rates. IRRs 
in Bold are Significant at <0.10. 
Truck driver 
fatality rate 
Fatality rate for all 
vehicle occupants 
Variable IRRa  IRRa 
State texting ban 1.07 0.82 0.96 0.83 
State handheld cell phone ban 0.98 0.97 0.83 0.49 
Federal texting ban for truckers 0.67 0.19 0.59 0.002 
Cell phone saturationb 1.14 0.72 0.55 0.024 
Unemployment 0.95 0.24 0.95 0.018 
State ethanol consumption 1.17 0.61 0.92 0.72 
State primary seatbelt law 0.86 0.51 0.85 0.27 
State BAC .08 law 0.90 0.64 0.91 0.44 
State road capital expenditure 0.95 0.39 0.96 0.22 
Population density 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.93 
State mean income 0.84 0.26 1.00 0.98 
State maximum allowable truck length 
48 feet (reference) 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
53 feet  or 53 feet 6 inches 1.13 0.85 1.11 0.82 
57 feet 4 inches or 57feet 6 
inches 2.35 0.096 1.41 0.41 
59 feet or longer 2.33 0.039 2.48 0.008 
State maximum rural truck speed limit 
55 mph (reference) 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
60 mph 3.00 0.092 1.49 0.30 
65 mph 2.36 0.100 1.09 0.77 
70 mph 2.46 0.096 1.16 0.64 
75 mph 3.43 0.027 1.84 0.069 
a IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio 
b Cell phone saturation was the only variable for which random effects produced a 




Table 11. Multivariate Multi-level Poisson Regression on Truck Driver Fatality Rate in 
Crashes Involving Distracted Truck Drivers. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable IRRa P value IRRa P value 
Constant 0.10 < 0.001 0.99 < 0.001 
Speed limit- 55 mph 1.00 (reference) -- 1.00 (reference) -- 
60 mph 2.88 0.097 2.97 0.089 
65 mph 2.39 0.089 2.42 0.089 
70 mph 2.11 0.17 2.10 0.17 
75 mph 2.51 0.11 2.65 0.091 
Maximum length- 48 feet 1.00 (reference) -- 1.00 (reference) -- 
53 feet  or 53 feet 6 inches 1.03 0.96 1.02 0.97 
57 feet 4 inches or 57feet 6 
inches 
2.04 0.19 1.91 0.24 
59 feet or longer 2.18 0.056 2.13 0.066 
State text ban   1.73 0.13 
State handheld cell ban   0.56 0.31 
Federal texting ban for 
truckers 
  0.52 0.06 
a IRR = Incident rate ratio 
Table 12. Multivariate Multi-level Poisson Regression on Fatality Rate for All Vehicle 
Occupants in Crashes Involving Distracted Truck Drivers. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable IRRa P value IRRa P value 
Constant 0.94 < 0.001 1.02 < 0.001 
Speed limit- 55 mph 1.00 (reference) -- 1.00 (reference) -- 
60 mph 1.39 0.40 1.43 0.35 
65 mph 1.14 0.66 1.17 0.60 
70 mph 1.10 0.77 1.10 0.78 
75 mph 1.73 0.14 1.74 0.13 
Maximum length- 48 feet 1.00 (reference) -- 1.00 (reference) -- 
53 feet  or 53 feet 6 inches 0.69 0.5 0.72 0.55 
57 feet 4 inches or 57feet 6 
inches 
0.77 0.6 0.78 0.61 
59 feet or longer 1.61 0.25 1.64 0.24 
State unemployment rate 0.98 0.57 0.97 0.29 
Cell phone saturation 0.74 0.32 0.72 0.31 
Federal texting ban for 
truckers 
0.59 0.008 0.51 0.001 
State texting ban   1.76 0.012 
State handheld cell ban   0.49 0.061 




 Fatality rates for truck drivers and all vehicle occupants in distraction-involved 
truck crashes have been decreasing since 2006 and 2007, respectively. While the 2010 
FMCSA ban was associated with a decrease in fatality rates for all vehicle occupants in 
2010, without more data after its implementation we cannot draw conclusions about its 
impacts on fatality rates. As in prior studies [14, 160], our results did not find that state 
DD laws were not correlated with reduced fatality rates. 
 
 Unlike prior studies that found distracted driving and crash fatality increasing in 
spite of state CPWD bans [14, 18, 159], the 2010 FMCSA texting ban was implemented 
during a period where distraction-involved fatalities were decreasing. Understanding the 
decrease in these fatality rates will be important for future assessments of distraction-
involved truck crashes. As previously mentioned the total motor vehicle crash fatality 
rate in the U.S. has been decreasing for decades. However, large truck-related fatalities 
increased by almost 9% from 2009 to 2010 [150], which would have meant that the 
decline in this sub-population of distraction-involved crashes occurred despite truck-
related MVC fatality rates increasing. In addition, Wilson and Stimpson found that all 
distraction-related fatalities were increasing through 2008 [14], whereas the present study 
showed a decrease in truck-involved distraction-related fatalities before 2008. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to compare the fatality rate for truck-involved distraction-
related fatalities to all distracted driving fatality rates in order to compare our findings to 
those presented by Wilson and Stimpson. Future analyses in this area should consider 
possible ways to isolate the effects of time trends in overall crash rates, from those related 
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to specific policy interventions. There are methods that have been used in prior analyses 
to address this potential bias [163, 164], and the next step of understanding the effects 
will be to employ such methods.  
 
There are several aspects of the FMCSA ban that potentially make it more 
effective than the state CPWD bans. Amendola reviewed the Connecticut CPWD ban and 
found that both law enforcement and the court system were among the factors 
contributing to that law’s ineffectiveness[165]. Unlike states where CPWD laws contain 
unclear or weak definitions of what constitutes offending behavior[69, 76], the FMCSA 
final rule clearly amends the Federal Code with instructions on prohibited behavior and 
recommended penalties[75]. It is possible that the lack of any national comprehensive 
distracted driving laws in the U.S. was impacting the effectiveness of these laws.  
 
Another important feature of the FMCSA ban is that it includes penalties for both 
drivers observed texting-while-driving, and a penalty for the drivers’ employers [75]. 
Therefore, employers have a monetary incentive to ensure that their drivers are not 
texting-while-driving. The Network of Employers for Traffic Safety, a corporate 
partnership for safe driving, conducted a poll of its membership in 2009 and reported on 
24 of its member organizations’ corporate cell phone policies [82]. Some of the 
companies (who were de-identified in the report) reserved the right to terminate workers 
violating bans on either handheld CPWD or texting-while-driving. In the 13 months 
between the announcement of the ban and its implementation, organizations would have 
had an opportunity to establish their own distracted driving policies. Previous analysis by 
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Hickman and colleagues found that truck drivers who drive for companies with 
enumerated cell phone policies have significantly reduced prevalence of CPWD 
compared to those companies that do not have such policies [4].  
 
Through the FMCSA, it is easier for the government to regulate commercial 
vehicles than it would be if the federal government wanted to ban texting in private 
vehicles. Because of the distribution of Federal and State authority under the United 
States’ Constitution, the federal government does not have jurisdiction over all driving 
regulations. If the federal government wanted to take action on texting-while-driving for 
all drivers, it could pass legislation making federal highway funds dependant on states 
enacting such a ban; as was done successfully in 2001 when the Bush Administration 
sought a nation-wide 0.08 BAC threshold for drunk driving [166]. By targeting 
commercial truck and bus drivers, the Department of Transportation was able to take 
action on a population that was readily available to them. We must remember that 
although the crashes examined in this study involved a distracted truck driver, they were 
not all caused by truck driver distraction, so further federal action to regulate truck driver 




 Although FARS is the most comprehensive database, no validation studies of the 
distracted driving measures were found in the extant literature. A NHTSA report on using 
FARS analyzing distracted driving notes that police reports of distraction are not 
consistent across states and jurisdictions [151]. Therefore, it is likely that FARS under-
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reports the number of crashes involving distraction and the estimates in this paper 
actually underestimate the true magnitude of this public health problem.  
 
There analyses could have been impacted by some measurement error. We were 
unable to determine if the crashes in our study were caused by distracted driving. FARS 
collects personal, vehicular, and environmental factors involved in each crash and does 
not weigh which of these factors was the “cause” of a given crash or fatality [151]. Thus, 
this study was limited in that it was only able to confidently explore crashes that involved 
DD. In addition, it is unknown what effect, if any, the change in coding of distraction-
related crashes had on our results. In 2010, the definition for distracted driving became 
more expansive than it was in prior years. The change in definition also resulted in FARS 
more closely matching another NHTSA database, the General Estimating System. 
Research using the General Estimating System found that the percent of police-reported 
crashes involving distracted driving did not change between 2009 and 2010[167]. 
Because of this, we do not believe that the change in FARS codes accounted for the 
effects of the FMCSA regulation that revealed by these analyses. 
 
 Due to sample size considerations, our unit of analysis was the state*year. 
Distraction-related crashes are rare events, so we needed a time period wide enough to 
capture them for each state. By doing so, we lose the ability to analyze seasonality as a 
factor for crashes. To accurately capture within state variation, we used the state as the 
level as analysis and did not analyze urban versus rural crash rates. Nor did we analyze 
driver-related factors, such as age, gender, licensure, or drink driving. Due to the 
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omission of these variables in the present study, the results may have been impacted by 
some residual confounding. 
 
Finally, the FMCSA Final Rule is not explicit on how states are to implement or 
enforce the law. We were unable to find any analysis of when and how each state 
implemented and enforced of the regulation, thus we are unable to determine how these 
factors affected our findings. More years of data after the ban was implemented will be 
necessary to demonstrate what, if any effect, it had on fatality rates. Any potential effects 




 This study quantified distracted driving-involved truck crashes, state-by-state, 
over an 11-year period. The state fatality rate for truck drivers in distraction-involved 
truck crashes was 0.321 per billion diesel VMTs and the rate for all vehicle occupants in 
these crashes was 1.101 per billion diesel VMTs. There was wide variation between 
states for fatality counts and rates. Fatality rates in these distraction-involved truck 
crashes were decreasing from 2007 through the end of the study period. State texting and 
handheld cell phone bans were not associated with decreases in fatality rates over time. 
While the 2010 FMCSA ban on texting while driving for commercial drivers was 
associated with a decrease in fatality rates for all vehicle occupants in distraction-
involved truck crashes, the ban was not implemented until the last 3 months of the study 
period, so we cannot say that it was responsible for the decrease in fatality rates. 
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Important aspects of the FMCSA ban were that it was nationwide in scope and carried 
very heavy penalties for drivers and employers. When more data from the period 
following its implementation become available, the longitudinal effects of the ban should 
be tested on distraction-involved crash fatality rates. Further research should determine 
how the regulation was implemented and enforced to determine if there are features that 





Manuscript 2: The Effects of Safety Climate on Distracted Driving in Commercial 
Truck Drivers  
 
Abstract 
For those who drive on the job, distracted driving is an occupational hazard. We 
hypothesize that organizational safety climate will affect distraction-related outcomes for 
truck drivers in the United States. A mixed methods study design was employed to 
investigate this relationship: an online survey of union truck drivers using the Safety 
Climate Questionnaire (SCQ) was complemented with semi-structured interviews of 
distracted driving and truck safety experts. A factor analysis of the SCQ produced factors 
that had previously been identified as describing Communications and Procedures, 
Management Commitment, and Work Pressure. Interview subjects described how these 
three constructs could decrease distracted driving. In univariate analyses, 
Communications and Procedures and Management Commitment were associated with 
self-reported distraction-related near crashes; none of the SCQ factors were significant in 
multivariate regressions. This is the first study to describe the effect of safety climate on 
distracted driving in the occupational setting. 
Key words: mixed methods; factor analysis; near crash; Teamsters; occupational safety 
 
Introduction 
 Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of occupational fatalities in the 
United States (U.S.) for all workers [31, 168]. Over half of the occupational fatalities to 
truck drivers in the U.S. are due to motor vehicle crash [31], and these deaths occur at a 
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rate of 3.7 per billion vehicle miles traveled (VMT) [32]. Truck driver health and well-
being has been previously shown to be affected by issues such as sleepiness and fatigue, 
poor physical fitness, and the work being shift work-based [27, 28]. Distracted driving 
has long been a hazard for truck drivers; however, the emergence of portable electronic 
communication devices has only their crash risk [4, 6].  
 
 In general, drivers are affected by distractions in four ways: 1) visual distractions 
that take the driver’s eyes off the forward roadway; 2) auditory distractions that take the 
driver’s aural perception from relative driving cues; 3) cognitive distractions take the 
driver’s mind off the driving task; and 4) manual distractions take the driver’s hands off 
the wheel [1, 2]. The first two forms of distraction could interfere with the driver from 
receiving necessary information relevant to the driving task, the third affects the 
processing of this new information, and the fourth delays the driver from taking 
corrective action necessitated by the situation [3]. Tasks that drivers can undertake have 
been broken into a taxonomy of three types of tasks: primary tasks are those that only 
control vehicle speed and direction; secondary tasks that support the primary tasks, such 
as turning on headlights or checking mirrors; and tertiary tasks that are any activities the 
driver undertakes that are unrelated to driving [1]. Our definition of distracted driving is 
any secondary or tertiary task that takes the driver’s eyes, hands, or concentration away 
from the primary driving task. 
 
 Studies of driver truck behavior using in-vehicle cameras have found over two 
dozen secondary and tertiary tasks as sources of distraction [4-7]. The term “cell phone 
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use while driving” (CPWD) encompasses any task involving a cell phone, including 
dialing a phone, talking on the phone, and reading or writing messages [9]. CPWD has 
been increasing in recent years due to the proliferation of cellular phones in the U.S. and 
elsewhere [10, 11]. Two of the most dangerous CPWD tasks are dialing the phone and 
sending, reading, and writing short message service text messages (a.k.a., texting) [6]. 
These tasks involve manual, visual, and cognitive distractions [2]. Both in the laboratory 
setting [12, 13] and during actual driving [6], texting has been shown to be the greatest 
hazard for crash or near crash. The Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) has 
conducted multiple studies on distraction among commercial truck drivers and texting 
created the greatest increased hazard for distracted driving crash or near crash [4, 6]. 
 
 For commercial truck drivers the vehicle cab is their workplace; therefore, 
distraction on-the-job is thus an occupational hazard. Because of this, organizational 
policies surrounding distracted driving are important in reducing distracted driving 
among professional truck drivers [4]. So while cell phones and other means of electronic 
communication give drivers the ability to conduct business while driving [35], because 
this is an occupational hazard, keeping drivers free from distractions while driving should 
be a concern for employers. “Safety climate” is a framework for understanding how 
highly an organization values safe worker behavior [40, 41]. Previously organizational 
safety climate has been associated with occupational injuries and safe worker behavior 
[42, 169, 170]. A study of Australian workers who drive on-the-job found that perceived 
safety climate was correlated with safer driving behaviors [47]. Because truck drivers 
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face so many occupational distractions, we hypothesize that occupational safety climate 
will have a major impact on safe behaviors surrounding distracted driving.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 This study was conducted using a mixed methods design. The ensuing sections 
will describe the qualitative analysis and the quantitative analysis separately. The 
qualitative and quantitative data were collected from separate populations. In mixed 
methods study notation, this manuscript follows a QUAN+qual design for the purposes of 
complementarity evaluation, that is, elaborating and illustrating quantitative results with 
the qualitative data [138, 139]. Using qualitative data to elucidate the statistical results 
allows us to further clarify the effects of the different aspects of safety climate on drivers 
[138]. Furthermore, by using qualitative data from a population outside that of the drivers 
who are surveyed quantitatively, this “between-method” triangulation should enhance the 
study’s external validity [124]. The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 





A purposive sample of experts in truck driver safety or distracted driving were 
recruited from the list of attendees at the Symposium on Prevention of Occupationally-
Related Distracted Driving sponsored by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health Occupational Safety and Health Education and Research Center on April 18, 2011 
in Laurel, MD. Ensuing interview subjects were recruited using a snowball sampling 
technique [125]. An interview guide was developed and refined by the study team and 
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was finalized after pilot testing with an expert in motor carrier safety who was a former 
driver.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted via Skype (Microsoft Corp., 
Redmond, WA) and were recorded using MP3 Skype Recorder v3.1 
(VOIPCallRecording.com). Audio files of the interviews were transcribed by uploaded 
the .mp3 files to productiontranscripts.com (Production Transcripts, Glendale, CA). Data 
collection was ceased after 11 interviews when data saturation was reached [171]. The 
recording failed on one interview, so only 10 of the 11 interviews were successfully 
transcribed. Notes on all 11 interviews were successfully transcribed. Data collection 
began in December, 2012 and ended in January, 2013.  
 
The 10 transcripts and notes from all 11 interviews were stored as Microsoft 
Word documents, which were then used for qualitative coding. Data were open-coded 
line-by-line to label the themes found in subjects’ responses [126, 127].  A codebook was 
developed during the focused coding process. A second coder was employed for a subset 
of three randomly-selected interviews as a check on the reliability of the coding process. 
Both coders met to discuss the coding and how well the codebook described the 
categorizations of the data [128]. The two coders differed slightly in their choice of 
wording of themes, but no substantive differences emerged. Because the interviews were 





 Quantitative data were collected via online survey. Members of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) in the U.S. were selected as target population for the 
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survey. The IBT represents over one million truck drivers and union members in other 
occupations in the U.S. and Canada [57]. The IBT was selected due to its size and 
nationwide reach. A business representative from an IBT Local who was familiar with 
the project was used to pilot test the survey and finalize the exact wording. The survey 
required only 10 minutes to complete upon final testing.  
 
With the assistance of personnel in the Office of Health and Safety at IBT 
headquarters, we sought sub-industries where the drivers were most likely to experience 
the distractions under study [58]. To identify drivers in the carhaul, express, freight, 
motion picture, package, and tankhaul industries, study subjects were asked to select the 
type of truck that they drove (with accompanying images) at the beginning of the survey. 
Those who didn’t identify one of the selected vehicles were directed to a disqualification 
page and thanked for their time. Of the 440 subjects who entered the survey, 79 (18%) 
were screened out when they identified themselves as not driving in one of the vehicles 
of interest. Over the course of the survey, 122 of the remaining 361 (34%) left the survey 
before completion, resulting in a final sample of 239 subjects.  
 
Of the 239 subjects who completed all portions of the survey, 60 (25%) drove 
delivery vans and 179 (75%) drove larger trucks. Attempts to determine if the final 
sample of respondents was representative of the larger population were limited because 
of few existing publically available data of truck drivers. The most recent was a 2002 
Census Bureau report on registered trucks in the U.S. that found that medium trucks (a 
category that includes delivery vans) comprised 23% of the American truck fleet and 
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larger trucks were 63%, while the remaining 14% trucks that were too small for the 
current study population [131]. A search of the peer-reviewed and grey literature 
produced no more recent estimates of the composition of the American truck fleet. Thus, 
relying on the numbers from the Census, a Pearson’s ² found no statistical difference for 
truck type between the study population and those subjects who dropped out during data 
collection (p-value = 0.4). While we are unable to make statements about the sample for 
other key factors, using this historical data, although limited, we are confident that our 
sample of drivers does not markedly differ from the national truck fleet on vehicle types 
represented herein. 
 
 Survey subjects were recruited via an announcement posted to the IBT website, 
teamster.org. The survey was administered using www.SurveyMonkey.com 
(SurveyMonkey Inc, Palo Alto, CA) and was open between April 2 and May 19, 2013. A 
rule of thumb for sample size when conducting factor analysis, as was done for this 
survey, is a ratio of 10 subjects per survey question [118], yet this is not a hard and fast 
rule [132]. However, ratios of 5:1 or 6:1 have also been frequently used [132], and with 
more than 300 subjects, the ratio of subjects to questions can may not need to be as high 
as 10:1 [133]. For the 35-item survey, a sample of at least 350 subjects would be very 
strong, whereas 175 subjects would produce the minimal 5:1 ratio. The final sample size 
and survey power are described in the Results section. 
 
 The online survey consisted of the 35 item Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCQ) 
modified for drivers by Wills and colleagues [46, 129]. Drivers were asked to what 
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degree they agreed with a given SCQ question using a Likert scale where 1 represented 
“Strongly agree,” 4 represented “Neutral,” and 7 represented “Strongly disagree.” 
Demographic data on the subject’s gender, age, and years driving experience were also 
collected. Subjects also self-reported if they ever had experienced any of the following 
safety critical events while on the job [148]: subjects first reported whether or not they 
ever had a crash while on the job; after being reminded of the definition of distracted 
driving, subjects reported whether or not they had ever had a crash while distracted, had 
to break hard to avoid a crash while distracted, and swerve to avoid a crash while 
distracted.  
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine if the six factors of the 
SCQ as determined by Wills  were appropriate for this population. From principal 
component analysis, the eigenvalues and percent variance indicated that there were 
between three and seven factors [140]. Using Wills  as a starting point, a 6-fator 
model was estimated using maximum likelihood; promax factor rotation was used due to 
correlation between factors [140]. Items with high uniqueness (greater than 0.5) were 
removed in an iterative fashion until we arrived at a model with three factors that loaded 
on SCQ items 1 through 12, 14 through 20, and 21 through 24. These three factors, the 
pattern matrix of which is presented in Table 13 are the same as the first three factors 
described by Wills . [46]. Mean scores for the three factors were 3.44 for 
Communications and Procedures (standard deviation (SD) = 1.6); 4.21 (SD=1.8) for 
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Work Pressures; and 3.90 (SD = 1.9) for Management Commitment. The scree plot1 with 
parallel analysis [141] in Figure 7 supports our data as best described by three factors 
[172]. We also generated the factor scores using the original six-factor structure from 
Wills  [129]. The mean (SD) scores for the six factors were 3.42 (1.6) for 
Communications and Procedures, 4.21 (1.8) for Work Pressure, 3.90 (1.9) for 
Management Commitment, 4.80 (1.6) for Relationships, 3.80 (1.7) for Driver Training, 
and 4.14 (1.8) for Safety Rules.  
 
The mean factor scores and demographic data were entered first into univariate 
regression for each of the four crash and near-crash outcomes. This analysis was 
conducted for the three-factor model that our analysis generated as well as using scores 
from the original six-factor model from Wills . Multivariate regressions were then 
conducted for each outcome for factors that had p-values  0.10. Entering covariates with 
p-values less than 0.2 has been used in model development in the past [94]; however, 
using 0.10 as a cutoff is a trade-off between including relevant covariates and model 
performance [119]. All analyses were conducted with Stata v.12.1 (Stata Corp, College 
Station, TX).  
  






Table 13. Pattern matrix for three factors for the SCQ. Chronbach’s alpha for reliability 
of each factor is listed. 
Items and Labels 1 2 3 
Factor 1- Communications and Pressure ( = 0.94)   
1. Changes in working procedures and their effects on safety are 
effectively communicated to workers 0.74   
2. Employees are consulted when changes to driver safety practices are 
suggested 0.79   
3. Employees are told when changes are made to the working environment 
such as the vehicle, maintenance or garaging procedures 0.74   
4. Safety policies relating to the use of motor vehicles are effectively 
communicated to the workers 0.87   
5. Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles are complete 
and comprehensive 0.84   
6. An effective documentation management system ensures the 
availability of safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles 0.82   
7. Safety problems are openly discussed between employees and 
management/supervisors 0.66   
8. Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles match the way 
tasks are done in practice 0.66   
9. Employees can discuss important driver safety policy issues 0.51   
10. Employees are consulted for suggested vehicle/driver safety 
improvements 0.72   
11. Employees can identify relevant procedures for each job 0.62   
12. Employees can express views about safety problems 0.50     
Factor 2- Work Pressure ( = 0.93)   
14. Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic 0.85   
15. There is sufficient 'thinking time' to enable employees to plan and 
carry out their work to an adequate standard 0.88   
16. Workload is reasonably balanced 0.87   
17. There are enough employees/drivers to carry out the required work 0.76   
18. Changes in workload, which have been made on short notice, can be 
dealt with in a way that does not affect driver safety 0.80   
19. When driving employees have enough time to carry out their tasks 0.82   
20. Problems that arise outside of employees' control can be dealt with in 
a way that does not affect driver safety   0.61   
Factor 3- Management Commitment ( = 0.95)   
21. Management are committed to driver safety 0.86
22. Management are committed to motor vehicle safety 0.85
23. Driver safety is central to managements' values and philosophies 0.82
24.Driver safety is seen as an important part of fleet management in this 
organization     0.70
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Figure 7. Scree plot with parallel analysis for safety climate questionnaire principal 








 Demographic data of the 239 subjects who completed the survey are presented in 
Table 14. The subjects were 229 men, 7 women, and 3 who chose not to enter their 
gender. Self-reported crash and near-crash outcomes were as follows: 130 (54%) reported 
ever having a crash on the job, 107 reported no crashes, and two did not answer; 41 
(17%) reported ever crashing while distracted, 197 reported no such crashes, and one 
subject did not answer; 112 (47%) reported ever having to brake hard to avoid a crash 























(45%) reported ever having to swerve to avoid a crash while distracted, 129 reported not 
doing so, and two subjects did not answer. 
 
Table 14. Descriptive data on 239 subjects who completed the survey. 
 Mean SD Minimum-Maximum 
Age (years) 48.0 8.9 21 – 69 
Driving experience (years) 22.7 10.1 1 – 45 







 Results of univariate logistic regressions for demographic data and the three 
factors are presented in Table 15. Variables entered into multivariate regressions were 
differed for each outcome: for ever experiencing a crash, covariates were gender, 
Communications and Procedures, Work Pressure, and Management Commitment; for 
ever experiencing a distraction-related crash, covariates were age and driving experience; 
for undertaking distraction-related braking, covariates were weekly driving exposure and 
Communications and Procedures; for undertaking distraction-related swerving, covariates 





Table 15. Univariate regression for demographic factors and three safety climate factors 
on negative driving outcomes in the workplace. The odds ratios (ORs) are presented with 
odds of the negative outcome versus no outcome. OR for Gender are for women’s odds 
over men’s odds. There were too few subjects who did not list a gender to calculate ORs. 




crash on the job
Ever experience a 
distraction-related 




on the job 
Ever have to 
swerve while 
distracted on the 
job 
Variable OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value 
Gender 0.13 0.06 3.75 0.92 1.51 0.60 7.62 0.06 
Age 1.02 0.25 1.05 0.03 0.98 0.27 1.02 0.27 
Driving 
experience 
1.02 0.13 1.04 0.03 0.99 0.66 1.01 0.28 
Weekly driving 0.99 0.66 1.01 0.45 0.98 0.06 1.00 0.73 
Communications 
and Procedures 
1.19 0.03 0.98 0.84 1.15 0.09 1.21 0.02 
Work Pressure 1.19 0.02 0.94 0.51 1.05 0.54 1.00 0.97 
Management 
Commitment 
1.15 0.04 0.98 0.90 1.08 0.25 1.14 0.05 
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crash on the job
Ever experience a 
distraction-





on the job 
Ever have to 
swerve while 
distracted on the 
job 
Variable OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Gender 0.11 0.01-
1.01 
3.67 0.75-17.90     8.09 0.93-
70.56 
Age     1.02 0.94-1.10         
Driving 
experience 
    1.02 0.96-1.09         
Weekly driving         0.98 0.95-
1.00 









Work Pressure 1.12 0.93-
1.36 









The outcomes of the four multivariate regressions are presented in Table 16. 
Some of these covariates approached significances. Gender approach significance in both 
ever experiencing a crash and experiencing distraction-involve swerving (p-values of 
0.051 and 0.058, respectively), yet the relationship between gender and these negative 
outcomes was switched: men were more likely to experience a crash and women were 
more likely to swerve while distracted. As age and driving experience increased, they 
approached significance for ever reporting a distraction-related crash. Increasing weekly 
driving exposure approached was significantly associated (p=0.039) for a reduction in 
distraction-related hard breaking. Communications and Procedures approached 
significance (p = 0.057) in multivariate regression for experiencing distraction-related 





Using the Wills . six factor model, we found significant results in univariate 
logistic regressions for ever crashing and ever swerving while distracted. Scores from 
factors 1, 2, and 6 were associated with ever experiencing a crash on the job and factors 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 were associated with ever swerving while distracted on the job. In 
multivariate regression, the p-values for all these covariates were 0.2 or greater. Thus, 
although our three factor model was not highly significant in multivariate regression, the 





 Of the 11 interview participants, five were researchers at academic institutions; 
three were at private research institutions; and one each were from a union, a private 
company, and a federal agency. Because participants were guaranteed anonymity, no 
further demographic data were collected. Although interview participants identified ways 
that drivers would feel pressure from supervisors, coworkers, or family and friends to 
undertake various distracting tasks, subjects said that it was ultimately up to each driver 
to make the final decision on whether or do a given distracting activity while driving. 
Interview subjects addressed how each of the three factors from the questionnaire could 
impact truck driver safety surrounding distracted driving.  
 
Because we did not interview truck drivers directly, we were unable to get 
information on specific company policies regarding the Communications and Procedures 
factor. One participant expressed concerns that it was possible for company culture, be it 
from management or fellow coworkers, to have a suppressive effect on drivers even 
89

bringing up safety concerns, as expressed in SCQ items seven, nine, and 12. To enforce 
company policies, interview subjects said that organizations could electronically monitor 
their drivers. Two interview participants cited DriveCam (manufactured by The Driver 
Science Company, San Diego, CA) as one method for monitoring driver behavior. 
 
The Work Pressure factor, specifically time pressure, was commonly discussed as 
important aspects of driver safety. A participant described how company culture could 
vary between companies and influence the need to respond to dispatchers: 
“[D]epending on the company and how they are structured and kind of the 
underlying safety climate and culture, we might see that drivers are under the 
impression that they need to be very responsive to anything that comes from the 
office. Whether it's from dispatch or from a supervisor-- things like that.  
Whereas, other companies might have policies where that feeling is a little less 
intense. ” 
Another participant stated that the pressures to respond quickly could be either explicit 
company policy or an “[i]mplicit expectation that they use the device while driving so 
that they can respond in a timely fashion to requests from the company.” A final, telling 
quote about the structure of a delivery driver from a third interview subject demonstrates 
just how intense time pressure can be for workers:  
“I rode with a truck driver and you know his schedule meant that he had to eat 
lunch in the truck, you know, he didn't have time to stop, go to the bathroom and 
you know, that schedule didn't allow it.  If he wanted to go to the bathroom he had 
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to find a restroom at one of his stops and there was no time to go to like a 
restaurant or a fast food restaurant or a Subway or anything like that.” 
 
Interview participants described many ways that organizations could manifest the 
Management Commitment factor of safety climate. The aforementioned video monitoring 
of drivers is one such method. Management could also use engineering solutions to 
protect drivers. Multiple interview subjects described how a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) device is a safer alternative to a driver reading a map, as the GPS requires less 
manipulation and many can give audio commands, removing the need for the driver to 
take his/her eyes off the road to see directions. Furthermore, three subjects described how 
management could set the in-vehicle dispatch device to promote driver safety, such as 
only allowing the device to receive messages when the vehicle was stopped, or for the 




 Organizational safety climate has previously been shown to correlate with safe 
workplace behaviors and injury rates [43, 45, 173]. This study sought to apply measures 
of safety climate to distracted driving in truck drivers in the U.S. Using key informant 
interviews and regression analyses of an established questionnaire, we believe that these 





 A VTTI study found that truck drivers who drove for organizations with CPWD 
policies had a lower prevalence of distracted driving as well as reduced odds for crashes 
and near crashes compared with organizations without such policies [4]. Our data showed 
in univariate regression that distraction-involved braking and swerving was correlated 
with the safety climate factors of Communications and Procedures and Management 
Commitment. By committing to safe work procedures where drivers are not required to 
use electronic communications while driving, management can reduce drivers’ exposure 
to distracted driving and decrease their crash risk.  
 
 A review of the origins of safety climate defines it as the social manifestation of 
organizational culture as construed collectively by workers [169]. Interview subjects 
described how an organization would be able to manifest its culture by consistent 
practices regarding driver communication safety procedures. Organizations should be 
consistent in their explicit and implicit expectations for driver behavior. Organizational 
policies that lead to drivers being conflicted about their work procedures are what 
organizational psychologist James Reason calls “inadvisable rules” [174]. Reason and 
colleagues further describe how organizations can prevent driver errors and policy 
violations with good organizational management and planning [175, 176]. Consistent 
messaging concerning the separation of driving and secondary communications tasks 
would reinforce good organizational culture surrounding distracted driving. 
 
In univariate analysis, Management Commitment was associated with drivers ever 
having a crash on the job and swerving while distracted. Management commitment to 
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safety has previously been identified as the most important aspect of safety climate [42, 
177]. The originator of the SCQ, Dov Zohar, hypothesizes that the management 
commitment is at the heart of safety climate and all other measures of safety climate are 
somewhat secondary [178]. Therefore while allowing drivers to have personal time for 
eating or drinking and using the restroom while driving might be explicit manifestations 
of Work Pressure, it still is a description of how management values the safe conduct of 
work by their drivers.  
 
This commitment to driver safety can be further manifested by how the driver’s 
work space (i.e., vehicle cab) is designed, such as removing distractions, or programming 
electronic devices so that drivers can only receive potentially distracting messages once 
the vehicle is safely stopped. According to a review by O’Toole, mandating engineering 
controls has been regulatory strategy used by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration to promote occupational safety [179]. Future human factors and 
ergonomic research could describe the effects of engineering controls on distracted 
driving. 
 
 Male gender was associated with a near significant increase in ever reporting a 
crash in multivariate regression. This finding is consistent with surveillance data from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that found that fatal crash rate on the job is 
eight times higher for men than women in U.S. [30]. Unexpectedly, we found that female 
drivers had a much higher odds of reporting distraction-related swerving than males. One 
of the interview subjects doubted that anyone would admit to the distraction-related 
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outcomes that we asked about. Although anonymous surveys decrease the likelihood that 
subjects would report “better” outcomes due to social desirability bias [180]. Collet and 
colleagues reviewed the literature and found no clear evidence that distracted driving 
affected men or women more [18], so it is possible that an unmeasured confounder 
resulted in women reporting less distraction-involved swerving than men. 
 
 That increased weekly driving exposure was correlated with decreased odds of 
reporting distraction-related swerving on the job was an unexpected finding. We might 
expect that drivers who have increased weekly exposure to driving would have increased 
exposure to distracted driving, and thus an increased likelihood of negative outcomes. 
Because the mixed methods analysis was concurrent, we did not have the opportunity to 
present these survey findings to the interview subjects. Future qualitative analysis could 
offer insight on why drivers with increased weekly driving exposure have lower odds of 





The current study had limited power compared to the Wills . studies in which, 
with sample sizes of almost 100 more subjects, this version of the SCQ was developed 
and validated [46, 47, 129]. Although we were missing three of the factors from Wills 
and colleagues’ original model, the three factors that we did derive were the factors that 
accounted for the majority of the variation in the Wills . studies. Furthermore, other 
than dropping item 13 from the SCQ, our confirmatory factor analysis produced three 




Our analysis of the Communications and Procedures factor was limited because 
we were unable to interview truck drivers about the procedures surrounding distracted 
driving at their organizations. While not being able to describe this component of safety 
climate may have been hindered by our selection of two different study populations, the 
selection of this between-method approach increases the external validity of the study 
[124]. So whereas we might lose some precision in describing a given factor of safety 
climate, the validity of the entire method is raised by drawing results from different, 
complementary populations.  
 
Since the survey was anonymous, we did not ask IBT members for which 
organization they drove. This limited our ability to examine the impact of policies within 
a particular organization on safety climate and distracted driving outcomes. However, we 
were able to survey drivers in a variety of industries, increasing the external validity of 
our results. Future analyses should analyze the effects of driving industry and 
organization on safety climate and distracted driving outcomes.  
 
While surveying IBT drivers creates the potential for a nationally-representative 
sample; however, in keeping the data as anonymous as possible, no items on the 
questionnaire asked the respondents to describe in which state(s) they drove and/or lived. 
Furthermore, there are no data available from the IBT to which we can compare our 
sample to assess the representativeness of the demographic data or type of vehicles 
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driven by survey respondents. Thus, the degree to which these data are generalizable to a 
larger population of IBT drivers is unknown, and a limitation of this research. 
 
Conclusion 
 In univariate regression, we found associations between safety climate constructs 
and crashes and distraction-involved near crashes in a population of Teamsters in the 
U.S. In multivariate analysis, demographic factors and Communications and Procedures 
approached statistical significance. Interviews with safety experts described how 
organizations could influence safe driver behavior surrounding distractions by 
establishing a good organizational climate. This could be accomplished through 
consistent enforcement of company policies designed to prevent distracted driving on the 
job. This research should lead to further investigations of how organizational 




Manuscript 3: Understanding Commercial Truck Drivers’ Decision-Making Process 
Concerning Distracted Driving 
Abstract 
Distracted driving is an occupational hazard for truck drivers. Truck drivers’ decision-
making process is affected by their personal views on distractions as well as workplace 
pressures. The purpose of this study is to understand the personal and organizational 
factors that affect whether or not truck drivers undertake distracting activities while 
driving on the job. Using the Theory of Planned Behavior, this concurrent mixed methods 
study employed an online survey of members of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters and key informant interviews with trucking and distracted driving safety 
experts. Results from logistic regression analyses showed that drivers’ perception of their 
supervisors’ normative beliefs concerning dispatch device use was directly associated 
with distraction-involved near crashes, regardless of intention to use a dispatch device. 
Drivers’ intentions toward texting while driving, however, mediated the effects of social 
norms and perceived control on near crash distraction-involved outcomes. Interview 
participants described how organizations that strictly enforce distracted driving policies, a 
social normative factor, could reduce unsafe driving. However, interview participants 
also felt that drivers ultimately had final say, a perceived control factor, concerning 
distracted driving behaviors. Both intentions toward distractions and perceptions of 
workplace factors concerning distracted driving were associated with distraction-involved 
near crash outcomes. The TPB constructs for texting and dispatch device differed in their 
impact in regression analyses on distraction-involved activities, suggesting that 
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 Distracted driving is increasingly becoming a hazard to drivers in the United 
States (U.S.) [151, 152, 181]. Drivers are distracted from primary driving tasks by 1) 
visual distractions that take their eyes off the forward roadway; 2) auditory distractions 
that take their aural perception from relative driving cues; 3) cognitive distractions that 
take their mind off the driving task; and 4) manual distractions that take the driver’s 
hands off the wheel [1, 2]. Although much of the increase in distracted driving is due to 
the use of cell phones and other electronic communication [10, 14], truck drivers face 
additional occupational distractions that stem from their occupational environment, 
including interacting with a dispatch device and writing notes or a log [6]. When driving 
on the job, truck drivers are faced with work and time pressures that influence their 
decision-making about whether or not to undertake distracting tasks [36].  
 
Research from the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) has 
demonstrated how the odds for crashes and near crashes are increased when truck drivers 
are distracted [6]. This VTTI study found that texting while driving increases the odds 
ratio (OR) for crash or near crash 23 times compared to when drivers are not texting. The 
VTTI study also found increased odds of crash or near crash for such activities as 
interacting with the dispatch device (OR=9.9), reaching for an electronic device 
(OR=6.7), looking at a map (OR=7.0), and dialing a cell phone (OR=5.9). Because motor 
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vehicle crashes are the leading cause of occupational death in commercial truck drivers 
[31], it is important to prevent crashes caused by distraction. The Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB) [53] is a framework for understanding factors that affect individuals 
when they consider whether or not to undertake a given behavior. Using the TPB, this 
paper describes how personal, social, and occupational factors affect truck driver 
decision-making concerning distracting activities while on the job. 
  
 The TPB, as shown in Figure 8, seeks to understand how attitudes, perceived 
behavioral control (PBC), social norms, and intentions affect behavior performance [53, 
56]. A previous study of truck driver safety in the United Kingdom used the TPB to 
understand what factors would be most effective in increasing safe driving behavior and 
compliance with safety regulations [50]. This prior study by Poulter . found that 
while social norms affected safe driving behavior, truck drivers’ compliance with driving 
regulations (“rule compliance”) was more affected by PBC. These authors concluded that 
programs aimed at increasing safe driver behavior and rule compliance would require two 
different approaches [50]. The TPB has also been applied to understanding distracted 
driving in young drivers [9]; however,  it has not been applied to understand distracted 




Figure 1. Conceptual model of the Theory of Planned Behavior (from Parker  




The TPB uses key informant interviews to prepare surveys for the population of 
study [52], which we did as well. In addition, this study also used key informant 
interviews to further elaborate on how drivers would be affected by each component of 
the TPB. The purpose of this study is to utilize a mixed methods concurrent design and 
analysis to describe quantitatively how the TPB factors affect distraction-related crash 
and near crash outcomes, and explore qualitatively the meaning of those results. 
Methods 
 This study employed a mixed methods concurrent design and analysis [142, 143]. 
In a mixed methods concurrent design, the qualitative and quantitative data are collected 
and analyzed separately, the results of each method are first presented separately, then 
integrated for interpretation [144, 145]. Although the qualitative data were collected first, 
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both quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed separately before integration [145]. 
Figure 9 illustrates how the qualitative and quantitative results are triangulated, that is, 
how the results from the one method converge, correspond, or corroborate those from the 
other method [139]. The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional 
Review Board approved of all study procedures. 
Figure 9. Visual diagram of the analysis of qualitative key informant interviews (Qual) 
and quantitative analysis of surveys (Quan). This visualization is based off Plano-Clark’s 




 Key informant interviews were conducted to elicit information on four TPB 
constructs - Attitudes, Intentions, Norms, and PBC - as they described distracted driving 
in commercial truck drivers [52]. A purposive sample of experts in truck driver safety or 
distracted driving were recruited from the list of attendees at the Symposium on 
Prevention of Occupationally-Related Distracted Driving sponsored by the Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Occupational Safety and Health Education 
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and Research Center on April 18, 2011 in Laurel, MD. Ensuing interview participants 
were recruited using a snowball sampling technique [125]. 
  
 The interview guide was developed and refined by the study team, and finalized 
after pilot testing with an expert in motor carrier safety who is a former driver. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted via Skype (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA) and 
were recorded using MP3 Skype Recorder v3.1 (VOIPCallRecording.com). Audio files 
of the interviews were transcribed by uploading the .mp3 files to 
productiontranscripts.com (Production Transcripts, Glendale, CA). Data collection 
ceased after 11 interviews, which was the point when data saturation was reached [171]. 
The recording failed on one interview, so only 10 of the 11 interviews were successfully 
transcribed. Since notes were taken during each interview, notes from all 11 interviews 
were successfully transcribed. Data collection began in December, 2012 and ended in 
January, 2013. Of the 11 interview participants, five were researchers at academic 
institutions, three were at private research institutions, and one a piece were from a union, 
a private company, and a federal agency. Because participants were guaranteed 
anonymity, no further demographic data was collected. The author of this dissertation 





 The 10 transcripts and 11 sets of notes were saved as Microsoft Word documents. 
Data were open-coded line-by-line to label themes found in the participants’ responses 
[126, 127]. Open coding was employed to develop the initial themes that were found in 
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commonly across the interviews. Focused coding, or level-2 coding, was employed to 
group themes into broader categories [126, 127]. For example, “personal control” and 
“work pressure” were two labels that often appeared close to one another as interview 
participants described the balance the drivers would have to strike in their decision-
making process. A codebook was developed during the focused coding process. A second 
coder, hired for the task, independently coded a subset of three randomly-selected 
interviews as a check on the reliability of the coding process. Both coders met to discuss 
the coding and how well the codebook described the categorizations of the data [128]. 
The two coders differed slightly in their choice of wording of themes, but no substantive 
differences emerged. Because the interview participants were anonymously recorded, 
results of the interviews will be reported by subject number. 
 
To establish which distracted driver behaviors were appropriate for the online 
survey of drivers [52], interview participants were first asked to give their opinions on 
how distracting certain behaviors would be to truck drivers, including texting while 
driving; reading the dispatch device; and writing notes or a log. Using a Likert scale, 
interview participants rated on a scale of one (not very distracting) to five (very 
distracting) 19 distracting behaviors described by the Virginia Tech Transportation 
Institute [4, 6] and confirmed as relevant by two pilot tests of the interview. Two 
behaviors were selected for analysis in the online survey: texting while driving was given 
a maximum distraction rating by every interview participant; “interacting with a dispatch 
device” was rated nearly as distracting as texting and is a behavior that is specific to the 
occupational environment of truck drivers. Only drivers who indicated that they use 
103

dispatch devices answered TPB questions regarding dispatch device use and all drivers 
answered questions about texting. 
 
&			 
 Quantitative data were collected via online survey. Members of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) in the U.S. were selected as target population for the 
survey. The IBT represents over one million truck drivers and union members in other 
occupations in the U.S. and Canada [57]. The IBT was in part selected due to its size and 
nationwide reach. In addition, we were able to develop a relationship with the head of 
Occupational Safety and Health for the IBT in Washington, D.C. in developing this 
study. This IBT official understood the importance of the research and served as a 
gatekeeper into the IBT population [125]. A business representative from an IBT Local 
who was familiar with the project was used to pilot test the survey and finalize the exact 
wording. The survey took 10 minutes to complete upon final testing. With the assistance 
of IBT personnel, we sought sub-industries where the drivers were most likely to 
experience the distractions under study [58]. To identify drivers in the carhaul, express, 
freight, motion picture, package, and tankhaul industries, study participants were asked to 
select the type of truck that they drove (with accompanying images) at the beginning of 
the survey. Those who did not identify one of the selected vehicles were directed to a 
disqualification page and thanked for their time. 
 
Of the 440 subjects who began the survey, 79 (18%) were screened out because 
they indicated that they did not drive one of the vehicles included in the study, and 68 
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dropped out before completing the texting questions and driving outcome questions. For 
the dispatch device section, 135 subjects were screened out as they indicated that they did 
not use a dispatch device and 57 dropped out before completing all the questions on 
dispatch device use. As these questions were part of a longer survey, some subjects 
dropped out before completing questions on the driving outcomes: a total of 277 subjects 
(77% of total eligible sample) completed survey questions for texting and the driving 
outcomes, and 153 (42% of total eligible sample) completed the questions on dispatch 
device use and driving outcomes.  
 
In the texting group, 26% of subjects indicated that they drove delivery vans (i.e., 
were in the package industry) and 74% drove larger trucks. A 2002 Census Bureau report 
on registered trucks in the U.S. found that medium trucks (a category that includes 
delivery vans) comprised 23% of the American truck fleet and larger trucks were 63%, 
while the remaining 14% trucks that were too small for the current study population 
[131]. A search of the peer-reviewed and grey literature produced no more recent 
estimates of the composition of the American truck fleet. The dispatch device sample was 
comprised of 35% delivery drivers and 65% larger trucks. The texting population, the 
dispatch device population, and the 68 subjects who dropped out before completing the 
survey had statistically similar distributions of vehicles that they drove (Pearson’s ² p-
value = 0.4). We have no data on the 79 subjects that were screened out as not driving 




 Survey subjects were recruited via an announcement posted to the IBT website, 
teamster.org. The survey was administered using SurveyMonkey.com (SurveyMonkey 
Inc, Palo Alto, CA) and was open between April 2, 2013 and May 19, 2013. A power 
calculation using data from a similar study of the TPB and speeding behavior [49] 
indicated that a sample size of 500 respondents would result in a power above 0.80 and -
level of .05 [137]. Survey data were downloaded from SurveyMonkey into Stata v12.1 
for analysis (Stata Corp, College Station, TX). The TPB constructs (Attitude, Norms, 
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC), and Intentions) were assessed in reference to two 
behaviors: texting and dispatch device.  
 
The TPB constructs were the independent variables and were scored as described 
by Montaño and Kasprzyk [52]. Attitude was assessed using the average of three 
semantic differential 7-point bipolar scales ranging from 1 to 7 with endpoints including 
“very harmful – very beneficial,” “very unpleasant – very pleasant,” and “very bad – very 
good.” Thus, an increased Attitude score indicates a more positive view of the distracting 
behavior. Intention was measured using a single 7-point bipolar scale (1 through 7) with 
endpoints “Definitely will – Definitely will not.” An increased Intention score indicates 
that a driver had less intention to undertake a given behavior. 
 
Both PBC and norms scores were generated by multiplying the two individual 
scores together [52].  For the resulting variables, both the sign of the score and the 
absolute value are informative. PBC was assessed using a multi-item indirect assessment 
by multiplying control beliefs (scored on a bipolar 7-point scale) with times perceived 
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power (scored -3 to +3 on a bipolar scale). The absolute values of the PBC component 
describes how confident the driver is in being able to avoid an activity that he/she deems 
to be easy (positive) or hard (negative) to avoid. Norms were assessed with a multi-item 
indirect assessment multiplying the normative belief (scored -3 to +3) times the 
motivation to comply (score 1 to 7). Negative norms values indicated that a driver’s 
supervisor thinks that the driver should undertake a given behavior and positive values 
indicate that supervisors think that the driver should not undertake the behavior. An 
increased absolute value for norms indicates how important the supervisor’s opinion 
concerning the distracting behavior is to the driver.  
  
Exploratory data analysis was conducted on the TPB constructs separately for 
both the texting and dispatch device populations [147]. Means and standard deviations 
were generated for each TPB construct and because the range of scores was small, 
frequency tables and histograms were also generated for visual assessment of the data. 
Although previous studies on driver behavior and the TPB have used mean scores to 
analyze each TPB construct [35, 56], our data were not normally distributed and clustered 
around certain responses. Thus, we categorized the four TPB constructs for the texting 
and dispatch device use data. Development of the individual categories is described in the 
Results section. 
 
Subjects also self-reported if they ever had experienced a series of safety critical 
events while on the job [148]. Subjects first reported whether or not they ever had a crash 
while on the job. After being reminded that distracted driving encompasses any activities 
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that that take the driver’s eyes, hand, or concentration away from the primary driving 
task, subjects reported whether or not they had ever had a crash while distracted, had to 
brake hard to avoid a crash while distracted, and swerve to avoid a crash while distracted. 
These four outcomes served as the dependent variables in four separate regression 
analyses, described below, in both the texting and dispatch device populations. The Olson 
. study found that truck drivers would undertake distracting activities in the non-
crash control periods as well as during crashes or near crashes [6]. Rather than asking 
drivers if they had ever driven distracted, which can occur without negative 
consequences, we asked for situations when the distraction was so great that it became a 





Means and standard deviations (SDs) were calculated for age, years driving 
experience and weekly driving hours. Descriptive analysis of the categorical TPB 
variables was conducted. To validate the model in Figure 9 (page 99), we examined 
whether or not Intentions mediated the effects of the other TPB variables on the four 
outcomes [94]. To test this model required a multi-step process. First, we correlated 
Norms, PBC, and Attitudes to Behavioral Intentions using logistic regression for both 
texting and dispatch device use [35, 56]. Second, univariate logistic regression was used 
to analyze the association of each of the four TPB constructs for texting and distracted 
driving with the four crash and near crash outcomes. Univariate logistic regression was 
also conducted for demographic data that the drivers reported: gender, age, driving 
experience, and weekly driving hours. Third, multivariate regressions were first 
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conducted without Intentions, then including Intentions to see if it attenuated the effects 
of the other three TPB constructs, that is, did the ORs for Norms, PBC, and Attitudes 
decrease and what, if any, effect was there on the significance of the ORs. A change in 
the ORs towards 1.0 and/or decreasing significance of the p-values of the ORs was 
considered to be a mediation effect. Control variables in the multivariate models included 
on those variables that had p-values  0.10. Entering covariates with p-values less than 
0.2 has been used in model selection in the past [94]; however, using 0.10 as a cutoff is a 





 Some interview participants went beyond the definition of distracted driving 
given in the Background section for how they conceive of distracted driving. Participants 
2, 5, and 8 expressed the belief that non-driving activities rose to the level of 
“distractions” only when driving performance was impacted. Interview participant 
number 2 was concerned that the distracting task was prioritized over driving and that 
safely operating the vehicle then becomes a secondary task. Many participants were 
concerned for the drivers’ decreased driving performance, but as one participant pointed 
out, while drivers might think that they are increasing their work efficiency by 
undertaking a second task, there is also a diminished capacity to carry out that second, 
distracting activity. Interview participants were able to describe situations where drivers 
crashed or came near to crashing when distracted. Only one of the 11 participants said 
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that he/she did not know of any crashes involving distracted truck drivers and further 
stated that he/she doubted that any driver would admit to driving distracted after a crash. 
 
 All interview participants were asked to comment on whom would influence 
drivers’ decision-making for three or four distinct behaviors, such as texting, dialing a 
phone, eating or drinking (many behaviors were repeated in multiple interviews). In the 
10 transcribed interviews, participants stated that supervisors and/or management would 
positively, negatively, or both influence drivers’ decision-making in 28 out of 32 
different activities. No other social referents were named nearly as frequently. Although 
the interviewer encouraged respondents to describe other potential social influences, such 
as family members or coworkers, it was clear that supervisors had the biggest influence 
on drivers’ decision-making process.  
 
 When asked about distracting activities, interview participants were able to 
identify pros and cons of a wide variety of behaviors. Dispatch devices and cell phones 
(both personally owned and owned by the company) were identified as ways for 
management and drivers to stay in touch. Benefits to staying connected via such 
electronic devices included updating information, route planning, informing customers on 
arrival times, and being able to make emergency contacts. Drivers also could benefit 
from being in phone contact with friends, family and coworkers. According to the 
interview participants, being in phone contact with family members, either via phone 
calls or text messages can give the drivers peace of mind from being able to check up on 
family members. Interview respondents also stated that drivers could use talking on the 
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phone as a way to ward off fatigue. Finally, complex tasks including writing notes or a 
log, personal grooming, and eating or drinking could benefit drivers by allowing them to 
finish up tasks that they would otherwise have to do once they have finished driving and 
exited the vehicle. 
  
 Yet interview participants very strongly condemned many of these distracting 
activities, saying that benefits were minor in comparison to the potential negative 
consequences. Interview participant number 8 was specific about the main drawback 
when he/she said:  
“So it goes then beyond what were they doing specifically to their eyes are off the 
road. And so it doesn't really matter whether they were texting, or reading the 
newspaper, or interacting with the dispatching device. The bottom line is that their 
eyes were off the forward roadway.”  
Interview participants discussed all aspects of visual, cognitive, and manual distractions 
as drawbacks. Comparing the different distracting behaviors, participants said that 
whatever tasks took the longest or involved multiple forms of distraction (e.g., visual and 
cognitive) were the most hazardous. Overall, interview participants felt that drivers 
would have negative attitudes towards distracting tasks when they weighed the pros and 
cons. 
 
Interview participants felt that drivers had a great deal of personal control over 
whether or not they undertake distracting behaviors while driving on the job. Even 
though work pressures or family pressures might influence drivers to feel that they would 
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need to undertake a secondary task, all the interview participants felt that it was 
ultimately up to the driver to make the decision. In the words of participant number 4,  
“I mean the decision ultimately rests on the driver.  [There are] pressures from 
things that would weigh into that.  But to engage in the actual activity while 
driving is completely under his control.”  
However, participants described a range over control of distracting activities. Participant 
number 10 stated that when reaching for objects in the vehicle cab, the more occupation-
related an object is, the less control that the driver has over that choice whereas the more 
personal an object is, the more control the driver has over that choice. 
 
Organizations could reduce drivers’ control over distracting activities by having 
strong, clear policies against distracted driving. According to interview participants, strict 
enforcement of these policies would be an effective deterrent, thus inhibiting drivers’ 
freedom to undertake distracting activities. Two interview participants cited DriveCam 
(manufactured by The Driver Science Company, San Diego, CA) as one method for 
monitoring driver behavior. Fear of punishment from the employer or receiving a ticket 
from law enforcement for violating the U.S. Department of Transportation’s ban on 
texting for commercial truck drivers [182] would further discourage drivers from driving 
distracted, effectively reducing their control over undertaking that given behavior. Heavy 
traffic conditions or construction zones where the driver’s full attention was needed for 





One other influence on PBC and norms cited by interviews participants were laws 
and law enforcement. In 2010, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration issued a 
rule stating that commercial truck and bus drivers were prohibited from texting while 
driving [182]. The ban, which prohibits truck drivers from texting with a phone or 
dispatch device, in the words of Participant 8, will be helpful in creating an 
organizational safety culture where distracted driving was not the norm. Not only does 
this ban create a list of prohibited activities that employers know that drivers should not 
be undertaking, but also the regulation allows for an $11,000 fine for the vehicle’s owner 
[182]. This last provision should give further motivation to organizations to ensure that 





 Table 17 describes the demographics of subjects who completed the 
texting and dispatch device sections of the survey. Both samples, the vast majority of 
which were men, average over 20-years of experience driving and reported that they 
drive more than 40 hours per week.  
 
For the texting population, all four TPB constructs were categorized as binary 
variables, because as previously noted, they were not normally distributed. Table 18 
describes the distributions of these variables. The Attitudes categories are 1) those who 
gave the lowest rating (i.e., one out of seven) to each of the three items on attitudes 
towards texting and 2) those who gave any ratings higher than that. The Norms categories 
are 1) those subjects who stated that their supervisor’s opinions were against texting and 
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their supervisor’s opinions were very important to them and 2) subjects who gave any 
other answer. The PBC categories are 1) subjects who felt it was easy to avoid texting 
and stated that they would not text and 2) subjects who gave any other answer. The 
Intentions categories are 1) those who intended not to text in the next 3 months and 2) 
any other response. 
 
Table 17. Descriptive data on the respondents to the components of the TPB questions 
for texting while driving and reading the dispatch device while driving. 
Texting while driving (n=277) 
Gender 265 male 9 female 3 unknown 
 Mean SD Minimum-Maximum 
Age (years) 48.0 8.8 21 – 69 
Driving experience (years) 22.8 10.1 1 – 45 
Weekly driving (hours) 47.6 11.6 6 – 70 
 
Using the dispatch device while driving (n=153) 
Gender 146 male 5 female 2 unknown 
 Mean SD Minimum-Maximum 
Age (years) 46.4 8.4 21 – 69 
Driving experience (years) 21.2 9.3 1 – 44 
Weekly driving (hours) 47.6 11.3 6 – 70 
 
Table 18. Descriptive data on binary TPB variables for the texting population (n=277). 
Variable Level Count (%) 
Attitudes Negative attitudes on all three items 202 (73%) 
Any other attitudes  75 (27%) 
Norms Supervisors oppose texting and strong motivation to comply 130 (47%) 
Any other norms 147 (53%) 
PBC Easy to avoid texting and will not text 193 (70%) 
Any other control beliefs 84 (30%) 
Intentions Strongly intend not to text 219 (79%) 
Any other intentions 58 (21%) 
 
There was greater variance for the TPB scores for the dispatch device questions 
than there was for the texting questions. An example is presented in Figure 10, a 
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histogram of responses to Intentions towards dispatch device use. Histograms for all TPB 
constructs are presented in Appendix 6 of this Dissertation. Unlike in the texting 
population, only half the subjects gave the maximum response “Definitely will not use” 
and the data were more evenly spread among the other responses. Thus, the dispatch 
device variables for the TPB were categorized differently than the texting population.  
Figure 10. Histogram of the Intentions to use the dispatch device while driving. 1 = 
Definitely will use; 4 = Neutral; 7 = Definitely will not use. 
 
 
Table 19 describes the distributions for the dispatch device population. The 
Attitudes categories are 1) very negative attitudes, akin to the first category in the texting 
populations; 2) negative attitudes; and 3) neutral and positive attitudes towards dispatch 
device use. The Norms categories are 1) those subjects who stated that both supervisor’s 
opinions were against use and their supervisor’s opinions were very important; 2) 
supervisor’s opinions matter and we less strongly opposed to use; 3) supervisor’s 
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PBC variable is binary, yet the categories are slightly different from the texting PBC 
variable: 1) confident towards avoiding dispatch device use and 2) not confident towards 
avoiding use. The Intentions variable is binary: 1) intend not to use and 2) neutral or 
intend to use.  
Table 19. Descriptive data on TPB variables for the dispatch device population (n=153). 
Variable Level Count (%) 
Attitudes Very negative attitudes 76 (50%) 
Negative attitudes 49 (30%) 
Neutral and positive attitudes 28 (20%) 
Norms Supervisors strongly oppose use and strong motivation to comply 54 (35%) 
Supervisors opposed and strong motivation to comply 45 (29%) 
Neutral motivation to comply regardless of supervisor’s opinion 21 (14%) 
No motivation to comply regardless of supervisor’s opinion 33 (22%) 
PBC Confident towards avoiding use 83 (54%) 
Not confident towards avoiding use 70 (46%) 
Intentions Intend not to use 98 (64%) 
Neutral intentions and intend to use 55 (36%) 
 
 
Table 20 describes the reported crashes and near crashes for each of the two 
populations. Over half of the subjects in both the texting group and the dispatch device 
group reported ever crashing on the job, with less than 20% in each group reporting 
distraction-related crashes. Respondents were fairly evenly split on experiencing a 




Table 20. Reported crashes and near crashes for subjects completing the texting and 
dispatch device sections. Percent of responses are in parentheses. 
 Texting (n=277) Dispatch device (n=153) 
Yes No Missing Yes No Missing 











































The results of the full univariate regression analyses are presented in Appendix 6. 
Here, I will briefly summarize the univariate results for the TPB constructs. For the 
texting population, Norms was associated with ever experiencing a crash and distraction-
involved swerving; PBC and Intentions were associated with distraction-involved 
swerving and distraction-involved braking; and Attitudes were not associated with any of 
the four outcomes. For the dispatch device population, all four TPB constructs were 
associated with the distraction-involved outcomes: crash, hard braking, and swerving. 
None of the TPB constructs were associated with ever experiencing a crash. Those items 
in bold in the tables in Appendix 6 were entered into multivariate regressions. 
 
In the first step of a mediation analysis, the Attitudes, Norms, and PBC were 
significantly associated with Intentions in logistic regression analysis for both texting and 
dispatch device use populations.  Table 21 presents the multivariate analyses for the 
texting population for the three outcomes (ever experiencing a crash, distraction-involved 
hard braking, and distraction-involved swerving) for which there were significant 
multivariate results. Increased odds of crash were associated with those drivers who did 
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not state that their supervisors were against texting and their supervisors’ opinions were 
very important to them; Intentions have minimal mediation effects on Norms, raising the 
p-value from 0.038 to 0.054. Drivers who did not state that texting was easy to avoid 
(PBC) were associated with increased odds of distraction-involved hard braking; 
however, these effects were mediated by Intentions. For distraction-involved swerving, 
Intentions mediate the effects of PBC and Norms. 
Table 21. Mediating effects of Intentions towards texting on other TPB constructs for 
crashes and near crashes on the job. 
 
Direct effects Mediation effects 
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Ever experience a crash on the job 
Driving experience 1.02 1.00-1.05 1.02 1.00-1.05 
Gender 0.09 0.01-0.74† 0.09 0.01-0.74† 
Norms 1.68 1.02-2.75† 1.66 0.99-2.76* 
Intentions -- -- 1.08 0.57-2.04 
Ever experience distraction-involved hard braking on the job 
Weekly driving 0.98 0.96-1.00† 0.98 0.96-1.00† 
PBC 2.42 1.42-4.11† 1.63 0.80-3.30 
Intentions -- -- 1.97 0.87-4.45 
Ever experience distraction-involved swerving on the job 
Norms 1.64 0.99-2.71* 1.55 0.93-2.58* 
PBC 1.77 1.03-3.03† 1.09 0.53-2.25 
Intentions -- -- 2.29 1.01-5.20† 
* p-value <0.1; † p-value <0.05 
Table 22 (p. 119) presents the results of mediation analysis for experiencing a 
distraction-involved crash and experiencing distraction-involved swerving. None of the 
demographic data or TPB constructs were associated with distraction-involved hard 
braking. Subjects who stated that they had neutral motivation to comply regardless of 
supervisor’s opinion were at increased odds of crashing compared to the Norms reference 
group; Intentions did not mediate these effects. Both subjects who stated that they had 
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neutral motivation to comply regardless of supervisor’s opinion and subjects who stated 
that they had no motivation to comply regardless of supervisor’s opinion were at 
increased odds of experiencing distraction-involved swerving compared to the Norms 
reference group; Intentions did not mediate these effects as well.  
 
To summarize the quantitative analyses, when testing the TPB model in Figure 9, 
Intentions did mediate the effects of the other TPB variables on the distraction-involved 
outcomes in the texting population. Yet in the dispatch device population, Intentions did 
not mediate the effects of norms on distraction-involved crashes and swerving. 
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Table 6. Mediating effects of Intentions towards dispatch device use on other TPB 
constructs for crashes and near crashes on the job. 
 Variable level 
Direct effects Mediation effects 
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Ever experience a distraction-involved crash on the job 
Driving 
Experience  1.04 0.98-1.09 1.04 0.98-1.09 
Attitudes Very negative attitudes Reference Reference 
 Negative attitudes 2.57 0.82-8.11 2.55 0.81-8.03 
 
Neutral and positive 
attitudes 0.60 0.12-3.00 0.54 0.10-2.86 
Norms 
Supervisors strongly 
oppose use and strong 
motivation to comply Reference Reference 
 
Supervisors opposed and 
strong motivation to 
comply 1.64 0.34-7.83 1.56 0.32-7.59 
 
Neutral motivation to 
comply regardless of 
supervisor’s opinion 8.11 
1.52-
43.17† 7.87 1.47-42.30† 
 
No motivation to comply 
regardless of supervisor’s 
opinion 2.20 
0.45-
10.74 2.07 0.41-10.37 
PBC  1.74 0.54-5.77 1.49 0.39-5.67 
Intentions  -- -- 1.36 0.43-3.51 
Ever experience distraction-involved swerving on the job 
Attitudes Very negative attitudes Reference Reference 
 Negative attitudes 1.46 0.63-3.40 1.46 0.63-3.39 
 
Neutral and positive 
attitudes 0.85 0.30-2.47 0.87 0.29-2.62 
Norms 
Supervisors strongly 
oppose use and strong 
motivation to comply Reference Reference 
 
Supervisors opposed and 
strong motivation to 
comply 2.14 0.85-5.43 2.16 0.85-5.53 
 
Neutral motivation to 
comply regardless of 
supervisor’s opinion 5.22 
1.26-
14.08† 4.24 1.27-14.20† 
 
No motivation to comply 
regardless of supervisor’s 
opinion 5.29 
1.89-
14.78† 5.37 1.90-15.14† 
PBC  1.31 0.57-3.06 1.38 0.49-3.84 
Intentions  -- -- 0.92 0.32-2.61 










 While regression analysis supported the TPB framework displayed in Figure 9 for 
texting, it did not do so for dispatch device use. In the interviews, participants reported 
feeling that drivers ultimately had control over whether or not they undertook distracting 
activities, yet one participant stated that drivers had less control over distractions that 
were more work-related. Drawing from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses, it 
is possible that drivers felt that they had much better control over their choices 
surrounding texting than dispatch device use. The quantitative results for the texting 
population support this conclusion, as Intentions mediates the effects of PBC on 
distraction-involved near crash outcomes. Yet for the dispatch device use, Intentions 
were more varied, and thus the social norms from drivers’ supervisors were most 
important in determining distracted driving behavior. 
 
In Tables 18 and 19, drivers indicated negative attitudes towards texting and 
dispatch device use. Although interview participants believed that drivers would find 
some positives to undertaking the distracting behaviors, the qualitative and quantitative 
data both point to drivers having negative attitudes about distracted driving on the job. In 
key informant interviews, participants felt that drivers would view distractions 
negatively, yet, because they were not drivers themselves, could not speak directly to 
drivers’ intentions. In this case, the quantitative results give us insight into an aspect of 





 The results of these analyses support the important role that truck drivers’ 
supervisors play in preventing distracted driving on the job. Interviews with experts in 
truck driving safety described how management can create a culture that either 
encourages or discourages distracted driving, while surveys of IBT members 
demonstrated the importance of organizational norms surrounding text messaging and 
dispatch device use while driving. The importance of supervisors to driver safety has 
been previously explored by Wills and colleagues in a population of professional drivers 
in Australia [46, 47, 129]. In these studies, Wills  found that management 
commitment to safety was the aspect of safety climate most correlated with safe driving 
behavior [47]. Motor carrier companies have taken proactive steps to prevent distracted 
driving. Both the Network of Employers for Transportation Safety [82], a private-public 
partnership concerned with reducing crashes on and off the job, and the American 
Trucking Association[182], an industry advocacy group, have stated that some of their 
member organizations had company policies on distracted driving prior to the 2010 
federal ban on texting while driving for commercial truck drivers [182].  
 
 The results of this study and previous work also show the importance of company 
policies for driver safety. Interview participants described how clearly enforced, explicit 
company policies on distracted driving, with no competing implicit expectations, could 
reduce employee distracted driving. A study of texting prevalence in commercial truck 
drivers by Hickman and colleagues found that drivers who drove for organizations with 
texting bans had a lower prevalence of texting while driving than companies without such 
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policies [4]. Enforcement of organizational rules prohibiting electronic communications 
while driving would affect both drivers’ perceived norms and PBC, as was described in 
the synthesis of the qualitative and quantitative data. 
  
 The regression results on attitudes towards the two distractions did not produce 
significant results. In Tables 18 and 19, the Attitude construct scores are very low, so it is 
also possible that floor effects were affecting the regression analyses [183, 184]. The 
interview participants were able to describe both pros and cons to undertaking a wide 
range of distractions, including complex tasks, such as writing notes and personal 
grooming, that were previously found to be hazardous for truck drivers [6]. It could be 
that the drivers felt that they could be more efficient when doing a second task while 
driving, which was seen in prior research [35] as was described by our interview 
participants. Further interviews should be conducted with drivers to understand their 
attitudes towards distractions. 
 
 Our regression analyses did not use distracted driving as the outcome of interest. 
From the VTTI study, we know that drivers can undertake distractions while driving and 
not experience any adverse events [6]. Previous research using the TPB framework has 
examined intentions to undertake an activity instead of direct observation of the activity 
itself [35, 56]. We did find significant correlations to Intentions for the three other TPB 
constructs for both texting and dispatch device use. By examining distraction-related 
crashes and near crashes, our outcomes of interest were times when distractions had 
affected driver safety. This is more in line with the definition of distracted driving given 
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by interview participants 2, 5, and 8, that is, a task is only distracting when it affects 
driver safety. Alternative analyses could have included a proactive analysis, where we 
measured TPB constructs then explored their association with future incidence of 





 This paper was limited in scope in that it could not cover drivers who are owner-
operators, which limits the generalizability of these findings to only union drivers. This 
distinction is important because owner-operated drivers face work and time pressures that 
are different from the union drivers that this study examined [185]. When interview 
participants would begin to describe such drivers, the interviewer (DS) had to remind 
them that that was beyond the scope of the study. While interview participants did 
describe both union and non-union driver/management interactions, the survey results are 
only applicable to union drivers. Union workers receive more safety training than their 
non-union counterparts and are less likely to accept hazardous working conditions [186]. 
It is possible that the survey populations have safer driving behaviors and better safety 
climate than non-union drivers in the U.S. 
 
 Similar to the present analysis, prior analysis of the TPB found that intentions 
mediated the effects of other constructs on behavioral outcomes [187, 188]. More 
advanced statistical models, such as Verschuur and Hurts’ structural equation model of 
the impact of TPB on unsafe driving behaviors [189] or the path analyses of the TPB and 
truck driver safety by Poulter . [50], should be conducted to see how each of the TPB 
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constructs affect distracted driving in the workplace for truck drivers. The sample size for 
both populations made these analytical approaches infeasible and might otherwise have 
limited our results as well. It was difficult to estimate the necessary sample size for a 
population and outcomes that had previously not been examined, but researchers will 
now have the estimates from this study for sample size calculations in future studies. 
Although we anticipated a sample size of 500 subjects as necessary for analysis, we did 
find some significant results in populations of 277 and 153 subjects. 
 
While the distribution of vehicle types for the texting population was similar to 
that seen in the Census Bureau report [131], the dispatch device population has a higher 
percentage of delivery van drivers. The Census report on the 2002 American truck fleet 
was the final report in that series before the Census discontinued that analysis, so there is 
an 11-year gap between when those data were collected and data collection in the current 
study. We cannot tell if this increase is due to a greater percentage of delivery van drivers 
using dispatch devices compared to drivers of larger trucks. Yet, the percent of delivery 
drivers in each study population were not significantly different from one another.  
 
No data are available to compare the percentage of delivery van drivers to larger 
truck drivers in the total IBT membership in the U.S. While sampling IBT members 
offers the possibility of a nationwide sample, we had no mechanism to analyze from 
which states the survey subjects drove. Furthermore, we are unable to compare the 
demographics of the study populations to IBT members or truck drivers. This population 
was overwhelmingly male, which is consistent with both previous research [190] and the 
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opinions of interview participants in the current study. The authors know of no 
nationally-representative studies that describe driver age, experience, and weekly driving 
exposure to which we can compare our study population. 
 
 This study was limited in assessment of outcomes of interest because we had to 
rely on self-reported incidents. Although self-reported incident report has been validated 
by previous studies [191, 192], methodological issues still remain. By asking subjects if 
they had ever had a crash or distraction-related near miss, we increased the time period of 
interest, and thus potential incidents. Landen and Hendricks caution that by increasing the 
time period for incidents that recall bias increases beyond 12 months of recall [193]. As 
the one participant who reported no knowledge of distraction-related crashes implied, 
there might be social desirability bias when asking drivers to admit to distraction-related 
driving outcomes; however, anonymous surveys decrease the likelihood of such bias 
[180].  
 
A final limitation was that not all subjects who completed the texting and/or 
dispatch device sections answered the outcome questions. This study was part of a larger 
survey of driver behavior and safety climate factors, so there were an additional 35 
questions between the end of the TPB sections and the outcome measures. If the survey 
was not as long, we might not have seen survey fatigue, which is one possibility for the 




 This study was not designed to examine the same populations with both the 
quantitative and qualitative methods; however, we believe that the mixed methods design 
lends strength to our results. Collins and colleagues stated that the legitimacy of each 
method within any mixed methods study should be the first measure of that study’s 
legitimacy [194]. Both surveys [195] and expert opinion [196] have been used in the past 
to assess truck driver safety. Using a concurrent design and analysis of the interviews and 
surveys creates what Onwuegbuzie and Johnson refer to as paradigmatic mixing 
legitimacy [142, 143]. That is, independent analysis of each method is conducted 
separately and meta-inference allows us to draw legitimate conclusions across both 
methods. Although the results of the surveys and interviews could have stood on their 
own, the mixing of results in this analysis provides additional insight into driver 




 In this study, we described how distracted driving behavior in truck drivers can be 
strongly impacted by their supervisors. By enforcing strict policies on distracted driving, 
supervisors can affect drivers’ perceived control and norms surrounding distracted 
driving, two aspects of the TPB that were correlated with negative distracted driving 
outcomes. Interview participants felt that drivers would have negative attitudes towards 
driving distracted and would not intend to undertake such distractions. In regression 
analyses, drivers’ intentions towards texting mediated the effects of the other TPB 
constructs on distraction-involved near crashes; yet their intentions towards dispatch 
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device use did not have the same mediating effects. But utilizing qualitative and 
quantitative methods for data collection and analysis, this study was able to describe how 
personal and organizational factors affect drivers when deciding whether or not they 





 The purposes of this dissertation was to describe the epidemiology of distraction-
involved truck crashes in the U.S., examine the impact of distracted driving laws on these 
fatalities, understand the impact of safety climate on distracted driving in truck drivers, 
and understand factors affecting the decision-making process of truck drivers regarding 
distracted driving on the job. In this dissertation, the first manuscript, Effects of State 
Policies on Fatalities Involving Distracted Truck Drivers, found that while fatality rates 
for distraction-involved truck crashes have been decreasing since 2007, state distracted 
driving laws had no effects on fatality rates. The 2010 federal ban on texting while 
driving for commercial truck drivers was associated with a decrease in the fatality rate for 
all vehicle occupants in distraction-involved truck crashes, yet more data will be 
necessary to establish the effects, if any, of federal ban. This is the first study to examine 
fatal crashes where truck driver distraction was a factor in the crash and to see if 
distracted driving laws affected these fatality rates. 
 
The second manuscript, The Effects of Safety Climate on Distracted Driving in 
Commercial Truck Drivers, explored the relation of safety climate factors to negative 
outcomes of distracted driving. Although the survey of drivers from the IBT did not 
produce many significant findings, interviews with experts in truck safety and distracted 
driving described how these elements of safety climate might affect distracted driving for 
truck drivers. From the SCQ-MD, the Communications and Procedures and Management 
Commitment factors were associated with self-reported near crashes in univariate 
129

analyses. Interview subjects described how management could affect driver safety, 
through work processes, time pressures, and communication methods. 
 
In the third manuscript, Understanding Commercial Truck Drivers’ Decision-
Making Process Concerning Distracted Driving, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
was used to describe how drivers consider whether or not to undertake distractions while 
driving. Interviews with experts in truck safety and distracted driving elaborated on these 
findings. For both texting and dispatch device use, TPB constructs of intentions, norms, 
and perceived control were associated with crash and near crash outcomes in regression 
analyses. Interview subjects reported that while drivers might gain some benefits in time-
saving from undertaking distractions while driving, that the negatives of distractions 
would vastly outweigh the positives. While supervisors were viewed as having the most 
influence on drivers’ distracted driving behavior, interview subjects felt that the ultimate 
decision on choosing whether or not to undertake distracting activities fell to the drivers 
themselves. 
 
 While the first manuscript explicitly considers the impact of government policy 
on truck driver safety, the second and third papers consider factors more related to the 
workplace and driver-management interaction. It might appear that factors affecting the 
first manuscript are different from those affecting the second and third, there are 
government agencies, safety groups, labor unions, and corporate representatives that 
affect all three areas. This chapter will describe how the results from the three 
manuscripts are integrated and their impacts on future research and practice. It also 
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includes an analysis of how different policy actors affect the formation and execution of 





 The FMCSA ban on texting while driving [75] directly regulates truck driver 
activity on the job. Because the regulation allows for a fine of both the driver and their 
employer [75], this policy creates an incentive for companies to enforce this ban for their 
employees. However, regulations such as these are not the sole reason that companies 
implement safety programs for their drivers. Some companies had CPWD bans in place 
prior to the 2009 announcement of the FMCSA regulation and its enactment in 2010, as 
described in a report by The Network of Employers for Transportation Safety (NETS) 
[82] and in written testimony to the FMCSA from the American Trucking Association 
(ATA) [182]. 
 
A study led by Jeff Hickman at the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) 
found that drivers who drove for companies with texting bans had a lower prevalence of 
texting while driving than for drivers of companies without such policies [4]. 
Furthermore, the reduction in prevalence in companies with CPWD versus those 
organizations without such policies was greater than the non-significant reduction found 
in states that had texting bans versus states that did not have texting bans [4]. Participants 
in the qualitative data collection outlined in the second and third manuscripts described 
technological means for monitoring driver behavior, including in-vehicle cameras and 
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company cell phone records. These technologies present a method for management to 
proactively enforce company policy, rather than having to react to negative events, 
including distracted driving citations or distraction-involved crashes involving their 
employees. 
 
 The Network of Employers for Transportation Safety (NETS) is a consortium of 
private and public organizations concerned with reducing crashes on and off the job 
[197]. Professional organizations like NETS allow for the sharing of information and best 
practices surrounding driver safety topics like distracted driving among members. The 
NETS website (www.trafficsafety.org) has some publically available information on 
distracted driving [198], and the NETS member companies share further information on 
policies and enforcement with one another (Jack Haley2, personal communication July 2, 
2013). Best practices for occupational distracted driving are also available from the 
federal government. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
has a fact sheet concerning distracted driving in the occupational setting [199]. While 
NIOSH is charged with conducting research on occupational hazards, it falls to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to regulate occupational safety 
issues. OSHA has a webpage with information on distracted driving [200] and model 
company policies [201], but it has not issued any regulations aimed at curbing distracted 
driving in the workplace. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which 
regulates cellular phone traffic in the U.S., also provides an online clearing house for 
possible distracted driving regulations[202]; however, the FCC states on this website that 

2 Jack Haley is the Executive Director for NETS 
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it does not endorse any of the technological or managerial interventions listed on the 
website. 

 In the Federal Register the FMCSA states that it received over 400 comments 
during the 6-month open comment period [182]. Some comments came from industry 
groups, including the American Trucking Association (ATA) and the Owner-Operator 
Independent Drivers Association. In its comments to the FMCSA, the ATA stated that 
many of its member organizations already had texting bans. On its website the ATA 
states that it seeks to educate policymakers about the needs of its members [203]. If the 
ATA was submitting comments to the FMCSA concerning texting, it was likely because 
its members felt that this was an important issue. Although the texting ban did not go into 
effect until October 2010, companies in the commercial trucking industry would have 
had forewarning that the ban was coming, both from the FMCSA’s call for comments, as 
well as from organizations like the ATA.  
 
Because the unit of analysis in Manuscript 1 was the state*year, I could not 
analyze the effects of the FMCSA regulation in 2010 month-by-month. A drop in 
fatalities after October in comparison to January through September in 2010 would 
provide some evidence that the statistically significant drop was due to the FMCSA ban, 
and not other reasons, such as pre-emptive implementation of organizational policies. I 
could find no analysis describing if the proposed texting ban had prompted organizations 
to implement their own policies in the months prior to enactment of the FMCSA’s rule. 
However, federal regulation can prompt organizations to enact policies before regulation 
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takes effect, a recent example of which is fast food companies posting calorie information 
at their stores before the relevant provisions of the Affordable Care Act went into effect 
[204]. 
 
Company policies concerning distracted driving on the job would seem to fall 
under the safety climate construct of “communications and procedures” [46, 129]. As part 
of the key informant interviews in manuscript three, one participant said that the FMCSA 
ban might create safety culture in an organization where distracted driving was 
previously the norm. Moreover, as shown in Manuscript 3, those drivers who had lower 
scores on the Norms TPB construct for texting and dispatch device use were more likely 
to have reported swerving while distracted (lower Norms scores mean that drivers stated 
that their supervisors wanted them to be in more contact while driving). So while some 
companies may believe it is efficient for drivers to communicate with their supervisors 
while driving [35], having a consistent policy that workers not drive distracted would 
result in safer outcomes for drivers. Later in this chapter I will use the results of this 




 Described elsewhere in this dissertation, Flin and colleagues identify the most 
commonly examined aspects of safety climate as 1) management/supervision, 2) safety 
systems, 3) risk, 4) work pressure, and 5) competence [42]. Previous research, including 
the work of Wills and colleagues in formulating the modified version of the Safety 
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Climate Questionnaire used in manuscript two [46], describes management commitment 
to safety as most important aspect of safety climate [42, 177, 178, 205]. One way for 
management to commit to worker safety is through the establishment of safety and health 
management systems, also known as safety management systems, or occupational safety 
and health management systems (OSHMS) [206].  
 
Systematic management of occupational safety and health has grown out of the 
fields of psychology, sociology, industrial relations, occupational safety, occupational 
health, and management [207]. The International Labor Office defines OSHMS as “a set 
of interrelated or interacting elements to establish [occupational safety and health] policy 
and objectives, and to achieve those objectives” (International Labor Office 2001, p 19) 
[208]. These programs started to gain popularity in the 1990s when “accident analysis” 
moved from focusing on individual errors to considering system-wide failures as the root 
cause of traumatic injury and death [174, 176, 207]. 
 
 Although some countries such as Canada and Norway have mandatory OSHMS 
programs [206], OSHA does not require any such programs in the U.S. Aside from online 
materials with best-practices for setting up these programs  [209, 210], OSHA also 
administers the Susan Harwood Training Grant Program for non-profit organizations that 
can be used to expand safety and health capacities or for demonstration projects on safety 
and health [211]. Robson  refer to OSHMS programs not mandated by regulation as 
“voluntary” [206]. These programs can be incentivized by government agencies (such as 
OSHA) or insurers. Robson and colleagues find that mandatory OSHMS programs are by 
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their regulatory nature, very broad in their requirements, whereas voluntary programs are 
highly complex and usually only found in large companies [206].  
 
An examination of all aspects of OSHMS programs for truck driver health and 
safety is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I will now discuss what I believe to be 
important factors for organizations to consider when creating a distracted driving 
component of a SMS. To do so, I will draw on data both from the Olson  VTTI 
study [6] (see also Appendix 1) from my dissertation research. 
 
An organization should first consider whether or not a specific type of driver 
should require contact with his or her supervisor while driving. As part of the surveys in 
this dissertation research, I asked IBT drivers to identify which industry [58] they drove 
for. The different types of drivers would all have different requirements put on their time 
and scheduling. One of the participants in key informant interviews described how little 
personal time a UPS delivery driver has while driving his/her route. In this example, a 
UPS driver (who would fall under the IBT “express” industry) would have much less 
control over their personal time than drivers who drove more point-to-point routes, such 
as carhaul, tankhaul and freight industries [58].  
 
I had hoped that the survey sample would be large enough to analyze crash and 
near-crash risk by IBT industry; however the power for such analysis was not possible 
with this sample. The third study on the SCQ by Wills  was the only previous work 
that I could identify where safety climate was compared across organizations [129]. This 
136

Wills . study, which did not any information about the organizations, including the 
kind of driving employees were undertaking, did not find any significant differences 
between the different organization’s safety climate scores. Future analyses should 
compare safety climate across organizations and across driving industries. (Similarly, 
Poulter . analyzed the effect of TPB on driver behavior in three different motor 
carrier organizations, yet they did not analyze between-company differences either [50].) 
 
If organizations decide that the cost-benefit analysis of contact between drivers 
and supervisors is beneficial [35], they should consider risk to the drivers and other legal 
factors. The Olson  VTTI study [6] (see Appendix 1) found an increased odds of 
crash or near crash when truck drivers were texting while driving (odds ratio (OR)= 
23.2); reaching for an electronic device like a cell phone or two-way radio (OR= 6.7); or 
interacting with or reading a dispatch device (OR=9.9). The risk for crash exposes 
companies to liability from property damage-, injury-, or fatality-involved crashes [37], 
or costs associated with workers’ compensation [38]. 
 
Management should also be aware of what laws and regulations certain methods 
of contact would violate. If drivers are contacted via text message for delivery updates, 
that would violate the FMCSA regulation and force drivers to break the law. The Final 
Rule from the FMCSA also states that drivers cannot use the dispatch device for text 
messages while driving [212]. If drivers were required to answer their handheld cell 
phone while driving to respond to their supervisors, then that would violate the law in 
several states [70]. Yet, as I described in the second manuscript, a participant said in the 
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second manuscript, drivers could get conflicting messages from supervisors where they 
have the “[i]mplicit expectation that they use the device while driving so that they can 
respond in a timely fashion to requests from the company.”  
 
These conflicting messages would affect the Intentions and Norms aspects of the 
TPB. Drivers might not intend to violate the law and explicit company policy, but they 
would still feel pressure to do so. If drivers know that violating internal policy and law is 
the norm within an organization, it could create a climate where drivers have poor 
attitudes concerning Wills and colleagues’ safety climate factors of communications and 




 While considering the ban on texting for truck drivers, the FMCSA also received 
comments advocating for and against banning all CPWD [182]. The FMCSA 
acknowledged the existing research on CPWD and crash risk, yet stated that banning all 
cell phone use for commercial truck drivers was beyond the proposed rule-making. 
However, because of the powers delegated to the FMCSA [25], it could consider a 
handheld or hands-free cell phone ban in the future.  
 
It could be that regulating commercial truck and bus drivers was an example of 
the federal government regulating where it was easily able to do so. Other examples of 
the federal government regulating texting under its jurisdiction includes CPWD for 
federal employees [81], and train operators [213]. As described in the Introduction 
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chapter, it is easier for the federal government to regulate driver behavior in truck drivers 
than it is for it to regulate drivers of personally owned vehicles. If the DOT was to 
connect highway funding to state texting bans, as it had previously done for state drunk 
driving laws [73], such legislation would face a much more difficult path through 
Congress than simple regulation by the executive branch. In this section, I will review 
how some of the stakeholder groups already mentioned in this chapter have affected the 
previous regulatory process with an eye towards future regulations.   
 
Advocacy organizations like NETS and the ATA can also influence the rule-
making process. In John Kingdon’s analysis of the federal policy process, interest groups 
are found to more often oppose changes in the status quo and block action rather than 
promote regulation [214]. During the comment period for the FMCSA texting ban, the 
Federal Register reports that the ATA supported this ban; however, elsewhere in the 
Federal Register reporting the FMCSA’s rule-making process, the ATA resisted many of 
the regulations that the FMCSA was proposing [182]. For example, the ATA wanted 
texting from the dispatch device to be exempted from the ban, a decision that the FMCSA 
ruled against, and the ATA also felt that the fines on employers were not warranted for 
companies that already had their own texting bans [182]. During motor carrier industry 
deregulation, completed in 1980, the ATA was also initially against changes to the 
system, yet ultimately supported the final legislation that was move favorable to their 
constituents [215]. If the FMCSA was to offer future regulation on CPWD, the ATA 
would definitely be opposed to that. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
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the comments submitted to the FMCSA could be analyzed in terms of which 
organizations were for and against different components of the proposed rule.  
 
Apart from federal regulation are the state bans on texting and handheld CPWD. 
On June 19, 2013 Florida became the 41st state to ban texting while driving [70]. As 
reviewed in the Introduction, and reinforced in manuscript one, there is currently no 
evidence that state texting or CPWD bans reduce crashes or fatalities. Although state 
CPWD laws have not been shown to decrease crashes or fatalities, the exact way that the 
states enact, implement, and enforce the laws might affect the laws’ effectiveness [69].  
Amendola reviewed the Connecticut CPWD ban and enumerated many reasons why it 
had not yet been shown to be effective [165]. For example, Amendola found that unlike 
Washington, DC, which aggressively enforces its handheld cell phone ban, other states 
do not do a very good job of enforcing CPWD bans and as a result, drivers do not feel 
that the laws apply to them. In some states like Pennsylvania [76], there is a high burden 
of proof placed on the law enforcement officers when attempting to issue such a citation 
for CPWD. Requiring the officers to pass a very high burden of proof to issue a citation 
might further discourage officers from issuing CPWD citations.  
 
When NHTSA created its pilot distracted driving deterrence program in 2010 – 
2011 [80], high-visibility law enforcement was one of the pillars of the program. Shown 
to be effective in the seat-belt enforcement programs of “Click it or Ticket” [216], raising 
the profile of law enforcement and also the threat of receiving a citation, this might be 
one method for countering the perception of drivers who do not believe that the texting 
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bans apply to them [165]. Although the FMCSA acknowledged that there would be a 
period where law enforcement would have to learn best practices for enforcing the 
texting ban for commercial drivers, the agency reasoned that this should not be sufficient 
to delay enacting the rule. How well this ban is implemented and enforced in the future 
will impact its effectiveness. A complication of observing distracted driving activity in 
truck drivers is how difficult it is for officers or observes to see into these large vehicles. 
The FMCSA sought to address such a problem during an investigation of seatbelt use in 
truck drivers [217], so observing distracted driving might be able to be accomplished by 
similar methods. To observe seatbelt use in truck driver, law enforcement needed to be 
positioned on overpasses or other raised locations. Thus, enforcement of truck driver 
behavior could be more resource-intensive, but is not infeasible.  
 
In the first manuscript, I found that truck length and rural maximum speed limit 
were state-level regulations that affected distraction-involved truck crash fatality rates. 
This reflects the analysis of Neeley and Richard’s paper on the effects of state regulations 
on truck crash fatality rates [87]. Neeley and Richardson’s analysis influenced me when I 
was designing my analysis because they showed how fatality rates in trucks can be 
affected by aspects beyond policies directly related to truck drivers, including state 
highway expenditures and unemployment rates. Because of the social and monetary costs 
of the motor carrier industry, such as fatalities, pollution, and road maintenance, that are 
not completely offset by the taxes and fees levied by the states [218], states should have 
an interest in motor carrier safety. Analyses like mine and that of Neeley and Richardson 
show that states should be able to effect distracted driving motor carrier safety through 
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means other than just regulation of distracted driving. So while my analysis finds that 
states can impact distraction-involved truck crash fatality rates, the regulations whose 
aims are specifically to reduce the crash risks presented by distracted driving (i.e., CPWD 






 According to Kingdon, academics, researchers and consultants are important parts 
of the policy process that often affect the policy alternatives more so than the policy 
agenda itself [214]. In the case of the texting ban, research from the Virginia Tech 
Transportation Institute actually helped drive the agenda. As discussed throughout this 
dissertation, the VTTI study led by Rebecca Olson produced a very thorough analysis of 
crash risk for truck drivers undertaking different distracted driving activities [6]. The 
study, funded by the FMCSA, has also been heavily cited by the federal government. 
Simply referred to as “the VTTI Study,” the statistic that texting while driving increases 
crash risk by 23 times was referenced by the federal government in such locations as the 
FCC’s distracted driving information page [202], and the texting ban Final Rule in the 
Federal Register [182].  
 
Research on motor carrier regulation has previously influenced federal policy on 
truck driver safety. When the FMCSA changed its hours-of-service regulations in 2003 
[219] it directly affected an important aspect of driver safety: fatigue [220]. Recent 
analyses of the 2003 hours-of-service regulation found that drivers were not driving more 
after the increase in allowable consecutive driving time [221], and, in two studies by 
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VTTI, drivers were not experiencing increased crash risk during the longer hours-of-
service [222, 223]. By court order the FMCSA was forced to revisit the hours-of-service 
regulations [221] and in the subsequent 2011 regulatory analysis the FMCSA cited work 








 Further analysis of the FMCSA will be required to determine whether or not the 
decrease in fatality rates associated with the ban is sustained. Although I chose to follow 
the method of Wilson and Stimpson for analyzing state fatality rates [14], there are other 
regression methods available for analyzing these fatalities. Fowles and colleagues 
conducted an econometric analysis of truck crash-related fatalities in relation to cell 
phone use across a 30-year span in the U.S. [108]. Their analysis did not analyze states, 
nor consider state CPWD bans or the 2010 FMCSA ban; however, their study lays out a 
detailed method for further analysis. I also believe that further analysis using the 
naturalistic driving method found in the VTTI study would be an appropriate way to test 
the effectiveness of the ban. The VTTI studies resulted in thousands of hours of in-
vehicle video [6] of drivers that could serve as baseline for a follow-up study. Although 
this was a personnel- and resource-intensive, repeating the study could be a way to 
compare prevalence of distracted driving pre- and post-ban. 
 
 Future research will also be necessary to consider how organizations can affect 
distracted driving in their employees. In the NETS report on distracted driving, some of 
the anonymous member companies reported reserving the right to terminate workers 
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violating bans on either handheld CPWD or texting-while-driving [82]. Future analysis 
should examine the safety climate for drivers from different organizations operating 
under different CPWD bans to determine the effects of specific prohibition and 
enforcement components, expanding on the work of Wills . that did not find any 
between-organizational differences in organizational safety climate [129]. I believe that 
this could be done with either quantitative or qualitative methods. A quantitative 
approach would be to use the methods of Hickman . to naturalistically observe the 
prevalence of CPWD and examine which aspects of company policy are best for reducing 
prevalence [4]. Interviews or focus groups could also be conducted with drivers and 
management, from the same organizations and different organizations, to understand 
what both sides view as effective organizational policies for reducing driver distraction. 
 
 My third manuscript used the TPB as the conceptual framework for describing 
distracted driving behavior. Gielen and Sleet [225] reviewed behavioral health theories 
for their impact on behavior change. Their review could provide the framework for 
changing driver behavior at the individual-level (e.g., using the stages of change model) 
or at the organization- or community-level (e.g., using community mobilization) [225]. 
Due to logistical challenges, I was unable to conduct focus groups with truck drivers as 
part of my research, a method that allows for participants to comment on and accept or 
reject their peers’ reasoning on decision-making [226]. Because I relied on key informant 
interviews with driving safety experts and not drivers themselves, the qualitative analysis 








 As has been described throughout this thesis, the methods employed have 
strengths and limitations. In this section I will now review the strengths and limitations of 
the methods used in this dissertation, and describe how the limitations could be addressed 
with future research. 
 
 Using the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) database as the basis for 
Manuscript 1 produces both challenges and great opportunities in the analysis. A first 
limitation is that this database only captures crashes involving fatalities. Crashes 
involving no injuries or non-fatal injuries are much more common than fatal crashes 
[130]. The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) has 
another database, the National Automotive Sampling System’s General Estimating 
System (GES), which captures data on crashes of all severities [151]. While FARS is a 
census of all fatal crashes in a given year, GES is only a representative sample of crashes 
in the U.S. Thus, in choosing to use FARS over GES, I was trading the breadth of crash 
types found in GES for the validity of capturing every fatal crash in the U.S. during the 
study period. 
 
Although previous research has used FARS to study distraction-related crashes in 
the U.S. [14, 160], it is not without limitations. In a report for NHTSA, Ascone and 
colleagues find that both FARS and GES distraction data could be limited in their 
reliance on police reports for distraction data in crashes [151]. Furthermore, Ascone  
raise concerns about the consistency of police reporting of distractions across 
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jurisdictions. Validation of the distraction variables as described in Table 1 of Manuscript 
1 should be undertaken in the future as more studies of distracted driving rely on the 
FARS database. Ascone  describe the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation 
Survey as a resource-intense method previously used for analyzing a small sample of 
crashes [151]. A similar analysis could serve as a validation method for distraction-
involved crashes. While the validity of the distraction variables is not yet established, the 
FARS database has been so often used for other fatal crash analyses (see Chen  [162] 
and Carpenter and Pressley as two examples [227]) that it allows for comparison to the 
wider literature on motor vehicle crash fatalities in the U.S. 
 
The statistical model used in Manuscript 1 is another strength of the analysis. 
From the ANOVA, there was more between-state variation than there was within-state 
variation. Because of this clustering, a multi-level model was necessary [94]. A recent 
study of the effects of cell phone on truck crashes released in early 2013 by Fowles and 
colleagues did not employ such a mutli-level analysis [108]. Whereas the Fowles  
paper was more concerned with long-term longitudinal effects of cell phones, they did 
not explore the effects of state laws on truck crashes. This decision to analyze state laws 
did not allow for the in-depth model testing seen in the Fowles  paper [108]; 
however, analysis of truck driver fatalities from Neeley and Richardson showed the 
effects of state laws [87], and thus the multi-level approach was chosen. Finally, the 
choice of the longitudinal model allows for analysis of change within states over time. 




The selection of diesel VMTs was another choice that adds strength to Manuscript 
1. The selection of VMT for rate calculation was consistent with many other occupational 
and non-occupational transportation studies. An alternative method for calculating 
occupational fatality rates would have been to use data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) on workers in a given industry [156]. Although this would allow for 
fatality rate comparisons between industries [228], the BLS data do not have the number 
of employees in a given industry by state. Choosing diesel VMTs was another important 
selection for the analysis. The DOT publishes data on VMTs for all vehicle traffic in a 
state, but the choice of diesel VMTs allowed for the observation of occupational exposure 
for this population.  
 
Although the analysis of fatality rates using VMTs was a strength of the study 
design, Manuscript 1 did not account for other trends in distraction-related crashes or 
commercial truck crashes. Snowden and colleagues conducted one such analysis, 
examining the effects of random alcohol testing on large truck fatal crashes, using light 
truck as a comparison group [163]. To conduct such an analysis, an appropriate 
comparison group would be required. Future analyses could be conducted comparing 
truck-involved distraction fatalities to rates of all distraction-involved fatalities in the 
U.S. [14] or for all truck-involved fatalities [150].  
 
Another method for examining the impact of state laws would be an interrupted 
time series difference-in-difference approach [229]. This difference-in-difference method 
is useful in examining the effects of transportation policies on crashes and fatalities, yet it 
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requires a greater number of time points than was available in our state*year analysis 
[229, 230]. Such an analysis might be feasible in the future for states with very high 
fatality counts, such as California, Texas, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, using 
state*month as the time period of interest.  
 
 In Manuscript 1, I analyzed fatal crashes where the truck driver was killed and 
fatal crashes where any vehicle occupant in any vehicle involved in the crash was killed. 
This creates the assumption that crashes in the first group and second group are similar. 
NHTSA analyzed fatal crashes in the U.S. and found that 2/3 of crashes in which a truck 
driver was killed were single-vehicle crashes [150]. The same NHTSA report finds that 
2,790 occupants of other vehicles were killed in multi-vehicle truck-involved crashes in 
2010 compared to only 192 truck drivers who were killed in multi-vehicle truck-involved 
crashes. These data indicate that the types of crashes resulting in fatalities to truck drivers 
are different than those crashes that result in fatalities in other vehicle occupants. This 
study was not designed to analyze crash type, but future analysis of truck crashes should 
account for these differences. 
 
 In Manuscripts 2 and 3, there were strengths and limitations for both methods, in 
addition to how the methods were mixed. Although the study proposal originally 
included focus groups of IBT member drivers, logistical challenges necessitated the use 
of key informant interviews. While expert opinion has been used to understand truck 
driver safety in the past [196], the elicitation interview process for TPB studies usually is 
performed with the same population that will be surveyed [52]. The snowball sampling 
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technique also allowed me to access experts that I would not have previously known of, 
or considered for study. For example, I had met Jack Hanley of NETS at a conference 
and although he felt that he was not an appropriate study subject, he was able to direct me 
to another NETS member who was able to provide the prospective of an expert from the 
management side of driver safety. 
 
 Although interview subjects made occasional reference to owner-operators during 
the interviews, no analysis of situations unique to owner-operators was conducted [185]. 
Further analysis should examine the effects of distracted driving on owner-operators and 
consider how their work pressures affect decision-making while driving. Although 
analysis of interviews was not only limited to discussion of union drivers, the survey was 
a purely union population. Union workers receive more safety training than their non-
union counterparts and are less likely to accept hazardous working conditions [186]. It is 
possible that the survey population in Manuscript 2 and 3 have safer driving behaviors 
and better safety climate than non-union drivers in the U.S. 
 
 In Appendix 5, I describe the frequency with which drivers reported which 
vehicles they drove. As discussed in the Methods section, I believe that the samples in 
Manuscripts 2 and 3 are representative of the American truck drivers, although I had few 
variables on which to test this hypothesis. While the Census data on the American truck 
fleet provided a comprehensive picture of vehicles in the U.S., that particular series of 
reports was ceased in 2004. The annual Highway Statistics reports from the FHWA 
report on vehicle fleet composition by state, but these data are not comparable to the IBT 
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industry groups used in this analysis [97]. While previous studies of commercial truck 
drivers in the U.S. have provided demographic data on their study populations (see 
Suzuki . as an example [190]), no national demographic data were available to which 
I could compare my survey samples. Although I partnered with the IBT to conduct this 
study, I have no data indicating how representative these samples are of IBT drivers.  
 
A benefit of partnering with the IBT is that the union represents drivers across the 
U.S., giving me the potential for a nationwide sample. However, as an attempt to keep the 
data as anonymous as possible for the respondents, I did not ask in which state(s) they 
drove or lived. So while Manuscripts 2 and 3 had the potential to be a nationally-
representative sample, I regret that I did not gather information on state or at least region 
of the country from the respondents. Another limitation of the survey was that subjects 
were able to skip some pages of the survey without penalty. This led to incomplete 
answers to the TPB questions, the SCQ-MD, or both. Furthermore, the four crash and 
near crash outcomes were at the end of the survey, and thus the most commonly skipped 
items. It is possible that better organization of the survey might have produced stronger 
quantitative results.  
 
This selection of different populations resulted in a trade-off of study validity. By 
not restricting interviews to only examine the driving experiences of union members prior 
to the survey of IBT members reduces internal validity; yet, external validity is increased 
when qualitative analysis of a broader driver population is used to elucidate surveys of 
the chosen population [142]. Part of this decision about which populations to include was 
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pragmatic: I was able to access a wide number of IBT drivers online via the 
organization’s own online media, whereas contacting as large a population of non-union 
drivers would have been more difficult. Furthermore, partnering with the IBT lent 
increased legitimacy to my recruitment announcement. By posting the material on the 
IBT’s website, members would understand that the study has gone through some sort of 
vetting process by IBT leadership and that I wasn’t seeking to take advantage of them. 
 
For both Manuscripts 2 and 3, 		 relationships (the TPB, Wills ’s work 
on the SCQ-MD) were hypothesized to describe distracted driving and safe driver 
behavior. Because of the existing theoretical framework, these studies were conducted 
using what Morse refers to as a deductive framework [138]. That is, while quantitative 
and qualitative data were analyzed together in Manuscript 3, the underlying TPB 
framework drives study design and data analysis. An alternative to this method would 
have been to develop the theoretical framework  with the qualitative methods 
being complemented by the surveys. This study did not allow for the time for developing 
and pilot-testing new surveys that may have been developed from a grounded theory 
approach [127127]. Furthermore, the use of TPB and safety climate frameworks allows 
for the results of Manuscripts 2 and 3 to be placed more easily into the larger 
occupational safety climate and health behavior literatures, respectively. 
 
Conclusion
 In this dissertation, I examined the effects of state and federal policies, 
organizational safety climate, and driver behavior on distracted driving in commercial 
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truck drivers. This study will make significant contributions to the growing literature on 
distracted driving. By examining an occupational population, this study also contributes 
to the greater research on occupational health and safety in the motor carrier industry. 
While recent research on the motor carrier industry has focused on driver health and 
wellness, this dissertation is a return to examining their occupational safety for a risk 
factor that has been understudied in this population. Finally, by using a mixed methods 
approach, I expanded this methodology into new areas of occupational health and driver 
behavior. This dissertation has shown that federal policy, organizational safety climate, 
and driver decision-making are important factors that should be considered when seeking 




Appendix 1. Secondary and tertiary distractions undertaken by commercial truck drivers 
in the VTTI Study. Odds ratios and lower confidence limit (LCL) and upper confidence 






















































Appendix 4. Codebook from key informant interviews. 

























































































Appendix 5- Results of the online survey. This Appendix describes how I arrived at the 
populations for both the TPB and safety climate analyses. Answers to individual SCQ 
and TPB questions are also presented. 
 
Figure 1. The below flow-chart shows how the subjects answered the various sections of 
questions. A detailed description is given below. 


443 subjects started the survey. 440 agreed to the Informed Consent. When asked 
to describe what type of truck they drive, 79 (18%) subjects were screened out as not 
driving the appropriate type of vehicle. 361 subjects began entering demographic data on 
age, gender, driving experience, and weekly driving hours. 18 subjects dropped out of the 
study before entering demographic data, giving us 343 subjects with demographic data. 
 
Of these 343 subjects, 318 completed the questions on the TPB for texting, and 25 
did not complete this section. 135 subjects indicated that they did not use a dispatch 
device while driving, so they skipped the TPB dispatch section. 169 subjects completed 
questions on TPB and the dispatch device and 39 did not complete that section. 239 




Of the 343 subjects who completed the demographic data, 283 answered at least 
one of the 4 outcome questions; 277 responded to all 4 outcomes. The exact number of 
respondents to each outcome were as follows: 281 reported if they had ever been in a 
crash on the job; 283 reported if they had ever had a distracted driving-related crash on 
the job; 279 reported whether or not they had ever had to undertake distraction-related 
hard or emergency braking on the job; and 282 reported whether or not they had to 
swerve due to distraction while on the job. 
 
	 
Table 1 displays the results of the demographic data for the total sample of 343 
subjects that answered the demographic questions; those who completed the TPB 
sections on texting and dispatch device use (presented separately); and those who 
completed the safety climate questions. Using t-tests, all four groups reported in the table 




Gender 328male 9female 6unknown
 Mean SD Range
Age(years) 47.6 8.8 21–69
Drivingexperience(years) 22.2 10.1 1–45
Weeklydriving(hours) 47.6 11.8 6–70

TheoryofPlannedBehaviorTexting(n=277)
Gender 265male 9female 6unknown
 Mean SD MinimumMaximum
Age(years) 48.0 8.8 21–69
Drivingexperience(years) 22.8 10.1 1–45
Weeklydriving(hours) 47.6 11.6 6–70
TheoryofPlannedBehaviorDispatchdevice(n=153)
Gender 146male 5female 2unknown
 Mean SD MinimumMaximum
Age(years) 46.4 8.4 21–69
Drivingexperience(years) 21.2 9.3 1–44
Weeklydriving(hours) 47.6 11.3 6–70

Safetyclimatequestionnaire(n=239)
Gender 229male 7female 3unknown
 Mean SD MinimumMaximum
Age(years) 48.0 8.9 21–69
Drivingexperience(years) 22.7 10.1 1–45










Table 2 shows the vehicle type that respondents stated was their primary vehicle in the 
screening question at the beginning of the survey (Appendix 3). Responses are listed for 
all subjects who began the survey, the population of drivers in Manuscript 2 (SCQ), and 
the texting and dispatch device populations from Manuscript 3. A Pearson’s ² found that 
the 4 populations are statistically similar (p=0.4). 
 
Table 2. Distribution of vehicle driven by survey respondents. 
 Semi-truck Tank truck Carhaul Dump truck Package Van 
Began survey (n=358) 205 9 21 28 95 
SCQ (n=239) 145 4 15 15 60 
Texting (n=277) 166 6 16 17 72 







Table 3 shows the distribution for the answers to all the SCQ-MD questions used in the 
analysis. The mean and standard deviation of the factors are described in the safety 
climate manuscript.  






















62 41 33 33 17 20 33
Employeesareconsultedwhenchangesto
driversafetypracticesaresuggested








67 45 36 31 13 21 26
Safetyproceduresrelatingtotheuseofmotor
vehiclesarecompleteandcomprehensive





71 39 32 34 19 25 19
Safetyproblemsareopenlydiscussedbetween
employeesandmanagement/supervisors




41 36 26 50 23 21 42
Employeescandiscussimportantdriversafety
policyissues
70 57 34 26 15 11 26
Employeesareconsultedforsuggested
vehicle/driversafetyimprovements
39 30 24 29 21 30 66
Employeescanidentifyrelevantproceduresfor
eachjob





86 52 23 30 15 13 20
Timeschedulesforcompletingworkprojects
arerealistic




37 32 35 34 19 30 52
Workloadisreasonablybalanced 32 36 24 37 24 29 57
Thereareenoughemployees/driverstocarry
outtherequiredwork




30 32 22 37 29 30 59
Whendrivingemployeeshaveenoughtimeto
carryouttheirtasks




36 38 41 51 21 28 24
Managementarecommittedtodriversafety 35 36 29 46 23 27 43
Managementarecommittedtomotorvehicle
safety
44 35 33 36 26 22 43
Driversafetyiscentraltomanagements'values
andphilosophies
38 30 35 40 24 27 45
Driversafetyisseenasanimportantpartof
fleetmanagementinthisorganization




Table 4 shows the distribution for all the answers to the TPB questions for texting-while-












232 29 8 6 1 0 1
Textingonthejobis
verybad/verygood


































9 2 5 9 8 25 219

Table 5 shows the distribution for all the answers to the TPB questions for reading the 
dispatch device while driving on the job. 153 subjects completed this section. 
 
Table 5.  
 ResponseonLikertscale








101 12 6 17 9 4 4
Readingthedispatchdeviceon
thejobisverybad/verygood



































Appendix 6. Additional quantitative results from Manuscript 3. 
 
Distribution of scores for the dispatch device use TPB constructs in Manuscript 3. 











































































Univariate regression results. 
 
Univariate regression of demographic factors and the TPB components on crash or near 
crash for texting while driving or reading the dispatch device. Odds ratios (ORs) are 
expressed with subjects who never experienced a given event as the baseline. Bold ORs 




a crash on the 
job 
Ever experience a 
distraction-related 




on the job 
Ever had to 
swerve while 
distracted on the 
job 
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Gender* 0.10 0.01-0.76 2.38 0.57-9.87 0.93 0.24-3.55 2.67 0.65-10.92
Age 1.02 0.99-1.04 1.06 1.02-1.10 0.99 0.96-1.02 1.02 0.99-1.05 
Driving experience 1.02 1.00-1.05 1.05 1.01-1.08 1.00 0.98-1.02 1.01 0.99-1.04 
Weekly driving 1.00 0.98-1.02 1.02 0.99-1.05 0.98 0.96-1.00 1.00 0.98-1.02 
Texting Attitudes 1.02 0.60-1.76 0.55 0.25-1.20 1.26 0.75-2.16 1.46 0.86-2.49 
Texting Norms 1.59 0.98-2.57 1.22 0.66-2.28 1.37 0.85-2.21 1.88 1.16-3.05 
Texting PBC 1.36 0.81-2.30 0.61 0.30-1.27 2.32 1.37-3.92 2.03 1.20-3.41 
Texting Intentions 1.11 0.62-1.99 0.82 0.37-1.81 2.71 1.48-4.97 2.81 1.54-5.13 




Univariate regression of demographic factors and the TPB components on crash or near 
crash for dispatch device use while driving or reading the dispatch device. Odds ratios 
(ORs) are expressed with subjects who never experienced a given event as the baseline. 
The values for categorical Norms and Attitudes variables are listed for each level. Bold 

























OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Gender* 
 
























































oppose use and 
strong motivation to 























No motivation to 
comply regardless of 























* Odds ratios for Gender are odds for women divided by odds for men.  
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   University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
   Urbana, IL 
2001   Dean’s List, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 
   University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
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   Urbana, IL 
 
Professional/Continuing Education 
2009   Human Research Curriculum 
   Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative 
   University of Miami 
   Miami, FL 
2007 – 2009  HIPAA- Security 101: Introduction to HIPAA Security 
   Military Health Sciences (online) 
2007   Introduction to GIS using Arcview® 9.2 
   Geographic Information Systems Branch, DCSIM 
   Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 
 
Security Clearance 
Secret level government security clearance granted through USACHPPM (now 
USAIPH), October 29, 2008. 
 
Manuscript Peer Reviewer 
2012  )	L
!		, Thieme 












ERC Pilot Project Training Award ; Environmental Research Center for Occupational 
Safety and Health, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, Bloomberg School of 







ERC Pilot Project Training Award; Environmental Research Center for Occupational 
Safety and Health, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, Bloomberg School of 
Public Health, Johns Hopkins University- $4,000.00. 
2012 – 2013 
 
Peer Reviewed Publications 
1) Swedler DI, Kercher C, Simmons MM, Pollack KM. Occupational homicide of 
law enforcement officers in the U.S., 1996 – 2010. Inj Prev, ", 2013. 
 
2) Kercher C, Swedler DI, Pollack KM, Webster DW. Homicides of law 





3) Tiesman HM, Swedler DI, Srinivas K, Pollack KM. Fatal occupational injuries 
among U.S. law enforcement officers: A comparison of national surveillance 
systems. Am J Ind Med, 56(6): 693-700, 2013. 
 
4) Swedler DI, Bowman SM, Baker SP. Gender and age differences among teen 
drivers in fatal crashes. Ann Adv Automot Med, 56, 97-108, 2012 
 
5) Galvangno S, Thomas S, Baker S, Swedler D, Stephens C, Floccare D, Provonost 
P, Haut E. Helicopter emergency medical services for adults with major trauma. 
Cochrane Review (protocol stage) Published Online: August, 2011. 
 
6) Knapik JJ, Grier T, Spiess A, Swedler DI, Hauret KG, Graham B, Yoder J, Jones 
BH. Injury Rates and Injury Risk Factors Among Federal Bureau of Investigation 
New Agent Trainees.  Biomed Centr Public Health, 11:920-935, 2011. 
 
7) Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, Williams KW, Grier TL, Jones BH. Risk factors for 
medical discharge from US Army basic combat training. Milit Med, 176(10): 
1104-1110, 2011  
 
8) Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Swedler DI, Grier T, Hauret KG, Yoder J, Jones BH. 
Retrospective examination of injuries and physical fitness during Federal Bureau 
of Investigation New Agent Training. J Occup Med Toxicol, 6(1): 26, 2011. 
 
9) Grier T, Knapik JJ, Swedler DI, Jones BH. Footwear in the United States Army 
Band: Injury incidence and risk factors associated with foot pain. Foot (Edinb), 
21(2): 60-65, 2011. 
 
10)Knapik JJ, Trone DW, Swedler DI, Villasenor A, Brockelman T, Schmied E, 
Bullock SH, Han P, Jones BH. Injury reduction effectiveness of assigning running 
shoes based on plantar shape in Marine Corps basic training. Am J Sports Med, 
38(9): 1759-1767, 2011. 
 
11)Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, Grier TL, Jones BH. Validity of plantar surface visual 
assessment as an estimate of foot arch height. Med Sci Sport Exerc, 42(2): 375-
380, 2010. 
 
12)Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Swedler DI, Grier T, Darakjy SS, Jones BH. Systematic 
review of the parachute ankle brace: injury reduction and cost-effectiveness. Am J 
Prev Med, 38(s1): s182-s188, 2010.
 
13)Knapik JJ, Brosch LC, Venuto M, Swedler DI, Bullock SH, Gaines LS, Murphy 
RJ, Tchandja J, Jones BH.  Effect on Injuries of Assigning Shoes Based on Foot 
Shape in Air Force Basic Training. Am J Prev Med, 38(s1): s197-s211, 2010. 
 
14)Knapik JJ, Swedler DI, Grier TL, Hauret KG, Bullock SH, Williams KW, 
Darakjy SS, Lester ME, Tobler SK, Jones BH.  Injury reduction effectiveness of 
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23(3):685-697, 2009. 
 
15)Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Swedler D, Grier T, Darakjy S, Amoroso P, Jones BH. 
Injury Risk Factors in Parachuting and Acceptability of the Parachute Ankle 
Brace. Aviat Space Environ Med, 79 (7): 689-694, 2008. 
 
16)Knapik JJ, Darakjy S, Swedler D, Manning F, Hauret KG, Amoroso P, Jones BH. 
Parachute Ankle Brace and Extrinsic Injury Risk Factors during Parachuting. 
Aviat Space Environ Med, 79 (4): 408-415, 2008. 
 
Technical/Government Reports 
1) Grier T, Knapik JJ, Swedler D, Jones BH. Influence of a Viseolastic Insole on 
Foot, Knee and Back Pain among Members of the United States Army Band. US 
Army Public Health Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Technical 
Report No. 12-HF-97G010-09, 2010.  
 
2) Knapik JJ, Grier T, Spiess A, Swedler DI, Hauret KG, Graham B, Jones BH. 
Prospective Investigation of Injury Rates and Injury Risk Factors among Federal 
Bureau of Investigation New Agent Trainees, Quantico, Virginia, 2009-2010. US 
Army Public Health Command (Prov), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Technical 
Report 12-HF-97HRF1A-10, 2010. 
 
3) Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Swedler D, Grier T, Hauret KG, Yoder J, Jones BH.  
Retrospective Investigation of Injury Rates and Physical Fitness among Federal 
Bureau of Investigation New Agent Trainees, Quantico Virginia, 1999-2008.  US 
Army Public Health Command (Prov), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Technical 
Report No. 12-HF-97HRF1-09, 2010. 
 
4) Grier T, Knapik JJ, Swedler D, Spiess A, Jones BH. Injury prevention 
effectiveness of modifications of shoe type on injuries and risk factors associated 
with pain and discomfort in the US Army Band 2007-2008. U.S. Army Center for 
Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 
USACHPPM Report No. 12-HF-05WC-07, 2009. 
 
5) Knapik JJ, Trone DW, Swedler DI, Bockelman T, Villasenor A, Schmied E, 
Bullock S, Han P, Jones BH.  Injury reduction effectiveness of assigning running 
shoes based on plantar shape in Marine Corps Basic Training, San Diego, CA, 
and Parris Island, SC March-October 2007.  U.S. Army Center for Health 
Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground MD; 
USACHPPM Report No. 12-HF-05SBA-07C, 2009. 
 
6) Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Grier TL, Lester ME, Sharp MA, Tobler SK, Swedler DI, 
Jones BH. Injuries and Physical Fitness Before and After Deployments of the 10th 
Mountain Division to Afghanistan and the 1st Cavalry Division to Iraq, September 
2005 – October 2008. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive 
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Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; USACHPPM Report No. 12-HF-
05SR-05, 2009. 
 
7) Knapik JJ, Brosch LC, Venuto M, Swedler D, Bullock SH, Gaines L, Murphy R, 
Canada S, Hoedebecke E, Tobler S, Tchandja J, Jones BH. Injury Reduction 
Effectiveness of Prescribing Running Shoes Based on Foot Shape in Air Force 
Basic Military Training. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative 
Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; USACHPPM Report No. 12-MA-
05SBA-08A, 2008. 
 
8) Knapik JJ, Swedler D, Grier T, Hauret KG, Bullock SH, Williams K, Darakjy S, 
Lester M, Tobler S, Clemmons N, Jones BH. Injury Reduction Effectiveness of 
Prescribing Running Shoes Based on Foot Shape in Basic Combat Training. US 
Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine, APG, MD; 
USACHPPM Report No. 12-MA-05SB-08, 2008. 
 
9) Knapik J, Spiess A, Darakjy S, Grier T, Manning F, Livingston E, Swedler D, 
Amoroso P, Jones BH. A Survey of Parachute Ankle Brace Breakages. US Army 
Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, MD. USACHPPM Report No. 12-MA01Q2A-08. 2008. 
 
10)Knapik JJ, Darakjy S, Swedler D, Manning F, Hauret KG, Amoroso P, Jones BH. 
The Parachute Ankle Brace: Entanglements and Injuries after Controlling for 
Extrinsic Risk Factors. U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative 
Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; USACHPPM Report No. 12-
MA01Q2-07, 2007. 
 
11)Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Darakjy S, Grier T, Manning F, Livingston E, Swedler D, 
Amoroso P, Jones BH. Risk Factors for Parachute Injuries and Airborne Student 
Operations on the parachute Ankle Brace. U.S. Army Center for Health 
Promotion and Preventative Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 
USACHPPM Report No. 12-MA-01Q2-08B, 2007. 
 
12)Cook County Department of Public Health. West Nile Virus Prevention and 
Response Plan. Ed, Swedler, D, 3rd Edition, 2005. 
 
Conference Presentations 
1) Roberts ET, DuGoff EH, Canudas-Romo V, Heins S, Swedler D, Feldman D, 
Wegner S, Castillo RC. Clinical practice guidelines and claims data: “Making the 
best of bad data.” June 25, 2013. Academy Health, Annual Research Meeting, 
Balimore, MD 
 
2) Swedler DI, Bowman SM, Baker SP. Gender and age differences among teen 
drivers in fatal crashes. October 15, 2012. Association for the Advancement of 




3) Weeks J, Swedler D, Pollack KM, Agnew J. Risk factors for fatalities in small 
underground coal mines in the U.S. October 3, 2012. Safety 2012 (World Injury 
Conference), Wellington, New Zeleand. 
 
4) Swedler DI, Simmons MM, Kercher C, Pollack KM. Occupational homicide of 
law enforcement officers in the United States, 1996-2009. November 2, 2011. 
American Public Health Association, Washington, DC. 
 
5) Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Swedler D, Grier T, Hauret K, Yoder J, Jones BH. 
Association between injuries and physical fitness among Federal Bureau of 
Investigation New Agent Trainees. June 3, 2011. American College of Sports 
Medicine, Denver, CO. 
 
6) Grier T, Swedler D, Jones BH. Effect of Body Mass Index and Aerobic Fitness 
on Injury Risks in U.S. Army Trainees. June 1, 2011. American College of Sports 
Medicine, Denver, CO (poster). 
 
7) Grier T, Knapik JJ, Swedler D, Jones BH. Association of fitness and injuries in 
military basic training. June 3, 2010. American College of Sports Medicine, 
Baltimore, MD (poster). 
 
8) Swedler DI, Knapik JJ. Historical analysis of injury risk factors in U.S. Army 
basic combat training. August 20, 2009. Force Health Protection Conference, 
Albuquerque, NM. 
 
9) Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, FASCM, Grier TL, Lester M, Williams KW, Bullock SH, 
Jones BH, FASCM. Longitudinal Foot Arch and Risk of Injury in US Army Basic 
Combat Training. May 30, 2009. American College of Sports Medicine, Seattle, 
WA (poster). 
 
10)Knapik JJ, FASCM, Swedler DI, Grier TL, Bullock SH, Williams KW, Darakjy 
S, Lester ME, Jones BH, FASCM. Injury Reduction Effectiveness of Selecting 
Running Shoes Based on Plantar Shape. May 28, 2009. American College of 
Sports Medicine, Seattle, WA. 
 
11)Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, Williams K, Bullock SH, Darakjy S, Grier T, Jones BH. 
Risk Factors Associated with Medical Discharges from United States Army Basic 
Combat Training. Force Health Protection Conference. August 15, 2008. 
Albuquerque, NM.  
 
12)Grier T, Knapik JJ, Swedler D, Hauret KG, Williams K, Bullock SH, Darakjy S, 
Lester M, Clemmons N, Jones BH. Effects of Age and Smoking Prior to Basic 
Combat Training (BCT) on Initial Fitness Levels on Entry to BCT. August 14, 




13)Knapik JJ, Swedler DI, Grier T, Hauret KG, Williams K, Bullock SH, Darakjy S, 
Lester M, Clemmons N, Brown J, Jones BH. Injury Risk in Basic Combat 
Training Following Prescription of Athletic Shoes On the Basis of Plantar Foot 
Surface Shape. Force Health Protection Conference. August 13, 2008. 
Albuquerque, NM (poster). 
 
14)Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, Hauret KG, Bullock SH, Williams K, Lester M, Darakjy 
S, Grier T, Clemmons N, Brown J, Jones BH. Validity of Visual Assessment of 
the Plantar Surface as an Estimate of Foot Arch Height. May 30, 2008, American 
College of Sports Medicine, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
15)Knapik JJ, FASCM, Darakjy S, Swedler D, Hauret KG, Amoroso P, Jones BH, 
FACSM. Injury Prevention Effectiveness of the Parachute Ankle Brace after 
Controlling for Extrinsic Risk Factors. May 29, 2008. American College of Sports 
Medicine, Indianapolis, IN (poster). 
 
16)Swedler D. Monitoring Aseptic Meningitis as Advanced Surveillance for West 
Nile Virus in Humans in Cook County (IL). October 31, 2005. University of 
Michigan School of Public Health, Ann Arbor, MI (poster). 
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1) Roberts ET, DuGoff EH, Canudas-Romo V, Heins S, Swedler D, Feldman D, 
Wegner S, Castillo RC. Clinical practice guidelines and claims data: “Making the 
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4) Knapik JJ, Spiess A, Swedler D, Grier T, Hauret K, Yoder J, Jones BH.  
Association between injuries and physical fitness among Federal Bureau of 
Investigation New Agent Trainees. Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 
43 (5): S67, 2011. 
 
5) Grier T, Swedler D, Jones BH. Effect of Body Mass Index and Aerobic Fitness 
on Injury Risks in U.S. Army Trainees.  Medicine and Science in Sports and 
Exercise 43 (5): S251, 2011. 
 
6) Grier T, Knapik JJ, Swedler D, Jones BH. Association of fitness and injuries in 




7) Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, FASCM, Grier TL, Lester M, Williams KW, Bullock SH, 
Jones BH, FASCM. Longitudinal Foot Arch and Risk of Injury in US Army Basic 
Combat Training. Med Sci Sports Exerc, 41(5): S575, 2009. 
 
8) Knapik JJ, FASCM, Swedler DI, Grier TL, Bullock SH, Williams KW, Darakjy 
S, Lester ME, Jones BH, FASCM. Injury Reduction Effectiveness of Selecting 
Running Shoes Based on Plantar Shape. Med Sci Sports Exerc, 41(5): S73, 2009. 
 
9) Swedler DI, Knapik JJ, FASCM, Hauret KG, Bullock SH, Williams K, Lester M, 
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Guest Lectures 
1) Mixed Methods Interest Group. “A Mixed Methods Examination of Distracted 
Driving in Commercial Truck Drivers.” Dave Swedler, MPH. Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health. Baltimore, MD, April 11, 2013. 
 
2) Public Health Grand Rounds. “Multi-tasking Behind the Wheel: New Hazards 
and Public Health Solutions.” David I. Swedler, MPH, Meg Gobrecht Miller. 
Mid-Atlantic Public Health Training Center. Baltimore, MD, March 20, 2013. 
 
3) Graduate Seminar in Injury Research and Policy. “Fatalities in Crashes Involving 
Distracted Driving in Truck Drivers in the United States, 2000 – 2010.” Dave
Swedler, MPH. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, February 11, 
2013. 
 
4) Graduate Seminar in Injury Research and Policy. “Hot Topics in Doctoral 
Research.” Michael Kim, MPH and David Swedler, MPH. Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, February 21, 2012. 
 
Popular/Magazine Articles 
       1)  Hauret K and Swedler D. All Gain, No Pain. (*. v3: 8-9, April 2009. 
 
Letters to the Editor 
1) “Try to prevent the worst from happening.” David Swedler. 	A. 
January 10, 2010. 
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MPH Capstone Thesis 
Analysis of the 2005 West Nile virus outbreak in suburban Cook County, IL. University 




Relation of the vector of Lyme disease, )-
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, to the presence of 	"	. University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Life Sciences, Urbana, IL. May 2004. 
 
Preliminary Oral Examination 
Completed February 23, 2012 
Faculty Committee: Andrea Gielen (Chair), Karen Bandeen-Roche, Jacqueline Agnew, 
Stephen Bowman, Keshia M. Pollack (Mentor) 
 
 
